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Opinions – 6/27/13: Maryland Court of Special Appeals

Civil Procedure

Statute of Repose 

BOTTOM LINE: Plaintiff’s asbestos-related claims were barred by the Statute of Repose because defendant was not in actual possession and control of the property where plaintiff worked when the injury occurred.

CASE: Burns v. Bechtel Corp., No. 427, Sept. Term, 2012 (filed May 30, 2013) (Judges Zarnoch, MATRICCIANI & Thieme (retired, specially assigned)). Record Fax No. 13-0530-00, 12 pages.

FACTS: Robert Burns worked from 1949 to 1986 as a roving maintenance employee for the Potomac Electric Power Company (PEPCO). During his employment, PEPCO hired Bechtel Corp. as its general contractor to perform construction projects at its various power stations. Bechtel was responsible for each project’s design, specifications, and construction. The designs specified the use of asbestos insulation, to which Burns was exposed.

Burns was diagnosed with mesothelioma in August of 2009 and sued Bechtel and others involved in the construction projects. Bechtel moved for summary judgment, which the court granted.

Burns appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed.

LAW: CJ §5-108 provides repose for certain defendants from claims of “wrongful death, personal injury, or injury to real or personal property resulting from the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property.” Mrs. Burns argued Bechtel was excluded from repose by CJ §5-108(d)(2)(i) because the firm was “in actual possession and control of the property as owner, tenant, or otherwise when the injury occurred.”

Taken together, the plain meaning of the words “possession,” and the principle of ejusdem generis as applied to the examples “owner” and “tenant” listed in (d)(2)(i), imply that this subsection requires not only “control” but also some proprietary interest in the liable premises. According to the relevant construction contracts between Bechtel and PEPCO, Bechtel exercised “complete control of the project” at each location, not control of the premises themselves. Bechtel’s rights were thus limited to the scope of its contractual duties to perform construction work; the contracts did not give Bechtel a possessory or proprietary interest in PEPCO’s properties.

Further, the language and construction of subsection (d)(2)(i) mirrors the common-law principle of strict premises liability for abnormally dangerous activities. This common law liability requires “that the defendant be the owner, tenant or an occupier of the land in the sense that his occupancy is possession taken for the purpose of exercising control of the land.” Toy v. Atl. Gulf & Pac. Co., 176 Md. 197, 213 (1939). The Court of Appeals “has refused to extend the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine to instances in which the alleged tortfeasor is not an owner or occupier of land.” Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 304 Md. 124, 133 (1985).

Furthermore, by the express terms of §5-108(e), “[a] cause of action for an injury described in this section accrues when the injury or damage occurs.” The Statute of Repose incorporates the common law discovery rule of accrual: “[T]he language of present subsection (e), equating accrual with ‘when the injury or damage occurs,’ means when the injury or damage is discovered.” Hilliard & Bartko Joint Venture v. Fedco Sys., Inc., 309 Md. 147, 162 (1987). Mr. Burns’ injuries were discovered in 2009, thirty-eight years after Bechtel relinquished whatever control it had over the PEPCO sites in dispute.

Thus, Bechtel was not in actual possession and control of the PEPCO property when the injury occurred, and CJ §5-108(d)(2)(i) does not exclude it from the general statute of repose.

COMMENTARY: As originally enacted, CJ §5-108(a) did not specify whether, for its limited purposes, “improvements” entitled to repose included the component parts that would later become those improvements. Subsection (a) also did not specify a type of defendant entitled to repose. The General Assembly added subsection (b), which created a more favorable ten-year statute of repose for architects and professional engineers only. Rose v. Fox Pool Corp., 335 Md. 351, 366-67 (1994). CJ §5-108 was amended again so that repose does not extend to “a manufacturer or supplier for damages for personal injury or death caused by asbestos or a product that contains asbestos, [if] the injury or death results from exposure to asbestos dust or fibers which are shed or emitted prior to or in the course of the affixation, application, or installation of the asbestos or the product that contains asbestos to an improvement to real property[.]” Rose, 335 Md. at 367-70; CJ §5-108(d)(2)(ii).

