Supreme Court of Maryland: Attorney’s fees; statutory caps; malicious prosecution, more

Appeals; original jurisdiction

BOTTOM LINE: Where the circuit court issued an intervening protective order during the pendency of a de novo appeal from the district court, that did not transform the proceeding into the exercise of the circuit court’s original jurisdiction that would provide an additional right of appeal to the Appellate Court.

CASE: Walston v. Lindsay, No. 38, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed July 17, 2026) (Justices Fader, Watts, BOOTH, Biran, Gould, Eaves, Killough).

FACTS: Rosalyn Walston and Paul Lindsay are parents of a minor child, “M.” In the district court, Mr. Lindsay sought and obtained, on behalf of M., an interim protective order, a temporary protective order and, ultimately, a final protective order against Ms. Walston. Thereafter, Ms. Walston noted a de novo appeal of the District Court’s final protective order to the circuit court.

During the pendency of the appeal before the circuit court, Ms. Walston sought and was granted two motions for continuance. In granting the continuances, the circuit court entered intervening protective orders. After a de novo hearing on May 28, 2025, the circuit court granted Mr. Lindsay, on behalf of M., a final protective order effective through May 28, 2026. Ms. Walston then noted an appeal to the Appellate Court of Maryland.

The Appellate Court entered an order transferring the case to this court after concluding that it had no appellate jurisdiction because the circuit court had exercised its appellate jurisdiction in reviewing the decision of the district court.

LAW: Since the inception of the district court in 1971, Maryland has employed a two-tiered trial court system. Under this system, a party aggrieved by a judgment of the district court may take a de novo appeal to the circuit court.

Md. Code, Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, or CJ, § 12-301, which is the general statute authorizing appeals from a final circuit court judgment, specifically grants a right of appeal “from a final judgment entered by a court in the exercise of original, special, limited, statutory jurisdiction, unless in a particular case the right of appeal is expressly denied by law.” CJ § 12-302(a), however, denies a right of appeal “from a final judgment of a court entered or made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in reviewing the decision of the District Court, an administrative agency, or a local legislative body[,]” unless “a right to appeal is expressly granted by law[.]”

Ms. Walston argues that, although she filed a de novo appeal to the circuit court from the district court’s final protective order, the circuit court functionally exercised original jurisdiction, instead of appellate jurisdiction, when it issued intervening protective orders, and therefore, she retains a right of appeal to the Appellate Court under CJ § 12-301 Ms. Walston asserts that, by entering intervening orders during the pendency of the de novo appeal prior to the final protective order hearing, the circuit court acted as if the matter had been “filed anew” and it was hearing the case from the outset in the exercise of original jurisdiction.

This court disagrees. A circuit court has the authority to issue intervening protective orders during the pendency of a de novo appeal, and that, in so doing, it does not transform the nature of the proceeding into the exercise of the circuit court’s original jurisdiction that would provide an additional right of appeal to the Appellate Court.

A circuit court has concurrent jurisdiction under the domestic violence statute to enter orders providing for relief. There is no language in the statute that limits the types of orders that the circuit court may enter during the pendency of a de novo appeal. Nor is there any language in the statute indicating the General Assembly intended that a circuit court’s entry of intervening orders during the pendency of a de novo appeal would transform the nature of the proceeding from a circuit court’s exercise of its appellate jurisdiction into the exercise of original jurisdiction.

In Ms. Walston’s view, a circuit court that is exercising de novo appellate review would be powerless to enter an intervening protective order granting relief to a victim of abuse, or person eligible for relief, during the pendency of the appeal. Such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the statute’s purpose of providing an immediate and effective remedy.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County affirmed.

Constitutional; residence

BOTTOM LINE: Where a candidate had a future intent to reside within a legislative district, but did not reside there yet and had not yet abandoned his domicile outside the district, he was disqualified from the primary ballot.

CASE: Dove Jr. v. Simmons, No. 63, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed July 13, 2026) (Justices Fader, WATTS, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves) (Justice KILLOUGH concurs).

FACTS: Gary Simmons requested that the circuit court disqualify John Calvin Dove Jr. from appearing on the Democratic primary ballot for Legislative District 12B. The circuit court found that Mr. Dove did not reside in Legislative District 12B on the date of filing his certificate of candidacy and thus had misrepresented his address on the certificate.

LAW: Article III, § 9 of the Constitution of Maryland requires that, to be eligible to serve as a member of the General Assembly, on the date of election, a person must be a citizen of the State of Maryland, have resided in the State for at least one year next preceding that date, and have “resided” in the legislative district which he or she has been chosen to represent for at least six months prior to the election and, beginning Jan. 1, 2024, have “maintained a primary place of abode” in the district for six months prior to the election. If the district has not been established for six months, the person must have “resided” in the district for as long as it has been established and, beginning Jan. 1, 2024, have maintained a primary place of abode in the district for as long it has been established.

In response to a question on the certificate of candidacy form asking that he provide his residential address, Mr. Dove provided 284 Caldwell Road. The circuit court found that at the time Mr. Dove completed his certificate of candidacy, 1302 Bluegrass Way was his residence and domicile, and place of abode, i.e., that Mr. Dove resided and lived at 1302 Bluegrass Way, not 284 Caldwell Road.

The circuit court applied the correct legal framework in determining that Mr. Dove did not reside at the address he listed on the certificate of candidacy form. The circuit court’s analysis concerning Mr. Dove’s residential address being his domicile stems directly from this court’s case law. As this court has consistently held for well over 100 years, “resided” means “domiciled.”

The court found that Mr. Dove had “a future intent to reside in Pasadena” i.e., at 284 Caldwell Road, but did not reside there yet, and had “not yet abandoned his domicile at 1302 Bluegrass Way.” The circuit court’s ruling is on all fours with this court’s case law, which instructs that a person may not establish a new domicile merely by having an intent to move to a new location, without abandonment of the former domicile.

