Maryland Supreme Court 

Administrative; conflict of interest: Where residents alleged a development plan approved by Calvert County was “illegally passed” and is “therefore void” because one of the commissioners had a conflict of interest in the legislation and did not recuse himself, their suit was dismissed. A petitioner may not ordinarily seek relief from the courts in the form a judicial declaration that a legislative act is void or invalid based upon the motives of a public official. Dzurec v. Board of County Commissioners of Calvert County, Maryland, No. 1, Sept. Term, 2022 (filed Jan. 25, 2023).

Administrative

Conflict of interest

BOTTOM LINE: Where residents alleged a development plan approved by Calvert County was “illegally passed” and is “therefore void” because one of the commissioners had a conflict of interest in the legislation and did not recuse himself, their suit was dismissed. A petitioner may not ordinarily seek relief from the courts in the form a judicial declaration that a legislative act is void or invalid based upon the motives of a public official.

CASE: Dzurec v. Board of County Commissioners of Calvert County, Maryland, No. 1, Sept. Term, 2022 (filed Jan. 25, 2023) (Judges Fader, Watts, Hotten, BOOTH, Biran, Gould, Eaves).

FACTS: Four Calvert County residents sued the Board of County Commissioners of Calvert County, Maryland and Calvert County, Maryland, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Calvert County comprehensive plan was “illegally passed” and is “therefore void” because one of the commissioners, Kelly D. McConkey, had a conflict of interest in the legislation and did not recuse himself. The circuit court granted the county’s motion for summary judgment and the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed in an unreported opinion.

LAW: In Sugarloaf Citizens Association, Inc. v. Gudis, 319 Md. 558 (1990), and Kenwood Gardens Condominiums, Inc. v. Whalen Properties, 449 Md. 313 (2016), this court held that a petitioner may not ordinarily seek relief from the courts in the form a judicial declaration that a legislative act is void or invalid based upon the motives of a public official, such as whether the official had a conflict of interest, when undertaking purely legislative acts.

The Maryland common law principle—that a court ordinarily will not review legislative action for bias or conflicts of interest—stems from separation of powers principles arising under Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights. Simply put, this court observes no daylight between the remedy sought by Dzurec in this case and the remedies sought by petitioners in Sugarloaf and Kenwood Gardens, which this court rejected as being inconsistent with Maryland common law.

Dzurec argues that her cause of action is different from that of the petitioners in Sugarloaf because she has filed her action pursuant to the common law taxpayer standing doctrine, which permits her to seek the authority of the court “to enjoin illegal and ultra vires acts of public officials where those acts are reasonably likely to result in pecuniary loss to the taxpayer.” Dzurec asserts that McConkey’s participation in the commission’s vote on the comprehensive plan was ultra vires. This court disagrees.

Dzurec’s claim does not fall within the type of cases where this court has invalidated a legislative act because the local official or body acted ultra vires by exceeding the scope of authority authorized by statute or charter. In such cases, the legislative act in question was undertaken in a manner inconsistent with the authority granted by the enabling statute.

Here, there is no assertion that the adoption of the comprehensive plan was inconsistent with the requirements of the Land Use Article or a procedural requirement under the county charter or code for the adoption of a legislative act of the county commissioners. This court has found no cases in which this court has held that participation in a legislative matter where a conflict of interest is determined to exist constitutes an ultra vires act, which would permit a court to void it. To the contrary, such a holding would be directly at odds with this court’s holdings in Sugarloaf and Kenwood Gardens.

The court is similarly unpersuaded by Dzurec’s argument that she has an implied right of action under the Calvert County ethics code that would entitle her to seek and obtain a declaratory judgment that invalidates the Calvert County comprehensive plan.

Even assuming that Calvert County has the authority to enact a local law that modifies the common law to create such a such a judicial remedy, there is no such intention expressed here.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed.