U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4^th Circuit

Medical Malpractice; detainee’s death: Where the district court dismissed claims alleging that medical professionals exhibited deliberate indifference to the needs of a detainee, but the complaint sufficiently alleged that the medical professionals knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious injury to decedent, the claims were reinstated. Stevens v. Holler, Case No. 20-7102 (filed May 30, 2023).

Securities; proxy statement: Where a shareholder challenging a merger argued that the proxy statement should have included additional financial projections, but the merger proxy “provided a thorough and accurate summary” of the financial advisor’s work, and there was no showing the omission caused the shareholder to suffer any economic loss, the defendants prevailed on the claim. Karp v. First Connecticut Bancorp Inc., Case No. 21-1571 (filed June 1, 2023).

Maryland Supreme Court

Criminal; self-defense: Where the circuit court erred in excluding testimony that was critical to the defendant’s self-defense argument, and the state failed to show the error was harmless, a new trial was ordered. Additionally, language in the Appellate Court’s opinion that could be construed as evoking racial stereotypes or suggesting that they are the product of implicit bias was disavowed. Belton v. State, No. 8, Sept. Term, 2022 (filed May 31, 2023).

Maryland Appellate Court

Criminal; JUVRA: Where a defendant was a juvenile who were charged as adult, was sentenced within one case to at least 20 years’ incarceration and he or she has served at least 20 years of that sentence, they may file a motion for sentence modification under the Juvenile Restoration Act, or JUVRA. Johnson v. State, Nos. 1924, 1926, 1929 and 1930, Sept. Term, 2021 (filed May 30, 2023).  

Criminal; search incident to arrest: Where an officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for stolen license plates, the officer’s search of the glove compartment was not unlawful. Motor vehicle documents therein might contain additional evidence of the crime. Rodriguez v. State, No. 1530, Sept. Term, 2021 (filed June 1, 2023).

U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4^th Circuit

Medical Malpractice

Detainee’s death

BOTTOM LINE: Where the district court dismissed claims alleging that medical professionals exhibited deliberate indifference to the needs of a detainee, but the complaint sufficiently alleged that the medical professionals knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious injury to decedent, the claims were reinstated.

CASE: Stevens v. Holler, Case No. 20-7102 (filed May 30, 2023) (Judges THACKER, Heytens, Dawson).

FACTS: Shelly Kaye Stevens, as personal representative of the estate of James Allen Leslie Stevens, filed a second amended complaint alleging decedent suffered deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs while in custody at the Alleghany County, Maryland Detention Center which led to his death. The district court held that while “the Amended Complaint may adequately state allegations of medical negligence against [the individual medical defendants] . . . it fails to support a cause of action against them for a constitutional violation.” Therefore, the district court dismissed appellant’s second amended complaint.

LAW: The test for deliberate indifference is two-pronged and includes both objective and subjective elements. Appellant must demonstrate that (1) decedent was exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm (the objective prong) and (2) the prison official knew of and disregarded that substantial risk to the inmate’s health or safety (the subjective prong). Here, appellees do not dispute prong one. Therefore, this case turns whether the individual medical defendants acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” specifically, deliberate indifference to decedent’s health.

The district court held that appellant failed to plead actual knowledge because the complaint “acknowledge[s] that none of the Individual Defendants ‘thought it necessary’ to take the Decedent to the hospital.” And, in any event, the district court concluded that instead of stating an actionable claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, appellant had merely asserted that appellees failed to provide decedent with his desired level of care and had, at most, outlined a claim of medical negligence.

Appellant’s 44-page second amended complaint sets out in meticulous detail decedent’s persistent, documented decline in health and care, and the individual medical defendants’ knowledge that harm would result. Further, appellant alleged at least three protocol violations which demonstrate the individual medical defendants “knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious injury to the detainee or that they actually knew of and ignored a detainee’s serious need for medical care.”

Appellant sufficiently alleged that the individual medical defendants knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious injury to decedent. This court therefore concludes that the subjective prong of the deliberate indifference test is satisfied. The court also rejects the district court’s conclusion that appellant’s deliberate indifference claim amounts to no more than mere disagreement over the proper course of decedent’s treatment.

Appellant’s Monell claim against Correct Care Solutions was dismissed, in part, based on the dismissal of appellant’s underlying constitutional claim. Because the district court erred in dismissing the constitutional claim, the district court also erred in dismissing Count Two.

Likewise, the district court’s dismissal of appellant’s state analog claims was also in error. Finally, as to the state law claims contained in Counts Five through Seven, the district court’s dismissal was predicated on dismissal of all claims over which the court exercises original jurisdiction. Because dismissal of the federal claims was in error, so too was the district court’s dismissal of the state law claims.

Reversed and remanded.

Securities

Proxy statement

BOTTOM LINE: Where a shareholder challenging a merger argued that the proxy statement should have included additional financial projections, but the merger proxy “provided a thorough and accurate summary” of the financial advisor’s work, and there was no showing the omission caused the shareholder to suffer any economic loss, the defendants prevailed on the claim. 

CASE: Karp v. First Connecticut Bancorp Inc., Case No. 21-1571 (filed June 1, 2023). (Judges DIAZ, Thacker, Harris).

FACTS: Selwyn Karp contends that First Connecticut Bancorp Inc. and its directors violated the securities laws by misleading shareholders like him about the true value of their shares ahead of a stock-for-stock merger. To comply with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Karp claims, First Connecticut needed to disclose specific cash-flow projections—and particularly an earlier, rosier set of projections—in the proxy statement it circulated to investors.

The district court granted First Connecticut’s motion for summary judgment, holding that Karp hadn’t shown that (1) the cash-flow projections were material; (2) their omission caused him any economic loss or (3) the directors acted negligently in approving the proxy statement.

LAW: The district court briefing schedule stipulated that Karp had until April 9 to file a reply in support of his motion and opposing First Connecticut’s. But on that day—before Karp filed his reply—the district court issued an opinion and order denying Karp’s motion and granting First Connecticut’s. Karp claims this court must reverse the district court’s order because “he had no opportunity to contest” First Connecticut’s cross-motion.

Any error the district court committed was harmless. In his motion for summary judgment, Karp submitted a statement of 100 uncontested facts, a memorandum of law and 28 exhibits. And Karp doesn’t identify any specific evidence on materiality or loss causation that he was saving for his response brief.

Karp argues that the district court’s expedited order “denied [him] his right to have competing inferences resolved in his favor,” so it can’t be excused as harmless error. But there’s no indication that the district court misapplied the summary-judgment standard in reviewing First Connecticut’s motion.

Karp also contends that he planned to move to exclude First Connecticut’s experts under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Karp’s briefs don’t explain why the expert evidence was inadmissible. But even if the motion would have had merit, any error in admitting the evidence was harmless. The district court’s opinion doesn’t suggest that First Connecticut’s expert opinions were integral to its conclusions on materiality and loss causation.

To prevail in a private cause of action asserting a violation of Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9, “a plaintiff must show that (1) the proxy statement contained a material misrepresentation or omission (2) that caused the plaintiff injury and that (3) the proxy solicitation was an essential link in the accomplishment of the transaction.” The district court found that Karp hadn’t shown a genuine issue of material fact about materiality and loss causation (no one disputes transaction causation), nor about the defendants’ state of mind.

Regarding materiality, Karp argues that cash-flow projections would have “showed that the Merger consideration was inadequate, and that Piper Jaffray’s valuation was skewed,” so a reasonable investor would have found them important to their vote. First Connecticut responds that it’s not enough to speculate that shareholders might have found the projections helpful to the deliberations, so long as the merger proxy “provided a thorough and accurate summary” of the financial advisor’s work. This court agrees with First Connecticut.

Even if the proxy statement were misleading, First Connecticut is also entitled to summary judgment for a second reason: there’s no genuine issue of material fact relevant to loss causation. Because the court affirms the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the first two grounds, it finds it unnecessary to reach the third.

Finally, the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the individual defendants on Karp’s Section 20(a) claim is affirmed. Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act provides that “controlling persons” can be vicariously liable for violations of the securities laws. But a claim “under Section 20(a) must be based upon a primary violation of the securities laws,” and for the reasons above, Karp has established no such violation here.

Affirmed.

Maryland Supreme Court

Criminal

Self-defense

BOTTOM LINE: Where the circuit court erred in excluding testimony that was critical to the defendant’s self-defense argument, and the state failed to show the error was harmless, a new trial was ordered. Additionally, language in the Appellate Court’s opinion that could be construed as evoking racial stereotypes or suggesting that they are the product of implicit bias was disavowed. 

CASE: Belton v. State, No. 8, Sept. Term, 2022 (filed May 31, 2023) (Judges Watts, Hotten, BIRAN, Eaves) (Judges Booth, Gould and Getty concur).

FACTS: Terrance Belton contends that the circuit court erred in excluding testimony that was critical to his self-defense argument. He also argues that the Appellate Court of Maryland displayed bias against him in extensive dicta in its reported opinion affirming his convictions.

Belton asks this court to hold that the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial extends to appellate proceedings and further to hold that he did not receive due process on appeal. The state agrees that the right to a fair trial extends to appellate proceedings but argues that Belton’s appeal did not suffer from any constitutional infirmity.

LAW: The state acknowledges that the trial court erred in excluding Calloway’s statement, “This is my block,” as hearsay. The statement was not offered to prove that the block in question was Calloway’s, but rather for its effect on Belton. And the excluded statement was plainly relevant to Belton’s claim of self-defense. However, the state contends that the erroneous exclusion of this statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because it was cumulative of other evidence that was admitted which showed Calloway’s animus toward Belton.

In contrast, Belton argues that “This is my block” was different in kind from the other evidence before the jury and that, if the jury had been permitted to consider it, it is possible the jury would have found that Belton acted in perfect, not just imperfect, self-defense. The court agrees with Belton.

Based on Belton’s arguments about the evidentiary value of “This is my block” and its potential influence on the jury’s objective reasonableness finding, the state has failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the erroneous exclusion of Calloway’s statement in no way influenced the verdict. Its exclusion was harmful, reversible error. Accordingly the judgment of the Appellate Court with respect to Belton’s convictions for manslaughter and use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence are reversed and a new trial is ordered for Belton on those charges.

Because the Appellate Court erred with respect to the determination of harmless error and Belton is entitled to a new trial, this court shall not decide whether the Appellate Court deprived Belton of due process or otherwise abused its discretion through its choice of language in its opinion. However, given the unique circumstances present here, the concept of discretion in an appellate court’s choice of language merits additional reflection and guidance.

This court must express its concerns about the Appellate Court’s exercise of discretion in choosing the language of its opinion in this case. Separate and apart from a constitutional analysis, it highlights two problems: (1) literary analogies and other comparisons that could be interpreted as evoking racial stereotypes or suggesting that they are the product of implicit bias and (2) the opinion’s overall tone. Because the Appellate Court’s dicta is based on flawed and/or disputed factual premises, it will not constitute the law of the case on remand and should not be cited as authoritative in future cases.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed in part, reversed in part.

CONCUR: I agree with the following conclusions as expressed by the Majority. First, that “the right to fair and impartial judges – both in fact and in appearance – extends to appellate proceedings.” Second, “[i]f the language of an appellate court’s opinion could cause a reasonable person to question the participating judges’ impartiality or otherwise suggests bias on the part of the court, then the party potentially injured by that partiality or bias has been deprived of due process, and the court has abused its discretion.”

Third, because “the Appellate Court erred with respect to the determination of harmless error and that Belton is entitled to a new trial,” this Court need not reach the question of “whether the Appellate Court deprived Belton of due process or otherwise abused its discretion through its choice of language in its opinion.” Concerning section IV of the Majority’s opinion, I do not believe it is appropriate to parse through the dicta in the Appellate Court’s opinion creating dicta of our own.

CONCUR: Mr. Belton raises important issues concerning race and gender that have been, and will continue to be, discussed and debated in social, political, and academic circles, as they should be. If confronting these issues were necessary to resolve the case before us, I would do so without reluctance or hesitance.

But having resolved this case on the only substantive issue raised by Mr. Belton—the harmless error issue—and consistent with our tradition of not issuing advisory opinions, we should exercise judicial restraint. Unless necessary to resolve an issue before us, this court is not in the business of critiquing the language and tone of our colleagues’ judicial opinions, nor should we be.

Maryland Appellate Court

Criminal

JUVRA

BOTTOM LINE: Where a defendant was a juvenile who were charged as adult, was sentenced within one case to at least 20 years’ incarceration and he or she has served at least 20 years of that sentence, they may file a motion for sentence modification under the Juvenile Restoration Act, or JUVRA.

CASE: Johnson v. State, Nos. 1924, 1926, 1929 and 1930, Sept. Term, 2021 (filed May 30, 2023) (Judges ZIC, Ripken, Meredith).

FACTS: In 1998, when he was a minor, Julian Andrew Johnson committed a series of crimes on four separate occasions, was charged as an adult and convicted in each case and was given sentences which, cumulatively, resulted in 50 years’ imprisonment. More than 20 years later, in 2021, the Maryland General Assembly enacted JUVRA, which gave juveniles who were charged as adults, were convicted and are serving sentences of at least 20 years the opportunity to reduce their sentences.

In November 2021, Mr. Johnson filed motions in all four of his cases. In each case, the circuit court denied his motion on the ground that he had not been incarcerated for at least 20 years for an offense in each case.

LAW: JUVRA applies to “an individual who . . . has been imprisoned for at least 20 years for the offense.” These appeals present the question of how to determine whether an individual “has been imprisoned for at least 20 years for the offense” for purposes of JUVRA.

The circuit court determined that Mr. Johnson was ineligible for a sentence modification in Case No. 116 because he was serving two consecutive 15-year sentences and could therefore never be “imprisoned for at least 20 years for the offense.” Under Mr. Johnson’s interpretation of the statute, the circuit court should have regarded his sentence in Case No. 116 as a 30-year sentence rather than two 15-year sentences, thereby rendering him eligible for relief under JUVRA.

The state agrees with Mr. Johnson that “‘offense’ should be interpreted to mean conduct occurring during a criminal transaction even if that conduct results in multiple criminal charges,” and “‘sentence’ should be interpreted to mean the aggregate sentence imposed for all counts in a case.” Those interpretations of the statutory terms “offense” and “sentence,” the state contends, are necessary to avoid “absurd results” (specifically, to avoid a situation where eligibility for relief depends upon the vagaries of how a court structured a defendant’s sentence) and to best effectuate the legislative intent of JUVRA. Because reading the statute narrowly could produce absurd results, the court adopts the parties’ interpretation and reads “sentence” to refer to the aggregated punishments imposed for all counts within one case.

A defendant is eligible to file a motion for sentence modification under JUVRA, therefore, when (1) within one case, his or her “sentence” as defined here is at least 20 years’ incarceration and (2) he or she has served at least 20 years of that “sentence.” Therefore, the circuit court erred in denying Mr. Johnson’s motion for modification of sentence for Case No. 116 on grounds of ineligibility.

In the other three appeals, Mr. Johnson contends that this court should adopt the broadest possible reading of the statutory terms “offense” and “sentence.” If the sentences in Case Nos. 115, 114, and 365 are each treated as “separate and distinct” from each other and Case No. 116 for the purpose of JUVRA eligibility, as the circuit court treated them, then Mr. Johnson “would not be eligible for a reduction of any of those sentences.” Because the legislative intent is unclear, the court declines to read the statutory language as broadly as Mr. Johnson requests and instead concludes that Mr. Johnson’s Case Nos. 115, 114 and 365 are not eligible for JUVRA review.