Based on the evidence developed at the hearing, the circuit court correctly determined that at the time he completed the certificate of candidacy, 1302 Bluegrass Way was both Mr. Dove’s place of domicile or residence and primary place of abode, and that Mr. Dove had neither abandoned the location as his domicile nor rebutted the presumption that 1302 Bluegrass Way remained his domicile.

Mr. Dove contends that he cannot be found to have made a false statement on the certificate of candidacy because Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law, or EL, § 5-304(c)(4), states that in filling out a certificate of candidacy an applicant should provide a voter registration address or current address. According to Mr. Dove, because he provided his voter registration address as required by the statute and the address that he provided—284 Caldwell Road—is his correct voter registration address, he cannot be found to have made a false statement. The court rejects this argument.

To the extent that EL § 5-304(c)(4) requires that a candidate provide a voter registration address or current address, under Article I of the Constitution of Maryland, the voter registration address is required to be the place where the candidate resides. If the voter registration address is not the current address, the current address must be provided. The circuit court correctly determined that 284 Caldwell Road was neither the place that Mr. Dove resides nor his current address.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County affirmed.

CONCUR: I concur in the judgment. I write separately because the court arrives there by finding a material misrepresentation the trial court refused to make, and by avoiding the question this case was brought before the court to decide; namely, whether the constitutional residency requirement deadline was May 3, 2026. 

Corporate; futility

BOTTOM LINE: Where two shareholders who brought a derivative action without making a pre-suit demand on the board of directors failed to show that making a demand would be futile, their suit was dismissed.

CASE: Nathanson v. Tortoise Capital Advisors, L.L.C., No. 51, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed July 14, 2026 (Justices Fader, Watts, Booth, Biran, GOULD, Eaves, Killough).

FACTS: Howard Nathanson and Gus Gordon filed a derivative action on behalf of two Maryland corporations operating as closed-end funds, against Tortoise Capital Advisors, L.L.C., the funds’ investment adviser, and members of the funds’ board of directors.

Maryland law requires shareholders to make a pre-suit demand on the board of directors to initiate litigation on the corporation’s behalf before filing a derivative action. The shareholders did not do so here, but instead invoked what is called the futility exception to the demand requirement.

The futility exception is governed by Werbowsky v. Collomb, 362 Md. 581 (2001), where this court held that a pre-suit demand is excused only in the limited circumstances explored below. Here, the circuit court concluded that the shareholders did not plead sufficient facts to bring this case within that limited exception and dismissed the action with prejudice. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed.

LAW: A demand is excused as futile only where the allegations or evidence clearly demonstrate, in a very particular manner, either that a demand or a delay in awaiting a response would cause irreparable harm, or that a majority of the directors are so personally and directly conflicted or committed to the decision in dispute that they cannot reasonably be expected to respond to a demand in good faith, in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with ordinary prudence.

Even a director who “expects to derive a personal benefit” from a transaction “is not necessarily ‘so personally and directly conflicted or committed to the decision in dispute that [he] cannot reasonably be expected to respond to a demand in good faith[.]’” The question is whether his connection to the challenged conduct is such that he cannot weigh, in conformity with the statutory standard, whether the corporation should sue over it.

“Committed to the decision in dispute” refers to the rare case in which a director’s entanglement with the challenged decision is so personal and direct that he cannot weigh a demand to undo or rectify it—not the ordinary case of a director who made a decision and then defends it.

Two procedural aspects of the futility exception warrant emphasis.  First, a shareholder who files a derivative action without making a pre-suit demand must plead the facts that excuse the demand with particularity. Werbowsky requires that these facts “clearly demonstrate, in a very particular manner[]” that a demand would be futile, and the Maryland Rules now say the same: a derivative complaint must state “with particularity” either the efforts the plaintiff made “to obtain the desired action from the business entity” or “the reasons for not making an attempt to obtain the desired action.”

Second, although futility is often raised and decided on a motion to dismiss, as it was here, it need not be. The exception is fact-specific, and the issue “may be resolved as a factual matter.” A complaint that alleges enough to survive dismissal does not thereby conclusively establish futility; the question may be revisited on a fuller record.

Turning to the complaint here, the board has five members, so the shareholders had to plead particularized facts showing that at least three of them could not consider a demand under the standard set forth in subsection 2-405.1(c). They did so as to Tortoise’s chief executive officer. The question is whether the amended complaint pleads facts that establish that at least two of the remaining four directors are unable to evaluate a pre-suit litigation demand under section 2-405.1’s standard of conduct. It does not.

The shareholders’ allegations describe directors who presided over heavy losses, renewed the adviser’s contracts, praised the adviser, adopted defensive by-laws, opposed an earlier suit, declined a third party’s overture to discuss an assignment of claims and sat on a board that included the adviser’s chief executive. That is a narrative of a board resistant to the shareholders’ claims, but resistance does not prove incapacity.

What the shareholders have, in the end, is a strong disagreement with how the directors managed the funds and a confident prediction that the directors would have refused a demand. Werbowsky requires more: particularized facts showing that a majority of the board could not have considered the demand within the standard set forth in subsection 2-405.1(c). The shareholders do not meet this standard; as such, their argument fails.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed.

Freedom of Information; attorney’s fees

BOTTOM LINE: Where the circuit court awarded a prevailing party approximately half of the attorney’s fees it sought as the prevailing party in its Maryland Public Information Act suit, but it appeared to consider two inapplicable factors in so doing, it abused its discretion.

