4th Circuit: Excessive force, discrimination, asylum, more

Listen to this article

Civil Rights; excessive force

BOTTOM LINE: Where a man sued a sheriff’s deputy for excessive force and battery, and the sheriff claimed his force was not excessive and he was entitled to qualified immunity, these arguments were rejected. When construing the facts in the plaintiff’s favor, a juror could conclude the force was excessive, in violation of clearly-established law.

CASE: Barricks v. Wright, Case No. 25-1250 (filed March 3, 2026) (Judges Wilkinson, NIEMEYER, Agee).

FACTS: Joshua Barricks sued Sheriff Deputy James Wright for excessive force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, as well as for common law battery. Wright filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the force he used was not excessive but was only that necessary to arrest Barricks, who had fled and resisted arrest. Moreover, Wright claimed that he was entitled to qualified immunity.

The district court, after assessing the record, which included bodycam video,  identified several disputed facts at the crux of the qualified immunity analysis, including (1) to what extent Barricks posed a threat to Wright; (2) whether Wright pushed Barricks to the ground after he had surrendered; (3) whether Wright used his knuckles to strike Barricks’s face; (4) whether and to what extent Barricks resisted after hitting the ground and (5) whether parts of his body, other than his head, were readily available targets for “distraction strikes.”

The court noted that if the disputed facts were viewed in the light most favorable to Barricks, they would show that he had stopped resisting and no longer posed a threat when he got on his knees and put his hands behind his back, only to then have Wright slam him to the ground and punch him 12 times in the face. If a jury were to make these factual findings, the court concluded, the law was clearly established that Wright could not use that amount of force in those circumstances consistent with the Fourth Amendment.

LAW: In this case, the district court did not adjudicate conclusively whether Wright was entitled to qualified immunity. Rather, it concluded, after a lengthy and careful analysis of the facts of record, that the motion for summary judgment had to be denied because disputes of material fact existed as to whether Wright used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The district court’s assessment of the record evidence is not a matter that this court can review during this interlocutory appeal. This is because the Supreme Court has made clear that an appellate court may not review a district court’s summary judgment order insofar as it determines whether or not the record sets forth a genuine issue of fact for trial.

Nonetheless, if this court takes the disputed facts as the district court viewed them in the light most favorable to Barricks and they support, as a matter of law, Wright’s claim that he did not violate clearly established law, this court has jurisdiction to grant him qualified immunity. And whether Wright is entitled to qualified immunity turns on whether, as matter of law, he violated the Fourth Amendment with excessive force and whether a reasonable officer in his position would have so known.

In this case, when viewing the disputed facts in the light most favorable to Barricks, Wright pushed Barricks to the ground and pressed his head into the cement floor after Barricks had surrendered by dropping to his knees and putting his hands behind his head. Wright then used his knuckles to strike Barricks 12 times in the head, even though he had surrendered, and, in any event, other parts of his body were available for “distraction strikes.” And this force was applied in the context of non-violent misdemeanors — skateboarding on a public road and possible public intoxication.

Moreover, the evidence taken in Barricks’s favor also showed that there was no evidence that Barricks posed a threat to Wright with a weapon or otherwise. In short, the facts taken most favorably to Barricks would show that Wright applied gratuitous and injurious force after Barricks had surrendered and was no longer resisting.

With that version of the facts, the district court concluded that Barricks’s constitutional rights would have been violated, identifying five cases demonstrating that the “law was clear that an officer could not use [the] amount of force [Wright used] to subdue a suspect on his knees and not resisting.” With the possible exception of one, this court agrees that this collection of cases clearly establishes that Wright’s use of force would be excessive if the facts taken most favorably to Barricks were established.

Affirmed.

Employment; joint employment doctrine

BOTTOM LINE: Where two certified registered nurse anesthetists refused COVID-19 vaccinations, and their clinical privileges were then suspended by Inova Health Care Services, their Title VII claims against Inova were dismissed. It was not their employer and was not liable under a joint employment doctrine.

CASE: Hoffman v. INOVA Health Care Services, Case Nos. 24-1510, 24-1518 (filed March 3, 2026) (Judges King, RUSHING, Benjamin).

FACTS: Inova Health Care Services suspended clinical privileges at its medical facilities for Kelly Hoffman and Lorraine Austin after they refused COVID-19 vaccinations. North American Partners in Anesthesiology, or NAPA, subsequently terminated plaintiffs’ employment.

In separate complaints, Hoffman and Austin both sued Inova for discrimination, and Hoffman also sued NAPA. The district court dismissed both complaints for failure to state a claim, finding that neither plaintiff plausibly alleged Inova was her employer and that Hoffman did not exhaust the administrative process before suing NAPA.