The intent of this amendment was to create an exception to the Statute of Repose. Therefore, those within its ambit previously enjoyed repose under subsection (a). Stated differently, if it was necessary to enact this subsection and thereby remove from the statute of repose harm caused by asbestos “shed or emitted prior to or in the course of the affixation, application, or installation of” an improvement, then it is because such harm had previously fallen within the general repose of subsection (a).

Criminal Procedure

Bail bond 

BOTTOM LINE: The surety was entitled to remission of some portion of the penalty sum of the bond when the defendant was produced in court after the 90/180 day period.

CASE: Financial Casualty Insurance Company v. State, No. 1400, Sept. Term, 2011 (filed June 6, 2013) (Judges Eyler, D., Hotten & KENNEY (retired, specially assigned)). RecordFax No. 13-0606-00, 17 pages.

FACTS: On March 3, 2009, George Spencer was charged by criminal information with various narcotics offenses. Bail was set at $25,000, and Spencer was “released from commitment” when Financial Casualty Insurance Company posted a bond in that amount.

Spencer did not appear for trial on October 15, 2009. The next day, October 16, 2009, a warrant was issued for Spencer’s arrest. An undated letter from the court was sent to the bondsman, stating that as surety for Spencer, he had have 90 days (14th day of January, 2010) to satisfy this forfeiture by either producing Spencer in court, or by paying the penalty sum on the bond.

The record further indicated that a notice of recorded judgment in the amount of $25,000 “plus interests and costs” was entered on March 31, 2010 against Spencer and Financial Casualty. The docket entry for May 27, 2010 reflects a “Forfeiture of $25,000.00.”

On February 7, 2011, writs of habeas corpus were sent from the court to the bondsman and the Warden of the Baltimore City Detention Center, commanding them to have Spencer before the court on March 7, 2011. Spencer not brought from Balto City jail on that day and the case was reset for April 7, 2011. Writs were also sent on March 14, 2011, commanding Spencer’s presence on April 7, 2011. A criminal postponement hearing request form, dated April 7, 2011, states Spencer’s location as “city jail,” and the case was reset to June 2, 2011.

The bench warrant stated that Spencer was at the Baltimore County Detention Center. On May 5, 2011, a writ of habeas corpus was sent to the Baltimore County Bureau of Corrections commanding Spencer’s appearance on June 2, 2011. On August 22, 2011, Spencer pleaded guilty to the manufacture and distribution of narcotics; the other charges against him were nolle prossed. He was sentenced to 10 years incarceration, “suspend all but time served.”

On June 9, 2011, 4 Aces Bail Bonds, Inc., “on behalf of” Financial Casualty, filed a petition for remission with the circuit court, citing CP §5-208. The circuit court denied the petition.

Financial Casualty appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which reversed.

LAW: A bail bond is “a written obligation of a defendant, with or without a surety or collateral security, conditioned on the appearance of the defendant” before the court “as required and providing for the payment of a penalty sum according to its terms,” Rule 4-217(b)(1), when “the defendant fails to well and truly make his appearance before the court and to answer to the charges.” Allegheny Mut. Casualty Co. v. State, 35 Md. App. 55, 57 (1977). With the posting of the bond, “the principal is released from the custody of officers of the law and is considered as being in the custody of a surety of his own selection, whose duty is to assure the principal’s subsequent appearance” before the court. Tyler v. Capitol Indem. Ins. Co., 206 Md. 129, 134 (1955).

“If the accused does not appear the bail may be forfeited, not as a punishment to the surety or to enrich the Treasury of the State[.]” Irwin v. State, 17 Md. App. 518, 524 (1973). Rather, the threat of forfeiture is an incentive to the surety to ensure the accused’s timely presence at trial. Allegheny Mut. Casualty Co., 35 Md. App. at 58. In the event of forfeiture, the surety’s incentive is redirected from avoiding forfeiture to seeking the “[r]emission of the forfeiture” by returning the absconding defendant to the jurisdiction of the court. Allegheny Mut. Casualty Co. v. State, 234 Md. 278, 284 (1964). Without the possibility of remission, “there would be no inducement to the [surety] to have the defendant arrested and brought to justice.” Id.