CASE: Sugarloaf Alliance, Inc. v. Frederick County, Maryland, No. 32, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed July 14, 2026) (Justices Fader, WATTS, Booth, Biran) (Justices GOULD, Eaves dissent) (Justices KILLOUGH, Eaves dissent).

FACTS: Sugarloaf Alliance, Inc. filed two Maryland Public Information Act, or MPIA, requests with Frederick County, Maryland. After acknowledging receipt of Sugarloaf’s requests, the county took no apparent action and produced no documents for Sugarloaf. Eight months later, Sugarloaf filed a complaint in the circuit court, alleging that the county violated the MPIA by failing to timely produce the requested records.

Almost two months later, the county produced 20 documents, but withheld 136 other items. Following a bench trial, the circuit court directed the county to submit 15 of the withheld documents for in camera review and to provide Sugarloaf with the remaining documents. The county complied with the order.

Sugarloaf then filed a petition for attorney’s fees, costs and expenses, seeking a total of $48,813.62. At a hearing on the petition, the circuit court ruled that 14 of the documents were properly withheld and that it would not order disclosure of the documents. Thereafter, Sugarloaf filed a supplemental petition, seeking an additional $6,648.

The circuit court awarded Sugarloaf attorney’s fees in the amount of $25,000. It denied Sugarloaf’s supplemental petition for attorney’s fees, with a notation that the request should have been presented at the hearing on the original petition. Both sides appealed. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court’s judgment awarding Sugarloaf $25,000 in attorney’s fees, but vacated the order denying Sugarloaf’s supplemental petition for attorney’s fees and remanded the case for further proceedings on the supplemental petition.

LAW: This court finds that, in determining the amount of the attorney’s fee award, the circuit court considered circumstances not included in the factors set forth in Maryland Rule 2-703(f)(3) and that at least two of the factors discussed by the court were not relevant or appropriate for consideration under the lodestar approach—namely, that it would not ascribe an evil motive to county officials and that the citizens of the county would bear the burden of the attorney’s fees award.

In its opinion, after finding that Sugarloaf’s attorneys’ fees, totaling $48,813.62, were “customary and reasonable[,]” and discussing the two objectionable factors, without further explanation, the circuit court announced an award of $25,000. This court is unable to conclude that the circuit court followed established principles or the Maryland Rules in determining the award, given that, after observing that the number of hours expended and hourly fees charged by Sugarloaf were reasonable, the circuit court forsook application of Maryland Rule 2-703(f)(3) and considered circumstances that were not appropriate for determination of an attorneys’ fee award.

Under these circumstances, the circuit court did not follow the established standard for determining an attorney’s fee award and abused its discretion in determining the amount of the award. The court reverses the Appellate Court’s judgment affirming the award of $25,000 in attorney’s fees and remands the case to that court with instructions to vacate the circuit court’s award and to remand the case to the circuit court for it to reconsider the petition for attorney’s fees.

Finally, the county raises no issue with respect to the Appellate Court vacating the circuit court’s denial of the supplemental petition for attorneys’ fees and remanding the matter for reconsideration and has not filed a cross-petition concerning the matter. As such, the Appellate Court’s remand of the case to the circuit court for consideration of the supplemental petition for attorney’s fees is not in dispute.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland reversed in part as stated in the opinion.

DISSENT: Reviewing the court’s opinion with the deference that this discretionary decision is owed, the majority should have affirmed. Because it did not, I respectfully dissent.

DISSENT: The circuit court found Sugarloaf eligible for an award of attorney’s fees, applied the lodestar method, found the hourly rates and hours expended to be customary and reasonable, considered the results obtained and exercised its discretion to award $25,000 of the $48,813 requested. That is not an abuse of discretion. I would affirm.

Insurance; “household” exclusion

BOTTOM LINE: Where the “household” exclusion in an automobile insurance policy applied to the wrongful death claim brought by the adult children on behalf of their father, who was killed in a vehicle driven by their mother, the insurance carrier’s liability was limited to $30,000 (and not the $300,000 limit otherwise available if the exclusion did not apply).

CASE: Murphy III v. Government Employees Insurance Company, No. 55, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed July 13, 2026) (Justices Fader, Watts, Booth, Biran, GOULD, Eaves, Killough).

FACTS: This case requires the court to interpret and apply the provision of an automobile insurance policy called the “household” exclusion. Here, the insureds under the policy were a married couple with four adult children. The question is whether that exclusion limits the coverage available to satisfy a wrongful death claim brought by the adult children, where the “bodily injury” on which their claim depends is the death of their father caused by the negligent driving of their mother.

Both the circuit court and the Appellate Court of Maryland held that household exclusion applied, such that the insurance carrier’s liability to the adult children was limited to $30,000 (and not the $300,000 limit otherwise available if the exclusion did not apply).

LAW: The carrier’s coverage obligation hinges on two conditions. First, the insured must become “legally obligated” to pay “damages” to someone. Second, the insured’s legal obligation to pay damages must be “because of” something that happened—a triggering event.

That triggering event is defined as a “[b]odily injury, sustained by a person” arising out of an insured’s use of the “owned auto or non-owned auto.” The defined term “bodily injury,” therefore, merely identifies the event that gives rise to the insured’s legal obligation to pay damages; it does not define the scope of such damages or describe the types of claims that arise out of the event.

Here, the wrongful death statute provides the adult children with a cause of action for their father’s death. Said differently, the solatium damages available to the adult children under the wrongful death statute are, in the words of the policy, the “damages which an insured becomes legally obligated to pay,” but not part of the event—the “bodily injury” to the father—which triggered the mother’s obligation to pay such damages.

This interpretation of the term “bodily injury” and the function it serves in the “Losses We Will Pay” provision likewise applies to the provision limiting the carrier’s liability under the policy. Because the duty to pay under “Losses We Will Pay” is premised on the “bodily injury” that is the death of the father, it must be that same “bodily injury” to which the exclusion refers.

Thus, because the father was an insured, his “bodily injury” falls within the household exclusion. And because the insureds did not purchase the optional Supplemental Resident Relative Liability coverage that would have removed it, the exclusion therefore applies, limiting the carrier’s obligation to pay the adult children’s wrongful death damages to $30,000. This conclusion is supported by a line of Maryland cases discussed in the parties’ briefs and relied upon by the circuit court and the Appellate Court.

Judgement of the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed.

Municipal; statutory caps

 BOTTOM LINE: Where the circuit court held that the damages cap in the Local Government Tort Claims Act applied to a damages award under the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act, it erred. That statute has its own cap on damages that applies equally to private and government employers.

CASE: Prince George’s County v. Watts, No. 56, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed July 13, 2026) (Justices FADER, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, Getty) (Justice WATTS concurs and dissents).

FACTS: Joseph Watts sued Prince George’s County. He alleged that the County had unlawfully discriminated against him under both the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act, or MFEPA, and Prince George’s County Code § 2-222, and that it had unlawfully retaliated against him under MFEPA. A jury found the County liable for both disability discrimination and retaliation, and awarded Mr. Watts $1,700,000 in damages, including $1,098,104.50 for disability discrimination and $601,895.50 for retaliation.

The Local Government Tort Claims Act, or LGTCA, makes local governments responsible for the “tortious acts or omissions” of their employees committed within the scope of their employment. It also limits the liability of local governments by capping the amount of damages that can be awarded against them and immunizes local government employees from liability for such claims if they acted without malice.

The trial court applied the LGTCA damages cap and entered judgment for a total of $400,000, plus costs and attorney’s fees. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that the LGTCA liability cap did not apply to Mr. Watts’s claims because Mr. Watts’s injuries arose from statutory violations, not “tortious acts or omissions.”

LAW: The court holds that the LGTCA’s limitation on damages does not apply generally to all state statutory claims. The LGTCA is a general statute containing a general mechanism to limit the otherwise uncapped liability of local governments for tortious acts or omissions. Where the General Assembly has provided for a different balance in enacting statutory schemes that authorize private causes of action against local governments, the LGTCA does not apply.

That may be the case where a more specific statutory scheme expressly provides for the treatment of claims against local governments or where the other scheme is sufficiently comprehensive that we can infer that the General Assembly contemplated such claims. However, where state statutory claims sound in tort and it is not apparent that the General Assembly has made a decision concerning how to treat claims against local governments, the LGTCA may apply.

Focusing first on the MFEPA, that is a comprehensive statutory scheme that reflects detailed consideration of the scope of its coverage and its application to various categories and types of possible respondents. It also contains provisions concerning the types of damages that are available for violations and its own cap on compensatory damages based on the employer’s size. And it expressly applies to county governments and, in that circumstance, mandates the same remedies as are available against a private employer. Accordingly, MFEPA stands on its own and this court has no hesitation in concluding that the LGTCA cap on damages does not apply to MFEPA claims.

Section 20-1202 stands in stark contrast to MFEPA with respect to its general comprehensiveness and specific treatment of claims against governmental entities. Section 20-1202 establishes a cause of action for common law damages without any differentiation based on the type or category of defendant. It does not even mention local government entities as potential defendants.

Simply put, § 20-1202 does not provide any indication that the General Assembly contemplated claims against local governments and decided to impose a different scope of liability than that provided by the LGTCA. Under that circumstance, the LGTCA cap on damages applies. To decide otherwise would be to subject local governments to exactly what the LGTCA was adopted to prevent—uncapped liability to claims sounding in tort—with no indication that the General Assembly intended that result.

Accordingly, Mr. Watts will be entitled to a judgment in whichever amount is higher: (a) his MFEPA claims after application of the limitations provision of that statutory scheme; or (b) his § 20-1202 claim after application of the LGTCA damages cap. It will be up to the circuit court on remand to make those calculations.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed in part and reversed in part.

CONCUR/DISSENT: I concur with the majority that MFEPA claims are not subject to the damages cap of the LGTCA. I part ways with the majority, though, in its holding that claims arising under SG § 20-1202 and PGCC § 2-222 are subject to the damages cap of the LGTCA.

Parent and child; CINA

BOTTOM LINE: Although the mother complied with the Safe Haven Act when she left her four-day twins at a designated facility, that did not preclude a finding of “neglect.” While her action may not have caused them immediate harm, the child’s health or welfare is nonetheless “placed at a substantial risk of harm” because there is no parent or legal guardian who can make decisions on their behalf.

CASE: In re: B.Cd. & B.Cb., No. 47, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed July 15, 2026) (Justices Fader, Booth, Biran, Gould, KILLOUGH) (Justices WATTS, Eaves concur and dissent).

FACTS: The Maryland Safe Haven Act, codified at Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, or CJP, § 5-641, permits a parent to surrender an unharmed newborn at a designated facility within 60 days of birth, free from criminal prosecution or civil liability for the act of surrender. Within 24 hours after accepting the newborn, the hospital or other designated facility that accepts the newborn must notify the local department of social services.

Under the regulations adopted to implement the Safe Haven Program, a local department of social services is required to file a “child in need of assistance,” or CINA, petition with the juvenile court. For a juvenile court to adjudicate a child who was abandoned at a designated facility under the Safe Haven Act to be a CINA, the court must make a finding of “neglect,” that is, the child has been “placed at substantial risk of harm.”

Mother surrendered her four-day-old twin sons at Baltimore Washington Medical Center pursuant to the Safe Haven Act. The Anne Arundel County Department of Social Services took custody and filed CINA petitions. At the de novo adjudicatory and disposition hearing, she asserted the Safe Haven Act’s immunity from civil liability precluded a neglect finding. She also invoked CJP § 3-819(e) and requested that custody be awarded to father.