LAW: It is undisputed that NAPA, not Inova, formally employed plaintiffs. But “multiple entities may simultaneously be considered” an individual’s employer for purposes of Title VII under the “joint employment doctrine” adopted by this court. This court uses a nine-factor test to determine “which entities actually exercise control over an employee” such that they can rightly be considered an employer under Title VII.

Considering these factors, the court agrees with the district court that plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that Inova was their employer. Even accepting the complaints’ factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs’ favor, Inova did not have authority to hire and fire plaintiffs, did not exercise day-to-day supervision over them and was not responsible for their employment records.

As certified registered nurse anesthetists, plaintiffs’ duties were not akin to those of regular Inova employees. While Inova furnished equipment, facilities and some necessary training, those facts do not distinguish employees from non-employees in the setting of a hospital or surgical center. And although plaintiffs worked for years exclusively at Inova facilities, they did not subjectively intend to enter an employment relationship with Inova but instead knew that NAPA was their employer.

Turning to the dismissal for failure to exhaust, before pursuing a lawsuit under Title VII or the ADA, a plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies by filing a charge with the EEOC. Hoffman’s July 13 EEOC charge identifies Inova as the only employer who allegedly discriminated against her. It does not mention NAPA. Likewise, both right-to-sue notices were sent to Inova but not to NAPA.

After NAPA moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to exhaust, Hoffman asserted that she had submitted a letter to the EEOC on March 30, 2023, attempting to add a claim that NAPA also discriminated against her. In her letter, which Hoffman styled as an “Update and Amendment” to her original charge, Hoffman claimed that “NAPA engaged in discrimination against me along with the Inova Health System.” Hoffman appended NAPA’s contact information to her letter and uploaded the letter to the EEOC’s online portal. But Hoffman’s formal charge of discrimination was never amended, and NAPA did not receive notice of any charges against it before Hoffman filed suit.

The district court correctly ruled that Hoffman failed to administratively exhaust her claims again NAPA. Hoffman’s EEOC charge of discrimination, which limits the scope of her federal claims, did not name NAPA. The letter Hoffman sent to the EEOC eight months after her initial charge did not result in an amended charge or notice to NAPA.

Hoffman emphasizes that her letter to the EEOC was a conspicuous effort to amend her charge to add a discrimination claim against NAPA and that she used an appropriate channel for communicating with the agency. Even so, this court cannot read Hoffman’s private letter to the EEOC “as part of her formal discrimination charge without contravening [Title VII’s] purposes” to put employers “on notice [and] encourag[e] conciliation.”

Regarding her VHRA claim, Hoffman relies on the same letter to the EEOC, which she says would have been cross-filed with the Office of Civil Rights. That argument fails for the same reasons. In a footnote in her reply brief, Hoffman also states that she “filed an updated Complaint Questionnaire form with OCR on October 31, 2022,” citing to an unsigned and undated document. She offers nothing further about the import of this filing, thereby waiving any potential argument about this document multiple times over.

Affirmed.

Employment; shortening statute of limitations

BOTTOM LINE: Where an employee signed an agreement shortening her time to file employment-related claims against her employer, the agreement was unenforceable as to her claims under Title VII or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. However, the agreement was enforceable as to the Maryland Fair Employment Practice Act claims.

CASE: Thomas v. EOTech, LLC, Case No. 25-1094 (filed March 4, 2026) (Judges Harris, HEYTENS, Benjamin).

FACTS: Natalie Thomas used to work for EOTech LLC. Before starting her job, Thomas signed an EOTech-drafted document that included language purporting to shorten the time she would otherwise have to sue EOTech for any disputes “relating to [her] employment.” On Nov. 9, 2022, EOTech fired Thomas.

On Feb. 23, 2023, Thomas filed a charge of discrimination with both the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, or EEOC, and the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights. On Sept. 7, 2023, the EEOC sent Thomas a right-to-sue letter. On Dec. 6, 2023, Thomas sued EOTech in federal district court, alleging (as relevant here) violations of Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, or ADEA, and the Maryland Fair Employment Practice Act, or MFEPA.

EOTech argued the complaint was untimely under the limitations agreement because 196 countable days had elapsed (106 days from termination to filing an EEOC charge plus an additional 90 days after receiving notice from the EEOC). The district court agreed and granted summary judgment to EOTech on all claims.

LAW: The inevitable—indeed, the only—impact of the limitations agreement is to shorten the total time Thomas would have to complete two tasks: file a charge with the EEOC and, after the EEOC proceedings conclude, file a private lawsuit. To be sure, this limitations agreement states that its 180-day period “is tolled during the time [a] charge or claim is pending” before the EEOC.