Without aggregating the sentences across Mr. Johnson’s four cases, Mr. Johnson has only been serving time on the 30-year sentence for Case No. 116; therefore, he could not have served “at least 20 years” on any of the other three cases even if they were otherwise eligible for JUVRA review. In Case No. 115, Mr. Johnson was sentenced to 20 years’ incarceration consecutive to the 30-year sentence in Case No. 116; he has not yet begun to serve this sentence. Also, Mr. Johnson was sentenced to 10 years’ incarceration in Case No. 114 and five years’ incarceration in Case No. 365; therefore, without legislative action, neither of those sentences will be eligible for JUVRA review because he cannot serve “at least 20 years” for a sentence of less than 20 years.

Judgments of the Circuit Court for Wicomico County reversed and remanded in Case No. 116 and affirmed in Case Nos. 115, 114 and 365.

Criminal

Search incident to arrest

BOTTOM LINE: Where an officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for stolen license plates, the officer’s search of the glove compartment was not unlawful. Motor vehicle documents therein might contain additional evidence of the crime.

CASE: Rodriguez v. State, No. 1530, Sept. Term, 2021 (filed June 1, 2023) (Judges Reed, Albright, GETTY).

FACTS: This appeal involves two issues. The first issue is whether a police officer may search the glove compartment of the defendant’s vehicle for additional evidence without a warrant after arresting the defendant for theft of license plates. The second issue involves whether an officer must provide Miranda warnings before asking the defendant two questions—about the vehicle and the stolen license plates—during a brief encounter in a shopping center parking lot.

LAW: Rodriguez concedes that Cpl. McGroarty had probable cause to arrest him for the stolen license plates once he knew the car belonged to Rodriguez. The issue is purely one of law: whether the officer’s search of the car incident to arrest for stolen plates was permissible under Arizona v. Gant and could “reasonably lead to an expectation that further evidence of that offense may be found in the passenger compartment.”

The court concludes that that the officer had reason to believe that there would be evidence of the crime of arrest—for stolen license plates—inside Rodriguez’s glove compartment. Although Cpl. McGroarty testified at the suppression hearing that he was looking for evidence of the vehicle being stolen, he also affirmatively stated that he was searching for additional evidence of the crime of stolen license plates. His inability to articulate the exact object of his search does not diminish the reasonableness of the search.

Cpl. McGroarty had “some basis in fact” for his suspicion that Rodriguez’s vehicle contained additional evidence of the crime for which he was arrested. Stolen license plates necessarily involve motor vehicle records, which makes Rodriguez’s motor vehicle documents relevant to his crime of arrest.

The registration card to Rodriguez’s vehicle would establish whether the license plates did or did not match the registration card within the vehicle, which could establish knowledge of the crime on the part of Rodriguez. This justifies the officer’s decision to search for the vehicle’s motor vehicle records related to the license plates it displayed. Other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion under similar circumstances.

Notwithstanding this holding, the court explicitly rejects the state’s carte blanche argument that, after seeing the second license plate on the front passenger floorboard, the officer was permitted to search the entire passenger compartment of Rodriguez’s vehicle. The search must still be limited to containers and compartments which reasonably could contain the object of the officer’s search—evidence of the crime of arrest.

Because the court concludes that the search of Rodriguez’s glove compartment was proper under Gant, it need not address whether the search was valid under the automobile exception. The court reiterates only that the exceptions differ in key respects on the level of suspicion required, the need for an arrest, the scope of the search and the type of evidence sought. Also “the scope of the search authorized [under the automobile exception] is broader” than under the search incident to arrest exception, and that both are limited to “any area of the vehicle in which the evidence [sought] might be found.”

Turning to the second question, the totality of the circumstances indicate that Rodriguez was not restrained in a manner that resembled a formal arrest during the initial questions. Accordingly, Rodriguez was not in custody for purposes of Miranda, and Cpl. McGroarty was not required to administer Miranda warnings. The circuit court did not err in denying Rodriguez’s motion to suppress his statement to the officer that he bought the license plates from a friend.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County affirmed.