The juvenile court found that Mother’s actions constituted neglect, denied her CJP § 3-819(e) motion to award custody to father and committed the children to the Department’s custody. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed in a reported decision. While the appeal was pending, the CINA case closed, and father was awarded full custody.

LAW: The CINA statute defines “neglect” as the “failure to give proper care and attention to a child by any parent . . . under circumstances that indicate . . . [t]hat the child’s health or welfare is . . . placed at substantial risk of harm[.]” Mother argues that she could not have neglected the twins, because she left them “unharmed” within 60 days of their birth at a designated facility under the Safe Haven Act. This court disagrees with mother’s narrow interpretation of the word “neglect.”

Although the act of dropping the twins off at a designated facility may not have caused them immediate harm, the child’s health or welfare is nonetheless “placed at a substantial risk of harm[,]” because there is no parent or legal guardian who can make decisions on their behalf. The act of abandoning the child at the designated facility places the child at “substantial risk of harm” because without intervention by the local department, there is no one to provide for the child’s basic health or welfare needs.

Here, by the time the twins were ready for discharge, there was no parent available, no legal custodian, no provision for their ongoing care and no one legally obligated to feed, shelter, provide medical care for or make decisions for them in the long-term. These children had been left without permanent provision for their care, placing them at substantial risk of harm. That the Department intervened after the surrender does not alter the analysis. The focus is on whether the parent’s conduct placed the child at substantial risk of harm, not on whether a third party subsequently ameliorated that risk.

Mother nevertheless asserts the Safe Haven Act’s immunity from civil liability precludes a neglect finding. This court agrees with the Department that it would be an absurd result to interpret the Safe Haven Act to render the local department and juvenile courts powerless to protect a newborn in a CINA proceeding. For an unharmed newborn who is left with a responsible adult or at a designated facility under the Safe Haven Act, the child cannot be a CINA unless the juvenile court finds that the child “has been neglected.”

If, as mother argues, the language of the Safe Haven Act granting immunity from “civil liability” precludes a CINA neglect finding, a local department of social services would have no legal authority to provide the care, protection, safety, development and placement or reunification required by the CINA statute.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed.

CONCUR/DISSENT: I agree with the majority’s conclusion that CJ § 5-641 does not bar a neglect finding in a CINA proceeding. I do not agree, however, that action by a parent in compliance with the Safe Haven statute alone constitutes neglect under CJ § 3-801, as the majority holds.

Real Property; futility

BOTTOM LINE: Although the homeowner satisfied the outstanding judgment before the public auction was ratified, the district court erred when it vacated the sale. A sheriff’s sale may not be vacated as a result of a judgment-debtor’s post-sale satisfaction of the judgment.

CASE: Baltimore XV Properties LLC v. Newsteps’ Choice North Homeowners Association, Inc., No. 24, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed July 14, 2026) (Justice BIRAN) (Justices FADER, Booth, Gould concur) (Justices WATTS, Eaves, Killough dissent) (Justices KILLOUGH, Watts, Eaves dissent).

FACTS: Newsteps’ Choice North Homeowners Association, Inc. obtained a judgment against Wendy Carrington. The HOA placed a levy on Ms. Carrington’s interest in her home in the Northridge/Newsteps’ Choice North community in Bowie, Maryland. Ms. Carrington did not satisfy the judgment or otherwise obtain release of the levy on the property before the sheriff conducted a public auction. The winning bidder at the auction was Baltimore XV Properties LLC.

After the sale, but before ratification, Ms. Carrington satisfied the judgment by providing the necessary funds to the HOA. The district court decided that it was proper to vacate the sale because Ms. Carrington satisfied the judgment before the sale was ratified. On appeal, the circuit court reached the same result.

LAW: At common law, a sheriff’s sale generally was deemed final and valid as soon as it was made. In 1984, by rule this court made sheriff’s sales subject to court ratification.

Under Rules 3-644 and 14-305, a party who opposes ratification of a sheriff’s sale must file written exceptions to the sale. Because the court must strictly construe these rules as applied to a sheriff’s sale, a party may raise post-sale satisfaction of the judgment as an exception only if Rule 14-305 plainly allows it. Rule 14-305 does not do so.

Rule 14-305 provides that exceptions “shall set forth the alleged irregularity with particularity[.]” An “irregularity” within the meaning of Rule 14-305 is a problem with the sale itself. Examples of such irregularities include an unconscionably low sale price, errors in the advertisement of sale and the chilling of bidding on the property. Post-sale satisfaction of the judgment is not cognizable as an exception to a sheriff’s sale. It is not an irregularity in the sale itself.

Maryland law provides a clear and logical approach to the release of property from a levy, including by satisfaction of the judgment. Before a sale, judgment-debtors may pursue several avenues for release of levied property. Post-sale, those options no longer are available. A contrary reading of the rules would violate the requirement that this court narrowly construe provisions in derogation of common law.

Respondents argue that justice requires that a judgment-debtor’s post-sale satisfaction of the judgment void a sheriff’s sale that has not yet been ratified. This court disagrees. A purchaser’s inchoate equitable interest confers an important right upon the purchaser: the right to the ratification process set forth in the Maryland Rules. Allowing a judgment-debtor’s post-sale satisfaction of the judgment to void a sheriff’s sale would violate that right.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County reversed.

CONCUR: I join the majority opinion. I write separately to address the suggestion in Justice Killough’s dissent that the sheriff’s sale at issue may allow Baltimore XV to purchase a $458,000 house for $6,000. That suggestion is wrong or overstated in several different respects.