But that still means the limitations agreement gave Thomas just 180 days to do two things (file a charge and then a lawsuit) that both Title VII and the ADEA would otherwise have given her at least 270 days to do. This court agrees with the Sixth Circuit that allowing private parties to prospectively shorten the time an employee has to bring suit under Title VII or the ADEA would “abrogate[] substantive rights and contravene[] Congress’s uniform nationwide legal regime for Title VII” and ADEA lawsuits.

EOTech relies primarily on this court’s statement in In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litigation, 505 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2007), that “[a]s a general rule, statutory limitations periods may be shortened by agreement so long as the limitations period is not unreasonably short.” According to EOTech, that general rule governs here and the limitations agreement is enforceable because its single 180-day time limit is not unreasonably short.

But Cotton Yarn’s relevant holding is that—at least as a general matter—a provision in an arbitration clause that gives private parties less time to initiate arbitration than they would otherwise have had to file suit does not render the arbitration clause unenforceable or excuse courts from enforcing it.

This case involves no agreement to arbitrate and thus does not implicate the “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” that is embodied in the Federal Arbitration Act, or FAA, and framed the court’s entire analysis in Cotton Yarn. Cotton Yarn had no occasion to consider whether—and if so when—private parties may by contract create a new affirmative defense to an otherwise timely filed federal statutory claim.

This court’s holding is limited. The court need not—and thus do not—decide whether (and if so, when) private parties may ever prospectively shorten by contract the statutory period for suing on a federal statutory claim. Instead, it holds only that the district court erred in dismissing Thomas’s suit because parties may not by advance agreement render untimely a suit that would otherwise be timely under Title VII or the ADEA.

Under Maryland law, “[p]arties may agree to a provision that modifies the limitations result that would otherwise pertain provided (1) there is no controlling statute to the contrary, (2) it is reasonable, and (3) it is not subject to other defenses such as fraud, duress, or misrepresentation.” Guided by those standards, the court concludes the district court did not err in determining the parties validly limited the amount of time Thomas had to bring her MFEPA claims.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded.

Immigration; jurisdiction

BOTTOM LINE: Where the district court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review a decision of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services denying derivative asylum, it erred. The district court possessed jurisdiction because the agency’s decision was not an exercise of discretion but rather turned on a legal interpretation of the statute.

CASE: Ortez Reyes v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Case No. 25-1391 (filed March 5, 2026) (Judges GREGORY, Quattlebaum, Berner).

FACTS: Fredis Ortez Reyes is a native of Honduras. He is married to Gloria Magaly Estrada Moreno since Jan. 28, 2005. Ms. Estrada had previously been removed from the United States when she was seized after crossing the border in 2014.

In 2020, Ms. Estrada returned to the United States with her husband, who sought asylum. Ms. Estrada was ineligible to seek asylum herself because of her previous removal. She did seek withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture.

In January 2020, an immigration judge granted Mr. Ortez asylum but denied Ms. Estrada’s request for withholding of removal. Ms. Estrada’s appeal of that decision is now before the Board of Immigration Appeals.

In the meantime, Ms. Estrada’s husband filed a Form I-730 petition for Ms. Estrada to receive derivative asylee status under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A). On July 25, 2023, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, or USCIS, denied the I-730 petition on the basis that § 241(a)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, or INA, bars any form of relief for noncitizens who have prior orders of removal, such as Ms. Estrada. The district court dismissed Mr. Ortiz’s subsequent challenge to USCIS’s decision in federal district court on jurisdictional grounds.

LAW: Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) of the INA strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review “any judgment regarding the granting of relief under” an enumerated list of types of relief. The question in this appeal is whether the USCIS’s decision to apply § 1231(a)(5) to a petition raised under § 1158(b)(3)(A) is an exercise of discretion that falls beyond the review of the court. Per longstanding precedent, it is not. Pure decisions of law, such as the one at issue here, fall outside of the scope of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s command.

Although § 1158(b)(3)(A) confers discretion to USCIS to approve or deny I-730 petitions, in this case the USCIS’s decision was not an exercise of that discretion but exclusively a matter of statutory interpretation. There was no consideration of Ms. Estrada and her husband’s unique circumstances, nor the application of the § 1158(b)(3)(A) guidelines and standards. Rather, USCIS had determined, without discussion, that § 1158(b)(3)(A) should be interpreted to incorporate the prohibitions of § 1231(a)(5). For this reason alone, USCIS denied the I-730 petition.