CP §5-208 and Rule 4-217 “must be read together.” Allegheny Mut. Ins. Co. v. State, 50 Md. App. 169, 172 (1981). As such, when “a defendant fails to appear as required, the court shall order forfeiture of the bail bond and issuance of a warrant for the defendant’s arrest.” Rule 4-217(i)(1); see also CP §5-208(b)(2)(i). The surety has, however, 90 “or, for good cause shown, 180 days to return the defendant before requiring the payment of any forfeiture of bail or collateral[.]” CP §5-208(b)(2)(i).

More specifically, the Rule provides: “Within 90 days from the date the defendant fails to appear, which time the court may extend to 180 days upon good cause shown, a surety shall satisfy any order of forfeiture, either by producing the defendant in court or by paying the penalty sum of the bond. If the defendant is produced within such time by the State, the court shall require the surety to pay the expenses of the State in producing the defendant and shall treat the order of the forfeiture satisfied with respect to the remainder of the penalty sum.” Rule 4-217(i)(3); see also Prof’l Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 185 Md. App. 226, 230 (2009).

If the forfeiture order is not satisfied during the 90/180 day period, an order of forfeiture shall be entered and recorded as a judgment against the defendant and the surety in the amount of the penalty sum in addition to interest and costs. See Rule 4-217(i)(4).

When, as here, the defendant is produced in court after the 90/180 day period, “the surety may apply for the refund of any penalty sum paid in satisfaction of the forfeiture less any expenses permitted by law.” Rule 4-217(i)(5). In that event, the court “shall…strike out a forfeiture of bail or collateral and deduct only the actual expense incurred for the defendant’s arrest, apprehension, or surrender.” CP §5-208(b)(2). If, on the other hand, “the penalty sum has not been paid, the court, on application of the surety and payment of any expenses permitted by law, shall” set aside the judgment. Rule 4-217(i)(5).

In Allegheny Mut. Ins. Co. v. State, 50 Md. App. 169 (1981), the Court of Special Appeals interpreted art. 27, §616½(d)(1) of the Maryland Code — a statutory predecessor to §5-208 — which provided: “Any court exercising criminal jurisdiction shall strike out a forfeiture of bail or collateral where the defendant can show reasonable grounds for his nonappearance. However the court shall allow a surety 90 days, or for good cause shown, 180 days from the date of failure to appear to produce the defendant in court before requiring the payment of any forfeiture of bail or collateral. The court shall strike out a forfeiture of bail or collateral deducting only the actual expense incurred for the defendant’s arrest, apprehension, or surrender if the defendant is produced in court and if the arrest, apprehension, or surrender occurs more than 90 days after the defendant’s failure to appear, or at the termination of the period allowed by the court to produce the defendant.”

The Court commented: “The third sentence of the statute…contains the legislative mandate that the court shall strike forfeiture if a defendant is produced in court more than 90 days after his initial ‘failure to appear.’ Thus, the way the statute is phrased, if the surrender to the court of the defendant occurs…after the 90 day period, the court has no discretion to exercise, and it must strike the forfeiture.” Id. at 173.

Based on the then-applicable statute, rule, and case law, the court could not refuse remission of some portion of the penalty sum when Spencer was produced after the 90/180 day period. Whether the defendant is produced through the efforts of the State, the surety, or the voluntary act of the defendant, the surety is entitled to a refund of the penalty sum less any expenses permitted by law.

On remand, the court should determine what, if any, “actual expense [was] incurred for [Spencer’s] arrest, apprehension, or surrender,” CP §5-208(b)(2)(ii), and remit the penalty sum less that amount.

COMMENTARY: Had this case been decided under the revised statute and the revised rule, the surety would not have been entitled to a refund. Under the revised scheme, when a defendant is returned to the jurisdiction of the court after the 90/180 day period, a refund is only appropriate if the penalty sum was paid during the 90/180 day period. Here, bail was forfeited on October 15, 2009, and the surety was given until January 14, 2010, to satisfy the forfeiture by either producing Spencer or paying the penalty sum on the bond. According to the petition for remission, the $25,000 judgment entered on March 31, 2010, was not paid until May 31, 2010.

Criminal Procedure

Search and seizure 

BOTTOM LINE: The defendant’s landlord had apparent authority to consent to officers’ search of leased premises, where the officers reasonably relied on the landlord’s statements that the tenant had abandoned the premises, the lease had expired, and the landlord had taken possession of premises.