DISSENT: I disagree with the majority’s holding that “a sheriff’s sale may not be vacated as a result of a judgment-debtor’s post-sale satisfaction of the judgment” and that a debtor may only obtain a release of the property by satisfying the judgment prior to a sheriff’s sale. I disagree with the conclusion that, under Maryland Rule 14-305(e)(1), which authorizes exceptions to a sale setting “forth the alleged irregularity with particularity[,]” an “irregularity” is defined as “a problem with the sale itself.” I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

DISSENT: I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court. The underlying judgment was satisfied before ratification. After satisfaction of the judgment, the levy and sale lost any legal basis. Any inchoate interest held by the purchaser was extinguished. Treating the sale as effective despite satisfaction reinstates a self-executing sheriff’s sale in contravention of the Maryland Rules.

Sanctions; judicial removal

BOTTOM LINE: Where an Orphans’ Court judge violated multiple provisions of the Maryland Rules, including breaching the confidentiality of judicial deliberations by recording them, recording judicial colleagues and staff without their knowledge and/or consent and failing to cooperate during the Maryland Commission on Judicial Disabilities’ investigative process, he was removed from office.

CASE: In the Matter of the Honorable Marc Knapp, Judge of the Orphans’ Court for Anne Arundel County, JD No. 1, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed July 17, 2026) (Justices Watts, BOOTH, Biran, Gould, Eaves, Harrell, McDonald).

FACTS: This case concerns Marc Knapp, a judge of the Orphans’ Court for Anne Arundel County, who was elected to that position by the qualified voters of Anne Arundel County in November 2022.

Investigative Counsel charged Judge Knapp with having engaged in sanctionable conduct that violated multiple provisions of the Maryland Rules.

Following a public hearing, the Maryland Commission on Judicial Disabilities issued a unanimous decision in which it made extensive findings of fact, and found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Judge Knapp committed sanctionable conduct as defined by Maryland Rule 18-402(m)(1). By unanimous vote, the Commission recommended that Judge Knapp be removed from office.

Judge Knapp filed 24 exceptions to the Commission’s findings of fact, and five exceptions (including multiple subparts) to its legal conclusions, and urged this court to adopt a lesser sanction. The Commission filed a response to Judge Knapp’s exceptions. Following argument, this court entered a per curiam order concluding that Judge Knapp committed one or more of the violations determined by the Commission. It ordered his removal. This opinion explains why.

LAW: Judge Knapp first asserts that the Commission erred in denying his request to consolidate his hearing with a hearing on his colleague, Chief Judge Vickie Gipson’s pending disciplinary charges. The chair determined, among other things, that any potential judicial economy was outweighed by the potential for confusion, and the right of confidentiality. In undertaking a balancing analysis, the chair gave a reasoned and thoughtful explanation for her denial of the motion.

Judge Knapp also contends that the Commission should have excluded from the evidence, and therefore should not have considered, a recording extracted from his cell phone, based upon his contention that the cell phone was unlawfully seized by law enforcement officers. The chair’s application of the applicable factors to the evidence in this case was not clearly erroneous and ascribe no error to her denial of Judge Knapp’s motion.

Judge Knapp filed 24 exceptions to the Commission’s fact-finding. Most of his exceptions involve findings in which the Commission chose to credit the testimony of a witness or a number of witnesses over Judge Knapp’s account or characterization of events. Judge Knapp contends that the Commission erred by failing to accept his version of the facts, or his characterization of the same, over the accounts of other witnesses. Having conducted an independent review of the record, the court overrules these exceptions as they all involve findings that were based upon the Commission’s witness credibility determinations, which were not clearly erroneous.

The court overrules Judge Knapp’s remaining exceptions, most of which are persnickity and insignificant complaints. For example, Judge Knapp excepts to the Commission’s finding that “[d]uring all relevant times, the Anne Arundel County Orphans’ Court sat on Tuesdays and Thursdays from 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.” He asserts that during the time in which Judge Duba was on the court, he “was a full-time high school teacher in Prince George’s County and was unable to arrive until 11:15 a.m. during the school year which meant that hearings did not begin until 11:30 or later.” The Commission’s findings refer to the orphans’ court’s general hours in which the court sat, which was based upon the testimony of both Judge Duba and Judge Knapp.

The Commission found by clear and convincing evidence that Judge Knapp engaged in the following sanctionable conduct in violation of Rules 18.101 and 18.101.2: (1) engaging in loud arguments with a judicial colleague that were heard by Register of Wills staff and the public; (2) being rude and confrontational to a judicial colleague during hearings before the public and in chambers; (3) making disparaging statements about the judiciary, the Orphans’ Court and a judicial colleague to the public, law enforcement and the media; (4) violating a temporary peace order; (5) breaching the confidentiality of judicial deliberations by recording them; (6) recording judicial colleagues and staff without their knowledge and/or consent; (7) failing to cooperate during the Commission’s investigative process; (8) making negative comments, some very demeaning and with a raised voice, to staff and judicial colleagues, including mocking others’ work product, educational level, competence and intelligence; (9) engaging in aggressive behavior, including invading personal space and refusing to retreat upon request; (10) using unprofessional language, including profanity, in the courthouse, as well as in written communications; and (11) failing to cooperate with colleagues to promote confidence in the judiciary. The court overrules his exceptions.

Judge Knapp’s removal from office was the only disposition sufficient to preserve the integrity of the judiciary, and assure the public that the Judiciary will not, and does not, condone such egregious misconduct.

So ordered.

Sanctions; commitment orders

BOTTOM LINE: Where the Maryland Department of Health must commit a defendant found not competent to stand trial and dangerous to self or others because of a mental condition to a health care facility no later than 10 business days after receiving the commitment order, and the Department repeatedly failed to do so, it was sanctioned.