Ms. Estrada’s husband does not challenge “how the agency exercised its discretion” but rather USCIS’s interpretation of the INA itself. Such a challenge to the agency’s statutory interpretation “is entirely separate from other discretionary decisions and involves a question of USCIS’s statutory authority” that falls outside the scope of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) jurisdiction stripping.

The district court had jurisdiction to review USCIS’s decision to deny derivative asylum under § 1158(b)(3)(A) because the agency’s decision was not an exercise of discretion but rather turned on a legal interpretation of the statute. As both parties requested at oral argument, this case is remanded to the district court to address the merits of that question.

Reversed and remanded.

Insurance; deference

BOTTOM LINE: Where a plan administrator did not adhere to the deadline when reviewing an appeal from an initial denial of long-term disability benefits, its tardy decision was not entitled to any deference.

CASE: Cogdell v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company, Case Nos. 24-1940, 25-1083 (filed March 3, 2026) (Judges AGEE, Quattlebaum, Floyd).

FACTS: Heather Cogdell applied for long-term disability, or LTD, benefits in November 2022. The LTD plan was administered by Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company. After Reliance twice denied Cogdell’s LTD benefits claim, Cogdell timely filed an internal appeal on Aug. 15, 2023.

A plan administrator ordinarily has 45 days to decide an internal appeal of the initial denial. But if the plan administrator notifies the claimant that special circumstances exist and tells the claimant when a decision is expected, it can take up to another 45 days.

In a September 25 letter to Cogdell, Reliance stated that it “determined [it] will require an independent physician review” and that the letter was “to serve as notice of [its] intention to take beyond [45] days to make a final decision.” The September 25 letter did not include the date Reliance expected to issue its decision, nor did it identify a “special circumstance” to justify an extension.

On October 3, after the initial 45-day decision period lapsed, Cogdell sued Reliance in the district court for wrongful denial of benefits. On October 26—72 days after Cogdell filed her appeal—Reliance upheld its decision denying Cogdell’s claim for LTD benefits. The parties cross-moved for judgment on the administrative record and the district court found for Cogdell.

LAW: If the plan vests its administrator with discretion to make eligibility determinations, and the administrator effectively exercises that discretion, a district court must afford deference to the administrator’s decision in most instances. Here the court must decide two issues to apply the standard of review. The first is whether Reliance timely decided Cogdell’s internal appeal as required by the applicable ERISA regulations and the Plan.

Cogdell filed her internal appeal on August 15, 2023, meaning that, absent an extension, Reliance had until October 1 to issue a decision. It is undisputed that Reliance did not issue a decision by that date. But Reliance argues that it invoked the 45-day extension—postponing its deadline to November 13—in a September 25 letter to Cogdell. In its view, that act made its later October 26 decision timely.

The district court rejected Reliance’s argument and instead concluded that Reliance had only the initial 45 days to decide Cogdell’s internal appeal because no special circumstances justified an extension. On appeal, Reliance argues that the district court erred because, in its view, so long as a plan administrator determines special circumstances exist, that finding in and of itself is sufficient. The court agrees.

Reliance points only to the new records Cogdell submitted with her internal appeal and the need to have those records reviewed by “appropriate medical specialists” to ensure a “full and fair review[.]” But that does not explain why this event is not “ordinary” or is in any way “unusual,” so as to be a “special circumstance.” In fact, ERISA regulations seem to contemplate both these events as routine parts of most internal appeals.

Given these regulations, if new records or a physician review is a unique factor for a particular reason, the plan administrator must explain why that is so and what makes it a “special circumstance” in its notice to the claimant. In this case, neither the plan administrator nor the record reveal such information.

Reliance agrees that an untimely decision permits Cogdell to file a lawsuit without exhausting her administrative remedies but argues that it does not affect the applicable standard of review. The court disagrees. There was no exercise of discretion by Reliance as the plan administrator to which deference would be owed. Therefore, the district court was correct to review Cogdell’s claim de novo.

The ERISA regulations impose enforceable requirements on ERISA plans, and the Plan places temporal limits on Reliance’s ability as plan administrator to exercise its discretion. Consequently, the failure to follow the Plan’s time restraints negates the discretion that would otherwise be due. Reliance’s failure to issue a decision within the 45 days meant it failed to exercise its fiduciary discretion. A late decision, absent unusual circumstances not present here, is not entitled to deference because Reliance lacks the authority to take longer than the regulations and the Plan permit.

Turning to the merits, the district court concluded that Cogdell was entitled to benefits under the Plan. Finding no error in either the district court’s findings of facts or legal conclusions, this court rejects Reliance’s contrary arguments and affirms the award of benefits to Cogdell.

Affirmed.