CASE: Frobouck v. State, No. 2061, Sept. Term, 2011 (filed June 6, 2013) (Judges Meredith, Watts & KENNEY (retired, specially assigned)). RecordFax No. 13-0606-01, 23 pages.

FACTS: Scott Mapes owned a shopping plaza in Maugansville, Md. Mapes entered into a commercial lease with Chad Frobouck. Under the terms of the agreement, Frobouck was to lease property located at 18020 Maugans Avenue from April 15, 2009 through April 30, 2010. The property was to be used for Frobouck’s business. The lease was for a period of one year, following which the rental would be month-to-month. Rent was due on the first day of each month, and non-payment of rent for a period of five days past the first day of the month would constitute an event of default. The lease agreement further provided that upon the occurrence of any event of default, a party could at any time thereafter give written notice to the other specifying such event of default and stating that the lease would expire on the date specified in such notice. In addition, the lease agreement provided that the landlord would have access to the property during the tenant’s regular business hours for the purpose of inspecting the property and making repairs.

Mapes did not receive a rent payment from Frobouck on August 1, 2010. On August 3, he left voicemail messages on Frobouck’s cell phone and on the cell phone of Frobouck’s business partner regarding the past-due payment. Mapes called both numbers again a few days later to find that both phone lines had been disconnected. Mapes emailed Frobouck and his business partner and also asked one of the other tenants if anyone had seen Frobouck’s vehicle. The tenant told Mapes that no one had seen Frobouck’s car.

Mapes did not receive any payment or communications from Frobouck or his partner. On August 13, Mapes, believing the lease had “expired” and that he was in possession of the property, attempted to enter the property. Discovering that the lock had been changed, he “drilled” the lock and entered the property to find the interior in disarray. Once inside, Mapes observed a “lots of pot,” and called the police.

Sheriff’s Deputy Matthew Bragunier responded to the call. After Mapes invited Deputy Bragunier inside to view the marijuana, the deputy called for backup. Agent Bryan Glines of the Narcotics Task Force (“NTF”) later arrived. Mapes immediately consented to the officers’ request to enter the property and allowed them access to the premises. He explained to the officers that the tenant had left and that he had taken possession of the property. Mapes signed a consent form after the second officer arrived.

Deputy Bragunier later testified that when he responded to Mapes’s call, the door to the property was already open, and Mapes was fidgeting with the locks. From outside the property, Deputy Bragunier did not see any contraband, but he noticed an overwhelming scent of unburnt marijuana. According to Deputy Bragunier, Mapes identified himself as the landlord, the owner of the strip mall, and invited the deputy onto the property. When they crossed the threshold of the property, Deputy Braguiner noticed buckets filled with potting soil and broken stems. As he proceeded down the hallway, he looked into a second room and saw numerous sapling marijuana plants. At that point, he exited the premises and contacted NTF. Agent Glines and his supervising sergeant, Sergeant Kerns, responded. Deputy Bragunier told the officers that he had entered the property and seen what he believed to be marijuana plants. Agent Glines called an attorney, who advised him to have Mapes sign a consent-to-search form.

Based on evidence discovered by Glines, Frobouck was charged with manufacturing marijuana. Frobouck moved to suppress the evidence discovered by the officers. The motions court denied the motion and Frobouck was convicted of manufacturing marijuana.

Frobouck appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed.

LAW: The Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is subject to specifically established and well-delineated exceptions, one of which is a search conducted pursuant to consent. Authority to consent to a search requires a considered judgment of both factual circumstances and legal issues, that is, the “totality of the circumstances.” Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 334 (2006). The consent of the owner of the property searched (actual authority) may serve to validate a property search. State v. Rowlett, 159 Md. App. 386, 395 (2004). Generally speaking, a landlord cannot consent to the search of his tenant’s property when the lease is still valid. See Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616 (1961). However, the consent of a third party having either “common” or “apparent” authority over the property may also serve to validate a property search. Rowlett, 159 Md. App. at 395.

Here, while Mapes did not provide written consent for the search until after Bragunier had already entered the property, Mapes testified that he immediately consented to the officers’ entry onto the property and “allowed” them access to the premises. Moreover, Mapes testified that he believed Frobouck had abandoned the leased premises, and he told the officers that Frobouck had left and that he, Mapes, had taken possession of the property. Mapes told Agent Glines that the lease had expired. Finally, the door to the property was wide open when the officers arrived, and they did not know that Frobouck had drilled the locks. There was no indication that a tenant was still occupying the premises.

Even if Mapes lacked actual authority to consent to a search of the property, the officers acted reasonably in relying on Mapes’ representations that he had rightfully taken possession of the property and could therefore grant the officers valid consent to enter. Moreover, Frobouck did not point out any “surrounding circumstances” that would require the officers to make further inquiry into Mapes’ authority to consent. Given that Mapes had represented to the officers that the lease had expired and he had retaken possession of the property, the officers’ reliance on Mapes’ consent was reasonable. Therefore, the motions court properly denied Frobouck’s motion to suppress based on Mapes’ apparent authority to consent to the officers’ entry into the premises.

Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed.

COMMENTARY: Frobouck additionally contended that the trial court improperly admitted prejudicial hearsay in the form of statements by Deputy Bragunier and Agent Glines that there was a “marijuana grow” in the leased premises. Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. A statement that is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted is not hearsay and it will not be excluded under Maryland Rule of Criminal Procedure 5-802. Stoddard v. State, 389 Md. 681, 689 (2005).

In the present case, the objected-to statements of Deputy Bragunier and Agent Glines were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted (i.e., that there was a “marijuana grow”). Instead, these statements were introduced to explain briefly what had brought the officers to the scene in the first place. In addition, these objected-to statements were cumulative to other statements which were not objected to. Thus, even if the objected-to statements were inappropriate and should not have been admitted, there was no undue prejudice, as the statement did not ultimately affect the jury’s verdict given the cumulative nature of these similar statements. Yates v. State, 429 Md. 112, 124 (2012).

Election Law

Conspiracy to violate the authority line requirement 

BOTTOM LINE: Defendant violated election laws by distributing campaign material without an “authority line” disclosing the name of the responsible campaign finance entity and treasurer.

CASE: Henson v. State, No. 1046, Sept. Term, 2012 (filed May 30, 2013) (Judges MATRICCIANI, Hotten & Moylan (retired, specially assigned)). RecordFax No. 13-0530-01, 18 pages.

FACTS: Shortly before the Nov. 2, 2010 statewide elections, senior members of the Bob Ehrlich for Maryland Campaign met to discuss strategy. The discussion pertained to how to influence African-American voter turnout in Baltimore City and Prince George’s County. The Ehrlich Campaign retained Julius Henson’s businesses, Politics Today and Universal Elections, to provide consulting services. In that capacity, Henson received a telephone call from Paul Schurick, a member of the Campaign, inquiring how the Campaign could decrease voter turnout in the aforementioned jurisdictions.

Henson and his employee, Rhonda Russell, retained the services of a company named Robodial, which owns and operates software that places recorded phone calls — “robocalls” — and records logistical data about them. Ms. Russell set up an account with and uploaded a list of phone numbers for residents in each county who were selected to receive the robocall.

On Election Day, Henson dictated the call’s language. The call stated: “Hello. I’m calling to let everyone know that Governor O’Malley and President Obama have been successful. Our goals have been met. The polls were correct and we took it back. We’re okay. Relax. Everything is fine. The only thing left is to watch it on TV tonight. Congratulations and thank you.” Ms. Russell inquired why the message lacked an authority line, and Henson responded that the client did not want one. Ms. Russell uploaded the contents of the message to

Shirley Malloy, a resident of Prince George’s County, received the robocall on the evening of November 2, 2010. At the time the call was placed to her, the polls were still open. Ms. Malloy testified that the call raised her suspicions because the President was not a candidate on any ballot in Maryland at that time. Peter Vandermeer, a Baltimore City resident, received the same call. The suspicious nature of the call prompted him to vote, and to inform the Attorney General’s Office and the Board of Elections about the call.

Henson was indicted on charges that he knowingly and willfully caused to be published and distributed campaign material that did not include the name of the campaign finance entity and the treasurer responsible for said publication and distribution, in violation of EL §§13-401 and 13-602(a)(9). The indictment also alleged that the robocall and authority line omissions constituted voter fraud in violation of EL §16-201(a)(6), and that Henson conspired with Schurick to commit all of these acts. Henson was convicted of conspiracy to violate the authority line requirement.

The Court of Special Appeals affirmed.

LAW: EL §13-602(a)(9) provides that “[a] person may not publish or distribute, or cause to be published or distributed, campaign material that violates” the authority line disclosure requirements of EL §13-401. EL §13-602(b)(1) further provides that any “person” who does is guilty of a criminal misdemeanor. By contrast, EL §16-201(a)(6) goes beyond mere failure to disclose the source of campaign funds and provides that a person may not “influence or attempt to influence a voter’s decision whether to go to the polls to cast a vote through the use of force, fraud, threat, menace, intimidation, bribery, reward, or offer of reward[.]”

Henson cited a 1995 Maryland Attorney General’s opinion discussing McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995), to argue that EL §§13-401 and 13-602(a)(9) do not apply to him because he is not a “person” but, rather, a “political consultant.”

The McIntyre court struck down an Ohio statute that prohibited the distribution of anonymous political literature by all private citizens. Id. at 348-53. But Henson was not convicted of being a private citizen who distributed anonymous campaign materials, he was convicted of distributing funded campaign materials that failed to disclose their source, a requirement specifically upheld by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 366-67 (2010): “Disclaimer and disclosure requirements may burden the ability to speak, but they ‘impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities,’ and ‘do not prevent anyone from speaking.’” Citizens, 558 U.S. at 367 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) and McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 201 (2003)). The Court has subjected these requirements to “exacting scrutiny,” which requires a “substantial relation” between the disclosure requirement and a “sufficiently important” governmental interest. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64.

In Buckley, the Court explained that disclosure could be justified based on a governmental interest in “provid[ing] the electorate with information” about the sources of election-related spending. Id. at 66. The McConnell Court applied this interest in rejecting facial challenges to BCRA §§201 and 311. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196. There was evidence in the record that independent groups were running election-related advertisements “`while hiding behind dubious and misleading names.’“ Id. at 197 (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm`n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 237 (D.D.C. 2003) (McConnell I)). The Court therefore upheld BCRA §§201 and 311 on the ground that they would help citizens “`make informed choices in the political marketplace.’“ McConnell, 540 U.S., at 197 (quoting McConnell I, 251 F. Supp. at 237).

Henson was a “person” for purposes of EL §§13-401 and 13-602(a)(9), and it was precisely his role as a consultant directing the use of campaign funds that excluded him from the First Amendment’s protection of anonymous speech.

COMMENTARY: Henson challenged the special condition of his probation prohibiting him from working in any capacity in election campaigns, whether it’s in a voluntary status or paid.

Probation is a “discretionary matter — a matter of grace, not entitlement.” Wink v. State, 76 Md. App. 677, 682 (1988). Probation is an “act of clemency bestowed by the court.” Hudgins v. State, 292 Md. 342, 347 (1982). The malefactor [] may be free as long as he conducts himself in a manner consonant with established communal standards and the safety of society.” Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265, 275 (1965). When imposing probation conditions, “[a] judge is vested with very broad discretion in sentencing criminal defendants, and is accorded this broad latitude to best accomplish the objectives of sentencing — punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation[,]” and is “limited only by constitutional standards and statutory limits.” Poe v. State, 341 Md. 523, 531, 532 (1996).

However, “a condition to the granting of probation which compels a defendant to give up a fundamental or constitutional right is not in and of itself unconstitutional or invalid.” People v. Lewis, 77 Cal. App.3d 455, 463 (1978)). Such a condition “cannot stand [only] if it is not related to the crime of which defendant has been convicted and if it has no reasonable relation to future criminality.” Id. at 463.

Although there is little authority for this proposition in Maryland, reported decisions from sister states recognize the propriety of prohibiting certain types of employment as a special condition of probation. See e.g., People v. Caruso, 174 Cal. App.2d 624, 647 (1959); State v. Fox, 22 Conn. App. 449, 457 (1990). Maryland has a strong interest in protecting the state from a person convicted of an election offense, which brings the sentencing court’s probation conditions within that case’s ambit. And Henson’s profession as campaign consultant is not one subject to State licensing requirements. There being no other legitimate control over his political activities, the court’s narrowly tailored, rational special condition that Henson not work in “any capacity in election campaigns” during the term of his probation was upheld.