CASE: Maryland Department of Health v. Boulden, No. 35, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed July 15, 2026) (Justices Watts, BIRAN, Eaves, Hotten) (Justices BOOTH, Gould, Killough dissent).

FACTS: Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc., or CP, § 3-106 provides that when a court finds that a defendant is not competent to stand trial and dangerous to self or others because of a mental condition, or IST, the court must order the defendant to be committed to a health care facility as soon as possible, but not later than 10 business days after the Maryland Department of Health receives the court commitment order.

Jeffrey Boulden, Glenn Hawkins, William Lomax, Kennard Goins, Malik Jackson and Steven Kauffman were each found IST by a circuit court. The Department failed to comply with the 10-day deadline in admitting respondents to designated health care facilities. Respondents then sought and obtained sanctions against the Department under CP § 3-106(c)(4).

The Appellate Court of Maryland held that the circuit courts did not abuse their discretion in deciding to impose sanctions. However, the Appellate Court ordered a remand in four of the cases for recalculation of the amount of sanctions.

LAW: The circuit courts did not abuse their discretion in imposing sanctions in respondents’ cases. The General Assembly has authorized trial judges to impose monetary sanctions that are reasonably designed to compel the Department to admit the defendants before them to designated health care facilities as soon as possible after the expiration of the 10 business-day deadline.

If there is a waiting list for placement, a court may sanction the Department for every day that it does not manage the waiting list so as to admit the defendant as soon as possible beginning on the eleventh business day following receipt of the defendant’s commitment order.

The record before the courts in respondents’ cases demonstrated that the Department did not manage the waiting list to admit respondents as soon as possible after the expiration of the 10-day deadline. The courts did not abuse their discretion in deciding to impose sanctions in respondents’ cases. In addition, the placement of Messrs. Hawkins and Goins before the hearing did not prohibit the court from imposing sanctions. The General Assembly intended to permit courts to sanction the Department under § 3-106(c)(4) both before and after the belated admission of a defendant.

On this court’s own initiative, it invited the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing whether, in imposing monetary sanctions against the Department in these cases, the courts violated Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which mandates the separation of governmental powers. The court now concludes that the Department waived its arguments based on Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights. Regardless, the Department’s separation of powers arguments lack merit. The General Assembly did not violate Article 8 in authorizing courts to impose sanctions under CP § 3-106(c)(4). In imposing sanctions in respondents’ cases, the judges did not usurp the functions of the Executive Branch.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed.

DISSENT: I would hold that interpreting CP § 3-106(c)(4) to authorize judges to impose sanctions on the Department for failure to place individuals within the 10-day period, without a finding that the Department acted willfully or had the present ability to comply with a commitment order, violates Article 8 of the Maryland Constitution.

Taxation; statute of limitations

BOTTOM LINE: Where the Appellate Court held that a taxation refund request was timely because it was filed within 30 days of the Comptroller’s notice of assessment, it erred. The refund request was for taxes paid voluntarily during the audit period of Aug. 1, 2003, through July 31, 2007—payments made in the ordinary course of business, not in satisfaction of a notice of assessment. It was thus subject to the general four-year statute of limitations.

CASE: Comptroller of Maryland v. The Potomac Edison Company, No. 12, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed July 17, 2026) (Justices Fader, Watts, Booth, Biran, GOULD, Eaves) (Justice KILLOUGH dissents).

FACTS: This case involves three issues concerning the Maryland sales and use tax statute. The first is the exemption Md. Code Ann., Tax-Gen, or TG § 11-210(b)(1), which exempts from the tax “tangible personal property” used “directly and predominantly in a production activity[.]”

“Production activity” includes the “processing” of “tangible personal property for resale.” The Comptroller of Maryland and The Potomac Edison Company dispute whether the equipment used by the latter to transmit and distribute electricity to its Maryland customers is used in a “production activity” and, if so, whether such equipment is used “directly and predominantly” for that purpose.

The second issue is the limitations period applicable to refund claims for the sales and use tax. The third issue concerns TG § 13-603, which requires the Comptroller to pay interest on a refund unless the taxpayer’s mistake in making the payment was not attributable to the state.

LAW: The threshold question here is whether Potomac Edison’s conductor, substation and transformer equipment is “used directly and predominantly in a production activity” under TG § 11-210(b)(1). That question has two parts.

The court holds that the equipment that comprises Potomac Edison’s transmission and distribution system subjects the electricity to a series of actions designed for the specific objective of delivering, over long distances, electricity generated out of state to Maryland customers at a voltage suitable for their use. Such equipment is, therefore, used for “processing” and, as such, performs a “production activity” under § 11-210(b)(1).

Second, the Tax Court’s finding that such equipment was used “directly and predominantly” for that purpose was supported by substantial evidence. Put simply, the Tax Court listened to the testimony, weighed competing technical accounts of the relevant equipment and made findings that reasonable minds could reach on the record before it.

The Comptroller next challenges the timeliness of the refund request. Subsection 13-1104(g) sets a four-year limitations period for sales and use tax refund claims, and it is undisputed that, under that provision, much of the refund request was filed outside the four-year period.

The Appellate Court held that the refund request was governed by the 30-day period under § 13-508(a), which runs from the date of the notice of assessment, not the four-year period in § 13-1104(g), which runs from the payment date. And because Potomac Edison had filed its refund request within 30 days of the Comptroller’s notice of assessment, the court held that the entire refund claim was timely under § 13-508(a). This court disagrees.

Potomac Edison’s refund request was for taxes paid voluntarily during the audit period of Aug. 1, 2003, through July 31, 2007—payments made in the ordinary course of business, not in satisfaction of a notice of assessment. Accordingly, the refund request is governed by the four-year limitations period in § 13-1104(g), rendering it untimely except as to those payments made between April 1, 2007, and July 31, 2007.

Having found that § 13-1104(g) does apply, this court will remand to the Appellate Court to address Potomac Edison’s arguments, raised but not decided there, that the parties mutually agreed to extend their respective deadlines and that the Comptroller is estopped from asserting otherwise.

Third, subsection 13-603(a) of the Tax-General Article requires the Comptroller to pay interest on an approved refund. Subsection 13-603(b) makes an exception for a refund “based on . . . an error or mistake of the claimant not attributable to the State.” The exception applies only if both conditions are met: the overpayment must be the taxpayer’s mistake, and it must not be attributable to the state.

The Comptroller argues that Potomac Edison “erroneously paid the sales-and-use tax it seeks in its refund claim due to ‘accounting system irregularities.’” That Potomac Edison paid such taxes on some, but not other, equipment purchases during the audit period shows, the Comptroller argues, that its accounting irregularities were not attributable to the state. This argument misses the mark. Potomac Edison is entitled to interest on its refund under § 13-603.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed in part, and reversed in part.

DISSENT: The General Assembly exempted the generation of electricity, not the importation of it. Potomac Edison generates nothing. By its own concession, it is a transmission and distribution intermediary—a conduit between out-of-state generators and Maryland consumers. It buys electricity made elsewhere, moves it across state lines and sells it. That is the business of a middleman, not a manufacturer. To treat it as one for purposes of the “production activity” tax exemption does violence to the statutory text, the legislative purpose and any recognizable understanding of the production activities the General Assembly chose to exempt.

Tort; malicious prosecution

BOTTOM LINE: Where a homeowners’ association’s malicious prosecution suit failed to plead facts showing a special injury, it was properly dismissed.

CASE: The Council of Unit Owners of the Millrace Condominium, Inc. v. Shapiro Sher Guinot & Sandler, P.A., No. 58, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed July 13, 2026) (Justices Fader, Watts, Booth, Biran, Gould, EAVES, Killough).

FACTS: Petitioners are homeowners’ associations and individuals on those respective associations’ boards. Respondents are developers, the law firm that represented them and an attorney from that law firm. Respondents filed a lawsuit against petitioners, who eventually secured a dismissal of that strategic lawsuit against public participation, or SLAPP, under § 5-807 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, or CJP, of the Maryland Annotated Code.

Petitioners then initiated the present suit against respondents, alleging one count of malicious use of process. Respondents moved to dismiss petitioners’ suit on the ground that they did not assert a special injury. The circuit court agreed, dismissing the suit, and the Appellate Court affirmed.

LAW: The lower courts correctly held that petitioners did not plead a special injury, as required to state a claim for malicious proseuction. The injuries pleaded in the complaint—litigation expenses, temporary diminution in property value, anxiety and emotional distress associated with defending a meritless lawsuit—do not differ in kind from the burdens that attend the defense of any civil action. This court’s case law has rejected these injuries as insufficient to satisfy the special injury requirement under a cause of action for malicious use of process. While those harms are real and may be substantial, they are not the kind of special injury, such as seizure of person or property, that the cause of action requires.

That conclusion is reinforced by what the underlying litigation here did not entail. The SLAPP produced no arrest or seizure of persons, no garnishment, no liens, no injunction against the use of the HOAs’ property and no foreclosures. Discovery was stayed by agreement of the parties. The SLAPP was dismissed under CJP § 5-807(d) within five months of its filing, and defendants voluntarily paid the HOAs’ attorneys’ fees and costs. The anti-SLAPP statute operated precisely as the General Assembly designed—modestly, but effectively.

Recognizing the difficulty of prevailing on the special-injury element under existing law, the HOAs ask this court to take the larger step of holding that the filing of a SLAPP, by its bad-faith nature, satisfies the special-injury requirement. The HOAs argue that the “special injury [requirement]” should not be permitted to protect those who file SLAPPs for “[i]llicit [p]urposes[,]” and that dismissal of their malicious use of process suit is “inconsistent with the constitutional values” promoted in the anti-SLAPP statute. Their arguments are unpersuasive.

The HOAs freely exercised their constitutional rights by attending Commission meetings and voicing their opposition to defendants’ development. The HOAs’ complaint alleges only that the SLAPP was intended to retaliate against them for that opposition. Their complaint contains no allegation that the HOAs actually ceased, or even curtailed, their participation in the underlying zoning matters or in any other public proceeding after the SLAPP was initiated.

Moreover the HOAs conflate the “bad faith” requirement in the anti-SLAPP statute, CJP § 5-807(b)(1), with the element of special injury in a claim for malicious use of process. Bad faith—or malice—and special injury are independent elements in a claim for malicious use of process; the presence of the former does not establish the latter. The prior proceeding against the HOAs was indeed instituted in bad faith, which contributes to the equation for both the SLAPP and the claim for malicious use of process. But that fact alone does not mean that the HOAs have suffered a special injury, as the Appellate Court correctly observed.

Most fundamentally, the per se rule that the HOAs propose is the very legislative choice that the General Assembly has declined to make. Under certain circumstances, the failure to enact legislation can be evidence of legislative intent, particularly “where bills have repeatedly been introduced in the General Assembly to accomplish a particular result, and where the General Assembly has persistently refused to enact such bills.”

When the General Assembly enacted and later revised CJP § 5-807, it specifically considered and rejected language that would have authorized damages and “additional relief” designed to deter SLAPPs. It has, over the course of many sessions, persistently declined to expand the statute’s remedies. This court will not, by judicial fiat, install a remedy that the General Assembly has consistently declined to enact. If the legislative balance struck in CJP § 5-807 is too modest to adequately deter SLAPPs, then that is a matter for the General Assembly to revisit.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed.