Supreme Court of MD: Juvenile court, jury instruction, expert testimony, more

Constitutional; ecclesiastical abstention doctrine

BOTTOM LINE: Where a religious entity sued its former bishop for refusing to vacate church property after he had been defrocked, the lower courts erred in holding that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prevented them from resolving the landlord/tenant dispute.

CASE: Eritrean Orthodox Tweahdo Diocese of USA and Canada v. Sinoda, No. 49, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed July 23, 2026) (Justices Fader, Watts, Booth, BIRAN, Gould, Eaves, Killough).

FACTS: To ensure that courts do not become entangled in religious disputes, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prohibits courts from resolving legal claims that necessarily turn on matters of religious doctrine, faith or governance. Although it protects religious organizations from judicial interference in spiritual matters, secular laws often may be applied to religious institutions and officials without running afoul of the First Amendment.

The issue in this case is whether the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine precludes a Maryland court from deciding a wrongful detainer action brought by the Eritrean Orthodox Tewahdo Diocese of U.S.A. and Canada, Inc.’s Board to reclaim possession of real property from respondent Abune Sinoda Tafla, who was formerly appointed by the Eritrean Orthodox Tweahdo Church’s Holy Synod to be the Church’s Bishop of the United States and Canada, but was later defrocked. Two lower courts answered yes.

LAW: Respondent claims the Synod lacked proper authority to defrock him as Bishop. Consequently, he was not properly removed from the Board, and the Board’s subsequent decision to remove him from the property – made without him present – was illegitimate.

According to respondent, he remains the true Bishop in control of the Corporation, with a possessory right to occupy the property that serves as a parsonage for the current bishop. Respondent contends that, in order to decide whether or not he has a right to possess the property, a Maryland court would need to decide a question of religious doctrine. Accordingly, respondent argues, the lower courts correctly invoked the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. This court disagrees.

The record lacks any evidence that there is any legal right for the Bishop of the United States and Canada to possess the property. The Church’s bylaws are silent concerning the provision of a parsonage to any bishop. The deed to the property mentions nothing about who will occupy the premises. It is undisputed that no lease provides for respondent to occupy the property for as long as he serves as Bishop (or for any other period of time).

There is no evidence of any other contract – such as an employment agreement – under which the Church or the corporation agrees to provide the property for use as a parsonage to the Bishop of the United States and Canada. Lastly, the Maryland Religious Corporation Law is silent on any such property right conditioned on the employment of a clergyperson.

Respondent’s argument essentially rests on the hierarchy of the Church: the Bishop leads the Diocese of the United States and Canada, and the corporation provides the property to the Bishop for use as a parsonage. But this court has held that ecclesiastical hierarchy, without more, does not alter property rights provided under Maryland law.

Turning to the merits, it is undisputed that the corporation has asked respondent to vacate the property on multiple occasions, and that respondent was aware of such requests prior to the filing of the 2024 Action. It is also undisputed that the corporation has revoked respondent’s license to occupy the property. As a matter of law, the corporation is entitled to judgment on its claim for wrongful detainer.

Judgement of the Circuit Court of Prince George’s County reversed.

Criminal; juvenile court jurisdiction

BOTTOM LINE: Where the juvenile court originally had jurisdiction over a delinquency proceeding against a 12-year-old only because he was charged with robbery (a violent crime) and four lesser offenses arising from the same incident, the dismissal of the robbery charge did not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the remaining misdemeanor charges.

CASE: In Re: D.E., No. 59, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed July 22, 2026) (Justices Fader, Watts, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, KILLOUGH).

FACTS: Under the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2022, or JJRA, the juvenile court has no jurisdiction over a delinquency proceeding against a child under the age of 13. But there are exceptions. One exception is when a child, at least 10 years old, is alleged to have committed an act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime of violence. A second exception applies when a child is alleged to have committed an act arising out of the same incident as such a crime of violence. A child who falls within either exception comes within the juvenile court’s exclusive original jurisdiction.

A juvenile petition charged D.E., then 12 years old, with robbery and four lesser offenses arising from the same incident. Robbery is a crime of violence. Its presence in the petition placed D.E. within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. After an adjudicatory hearing, a magistrate found D.E. not involved in the robbery but involved in misdemeanor theft. D.E. then moved to dismiss. He argued that the juvenile court lost its jurisdiction the moment it declined to sustain the robbery charge, because a 12-year-old alleged to have committed only a misdemeanor cannot be brought into juvenile court at all.

The magistrate denied the motion, explaining that under In re J.B., 261 Md. App. 274 (2024), jurisdiction attached at the filing of the petition and continued thereafter. D.E. noted an appeal to the Appellate Court of Maryland. Before that court heard argument, however, this court granted D.E.’s petition for a writ of certiorari.

LAW: Section 3-8A-03 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, or CJP, tells the juvenile court how it obtains jurisdiction. For a child 10-12 years old, the answer is that jurisdiction is determined at the charging stage: the petition must allege a crime of violence or an act arising from the same incident as a crime of violence. Subsection 3-8A-07(a) tells the court how long that jurisdiction lasts once the court has obtained it. The answer is until the child turns 21, “unless terminated sooner.”

D.E.’s argument depends on collapsing those two jobs into one. He reads § 3-8A-03(a)(1)(ii) as not only conferring jurisdiction at the outset but also as imposing a condition that must persist at every subsequent stage of the proceeding. The misdemeanor theft charge, D.E. contends, could only fall within the juvenile court’s purview via the same-incident clause. Because that clause operates purely by reference to a companion crime of violence, he argues that when the crime-of-violence anchor disappears, jurisdiction over the derivative same-incident charge dissolves with it.

While this reading possesses a certain structural symmetry, it finds no anchor in the plain language of the statute and yields consequences the General Assembly could not have intended.

The Appellate Court’s reasoning in In re J.B. tracks the analysis this court adopts today. The court explained that CJP § 3-8A-03(a)(1)(ii)(1) “granted the juvenile court exclusive original jurisdiction” over the crime of violence, and that CJP § 3-8A-03(a)(1)(ii)(2) “provided the juvenile court with jurisdiction to adjudicate” the lesser offense “because that alleged act arose ‘out of the same incident’” as the qualifying offense.

The court held that “the plain language of CJP § 3-8A-03(a)(1) is clear and unambiguous,” and that jurisdiction continued after the anchor charge left the case. If the General Assembly had wanted the juvenile court to lose jurisdiction in those circumstances, it could have provided a statutory mechanism for that loss. It “chose not to do so[,]” and the Appellate Court saw “nothing in the legislative history of § 3-8A-03” supporting the contrary reading.

In sum, jurisdiction that attaches at filing continues under § 3-8A-07(a) until terminated by an event explicitly enumerated within the subtitle. A “not-sustained” finding on the anchoring offense is not a statutorily authorized mechanism for termination.

D.E. nevertheless asserts that his reading of the JJRA “avoids the threat of equal protection violations or at the very least the unequal treatment of children.” “Solely because the State charged [him] with robbery,” he says, “he was subjected to further proceedings . . . that other twelve-year-old children alleged to have committed the same misdemeanor would not have undergone.” The state responds that D.E. is not similarly situated to a child charged with a misdemeanor alone, because there was probable cause to charge him with robbery. This court agrees.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City affirmed.

Criminal; evidence

BOTTOM LINE: Where an abundance of circumstantial evidence permitted the jury to rationally infer that the defendant was intoxicated when he drove his vehicle, the Appellate Court erred when it vacated his convictions on the basis the state failed to present “specific evidence” that he was intoxicated while he operated the motor vehicle.

CASE: State v. Palmer Jr., No. 50, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed July 23, 2026) (Justices Fader, Watts, Booth, Biran, EAVES, Killough) (Justice GOULD concurs).

FACTS: A jury convicted the respondent, Marconi Palmer Jr., for, among other crimes, driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol. Palmer appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to sustain those convictions. The Appellate Court of Maryland agreed, noting that the state failed to present “specific evidence” that Mr. Palmer was intoxicated while he operated the motor vehicle.

LAW: The standard for sufficiency under Maryland law is no different for cases involving the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of, or impaired by, alcohol, than for any other case. It applies and treats circumstantial evidence the same as direct evidence. To the extent that the Appellate Court’s use of the phrase “specific evidence” could be interpreted to require the production of direct evidence, there is no such requirement.

Maryland’s case law is clear that direct and circumstantial evidence are to be treated equally and that factfinders can make reasonable inferences, not impermissible conjecture. It does not require a factfinder to rely on a particularized category of temporal evidence when determining if a defendant was intoxicated while driving. Instead, to attain a conviction, the state simply needs to produce evidence that permitted a factfinder to rationally infer that a defendant was intoxicated when they drove their vehicle. Those are the only principles that are relevant.

At bottom, when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the [state], any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Here, the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The vehicle here veered off of a dry roadway, with demarcating fog lines, and struck a sign, pulling that sign from the ground and causing damage to the vehicle. The only key to the vehicle was in Palmer’s pocket.

Palmer displayed signs of intoxication, such as bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, repeatedly asking Trooper Barfield what his name was and providing inconsistent explanations as to the status of the vehicle (waiting for a tow truck versus simply needing to inflate a tire). Palmer also generally displayed an aggressive and uncooperative behavior. That is certainly enough for the jury to conclude—as it did, which remains uncontested in this appeal—that Palmer was the driver of the vehicle, which was driven in a negligent manner and that he was intoxicated when law enforcement arrived.

That leaves the critical inquiry: Whether Palmer’s negligent driving can be attributed to driving while intoxicated. The jury, therefore, was presented with two options concerning the alcohol-related charges: Palmer either (1) drove the vehicle while intoxicated, resulting in the accident or (2) was sober when he negligently struck an inanimate object and then decided to consume alcohol while either waiting for a tow truck or to inflate a flat tire.

It is not beyond the realm of a permissible rational inference for the jury to infer that the negligent driving and accident were, in fact, caused by Palmer’s intoxication. The jury equally, and just as rationally, could have inferred that although Palmer crashed the vehicle, he did not consume any alcohol until after the accident. But when presented with permissible and competing rational inferences, the choice of which to accept belongs to the jury.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland reversed.

CONCUR: I agree that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Palmer’s convictions and that the Appellate Court’s judgment should be reversed. I write separately because I do not read the Appellate Court’s opinion as applying a heightened standard of proof for offenses based on driving while intoxicated. Thus, because the majority’s approximately 12-page analysis that such a heightened standard would have been an error is unnecessary, I concur in the judgment.

Criminal; jury instruction

BOTTOM LINE: Where the defendant challenged the circuit court’s refusal to give a jury instruction, but there was insufficient evidence to support the instruction, and any alleged error was harmless, the verdict was affirmed.

CASE: Shuler v. State, No. 57, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed July 20, 2026) (Justices Fader, BOOTH, Gould, Eaves, Killough) (Justice WATTS concurs and dissents) (Justice BIRAN concurs and dissents).

FACTS: The state charged Montay D. Shuler with first- and second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, robbery with a dangerous weapon and various firearms offenses, in the shooting deaths of two individuals during a marijuana purchase. Shuler testified that he acted in self-defense.

To impeach Shuler, the state introduced his prior statement denying all involvement in the shooting during a late-night, uncounseled custodial interview after his arrest. Although Shuler conceded that the statement was admissible, he requested a pattern jury instruction directing the jury that it could consider his prior statement only if it first found that the statement was voluntary. The trial court denied his request.

Ultimately, the jury acquitted Mr. Shuler of first- and second-degree murder, but found him guilty of two counts of voluntary manslaughter, one count of robbery with a deadly weapon, two counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence and illegal possession of a regulated firearm. The Appellate Court affirmed.

 LAW: In rejecting Shuler’s request for a jury instruction, the Appellate Court relied on two rationales. First, it reasoned that the instruction was unnecessary because Shuler’s prior statement was offered for “impeachment” and not “to prove guilt.” Second, it concluded that the statement fell outside of the scope of the instruction because it was neither “a confession” nor “incriminating,” but was instead “exonerating.”

The state does not defend either rationale before this court, and this court agrees that both are incorrect as a matter of law. It reaffirms this court’s existing case law and rejects the notion that a different procedure for adjudicating voluntariness applies simply because a statement was offered to impeach or was facially exculpatory.

However, turning to the evidence presented in this case, Shuler failed to present “some evidence” that his custodial statement was not voluntary under either the federal and state constitutional test or Maryland’s common law totality of the circumstances test. Critically, Mr. Shuler did not testify that he felt compelled to speak—instead, he testified about why he was untruthful about not being involved, as opposed to giving his self-defense account of the events to which he testified at trial.

His testimony mentioned no circumstances that would allow a reasonable factfinder to find that his will was overborne such that his statement was involuntary. Far from it: Mr. Shuler’s testimony indicated that he made a deliberate, strategic decision about what to tell the police about the incident.

Finally, even assuming Shuler presented sufficient evidence to require a voluntariness instruction, any error in failing to give that instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Shuler’s exculpatory statement in which he denied any involvement in the shootings, which was admitted for impeachment purposes only, and when he acknowledged in his testimony that he lied when he was interviewed by the police, did nothing to affirmatively establish his guilt. Moreover, his guilt was established by ample other evidence.

Even if the jury had decided not to consider Shuler’s statement of denial, the jury had all of the other evidence before it, including the victim’s handgun that was found in Shuler’s vehicle, the jail call where he admits to “an and one” and discusses prices for the gun, and his own testimony in which he explains that he lied to police and admits to shooting both Mr. Palmer and Mr. Stewart.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed.

CONCUR/DISSENT: I concur in the majority’s holding that, before the state may use a defendant’s out-of-court statement for impeachment purposes, it must first establish that the statement was voluntary. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that Shuler failed to generate “some evidence” to support the giving of an instruction on voluntariness and that the trial court did not err in refusing to give the instruction.

CONCUR/DISSENT: I do not join of the majority opinion in which the majority concludes that Shuler failed to present “some evidence” that his custodial statement was not voluntary. However, I join the remainder of the majority opinion, including the part in which the majority concludes that any error in failing to give a voluntariness instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Criminal; expert testimony

BOTTOM LINE: Where the Appellate Court held the trial court wrongly admitted expert testimony, it erred. Plain-error review requires that the error be clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute.

CASE: State v. Thornton, No. 46, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed July 21, 2026) (Justices Watts, Gould, Eaves, KILLOUGH) (Justices FADER, Booth, Biran concur and dissent).

FACTS: William Thornton and James Dunbar were convicted for offenses arising from the murder of Donnell Brockington. Six individuals surrounded the victim and shot him 10-12 times. The suspects fled in a vehicle, crashed into a tree, and four of them, including Thornton and Dunbar, were apprehended.

The DNA of both respondents was found on a Desert Eagle 9mm pistol recovered from the front passenger floor of the getaway vehicle. The state’s firearms examiner testified at trial that two cartridge casings, one bullet and two bullet fragments “were fired with” the Desert Eagle.

During the pendency of Thornton’s and Dunbar’s appeal, approximately seven months after respondents’ trial, this court decided Abruquah v. State, 483 Md. 637 (2023). Based on the record before in that case, this court held that the methodology of the Association of Firearm and Toolmark Examiners, or AFTE, could support an opinion that ammunition evidence was “consistent with” having been fired from a particular firearm but could not support an unqualified opinion that the ammunitions fired from that specific firearm. The Appellate Court of Maryland subsequently reversed respondents’ convictions on plain-error review. The state appeals.

Tornton separately challenges the trial court’s decision to close the courtroom during jury deliberations and to permit only family members from each side to attend the return of the verdict. The Appellate Court rejected Thornton’s public trial claim, finding the closures de minimis.

LAW: Plain-error review requires that the error be “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute[.]” The admission of the firearms examiner’s testimony was not clear or obvious error at either the time of trial or the time of appeal.

At the time of the respondents’ trial, the unsettled state of the law placed the respondents on notice that the issue was open. Respondents’ counsel had every reason and opportunity to file a pretrial Daubert motion or, at the very least, to object at the time of the testimony. Four attorneys representing four defendants did neither. Plain-error review is not designed to rescue litigants from strategic choices made when the legal landscape is uncertain.

The Appellate Court’s analysis treated Abruquah as having resolved the question of unqualified firearms identification testimony with categorical clarity. It did not. Abruquah was a case-specific Daubert determination based on a particular evidentiary record. Even setting aside the express terms of Abruquah, the broader landscape of authority confirms that the admissibility of unqualified firearms identification testimony remains the subject of reasonable disagreement.

The respondents’ burden under the second prerequisite to plain-error review is to demonstrate that the admission of the firearms examiner’s testimony was not reasonably debatable. They have not carried that burden. The Appellate Court’s contrary conclusion was an error of law and an abuse of its discretion to grant plain-error review.

This court does not rule out the possibility that a trial record by itself, even without a formal Daubert hearing, might contain enough information to permit meaningful appellate review of the reliability of expert testimony. This is not such a case. Four co-defendants represented by four attorneys raised no challenge whatsoever to the firearms identification methodology. The trial record contains no testimony, studies or argument bearing on the reliability of the AFTE methodology as a general matter. Nothing in the record permits an appellate court to conduct the analysis Daubert requires. While that concern does not independently dispose of this case, it reinforces the conclusion that the Appellate Court erred in granting plain-error relief on this record.

Dunbar nevertheless contends that the state, as the proponent of the firearms identification evidence, bore the burden of initiating its own Daubert hearing to establish the reliability of the testimony, even in the absence of any challenge by the defense. In Dunbar’s view, the state’s failure to do so constituted preserved error. This court rejects that argument.

Thornton offers a separate argument that he is entitled to de novo rather than plain-error review of the firearms identification issue. He bases the argument on the fact that the trial court entertained his Abruquah claim on the merits at the hearing on his motion for a new trial in October 2023. Thornton contends that the merits ruling rendered the issue preserved for purposes of appellate review. This argument fails for several independent reasons.

Regarding the court closure, this court adopts the Kelly framework as the law of Maryland for evaluating de minimis closures. It concludes, however, that the closures here were not de minimis. Despite this, the closures were justified under the four-part test of Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984). The trial court advanced an overriding interest in juror safety and the integrity of deliberations, supported by three escalating incidents of spectator misconduct. The court’s response was no broader than necessary, considered reasonable alternatives and was supported by adequate findings on the record.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed in part, reversed in part.

CONCUR/DISSENT: Waller requires, among other things, that the closure “be no broader than necessary[,]” and that a trial court “make findings adequate to support the closure.” In my view, the court did not make sufficient findings to support the closure and, as a result, I am unable to conclude, on this record, that the complete closure of the courtroom when the modified Allen charge was given was appropriate.

Parent and child; CINA hearing

BOTTOM LINE: To exclude a child in a CINA proceeding — consistent with the principles of procedural due process and over the objection of the child’s counsel — the juvenile court must conclude in its discretion, after balancing relevant, individualized factors, that the child’s presence would be harmful to their wellbeing and that any such harm outweighs the child’s due process interests in attending the proceeding.

CASE: In Re: K.B., No. 60, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed July 24, 2026) (Justices Fader, Watts, Booth, Biran, Gould, EAVES, Killough).

FACTS: K.B. was born in 2012. Since 2016, K.B.’s grandmother has had custody of K.B. due to the “mild-to-moderate intellectual disabilities[]” of K.B.’s mother. In June 2023, the Department of Social Services of Worcester County (“Department”) petitioned to have K.B. adjudicated a child in need of assistance or CINA, citing reports that she had missed medical appointments and substantially fallen behind in school. Following adjudication and disposition, the Circuit court found K.B. to be a CINA.

Rather than remove her, the court allowed K.B. to remain in grandmother’s custody under an order of protective supervision by the Department with conditions dependent on K.B.’s care and at grandmother’s compliance with a care plan. A magistrate eventually recommended, however, that K.B. be removed from grandmother’s custody and committed to the Department for out-of-home placement.

K.B. and grandmother filed exceptions. At the subsequent de novo exceptions hearing, the juvenile court—over the objection of K.B.’s counsel—excluded K.B. from the hearing because the juvenile court did not believe that it was appropriate for K.B. to hear the testimony that was likely to occur in that hearing. The juvenile court ultimately adopted the magistrate’s recommendation, removing K.B. from grandmother’s custody and the Appellate Court of Maryland.

LAW: The juvenile court entered an order on May 5, 2026, adopting the recommendations of a magistrate that the CINA proceedings be terminated with a final award of custody to grandmother. For that reason, K.B.’s appeal is moot because it no longer presents a live case or controversy. Nevertheless, because it presents an issue of public importance for an identifiable group for whom K.B. is an appropriate surrogate (the right of a minor child to attend and partake in her own CINA proceeding), the court will address the merits.

The court holds that a child party to a CINA proceeding, at least one who is capable of understanding what is occurring in a courtroom proceeding to some extent, has due process interests that are entitled to protection. Accordingly, the default status at every proceeding must be that the child is entitled to attend the proceeding if they desire to do so.

Consistent with the court’s responsibility to protect the child’s best interests, however, a court may exclude a child party from some or all of a CINA proceeding if the court concludes that the child’s presence would be harmful to their wellbeing and that any such harm outweighs the child’s due process interests. To afford proper respect to the child’s due process rights, any such determination must be individual to that child’s circumstances, not based on generalized views about children generally. And any exclusion must be narrowly tailored to the identified harm—i.e., no broader than necessary to protect the child party’s wellbeing—and must be supported by facts identified on the record.

The test is as follows: To exclude a child in a CINA proceeding—consistent with the principles of procedural due process and over the objection of the child’s counsel—the juvenile court must conclude in its discretion, after balancing relevant, individualized factors, that the child’s presence would be harmful to their wellbeing and that any such harm outweighs the child’s due process interests in attending the proceeding. The juvenile court must then ensure that the exclusion is no broader than necessary, i.e., that it is narrowly tailored to address the concerns that the child’s presence creates.

Absent requisite findings and balancing regarding the child’s due process interests and welfare, a child in a CINA proceeding can be excluded—consistent with principles of procedural due process—only if the child is disruptive, or the child’s attorney waives the child’s participation. If the child party is excluded without appropriate consideration of their due process rights, then prejudice to the child is presumed, and procedural due process requires a remand for a new proceeding.

Here, the juvenile court erred when it excluded K.B. The juvenile court did not make an individualized determination concerning whether attending the hearing or any portion of it would be contrary to K.B.’s welfare, nor did the juvenile court balance any such determination against the weight of K.B.’s due process rights. The juvenile court also did not assess whether a lesser option than complete exclusion would protect its concern for K.B.’s welfare.

As such, K.B. could be excluded only if she was disruptive to the proceedings or if counsel waived K.B.’s presence in the courtroom. There are no findings concerning the former, and the record clearly demonstrates that K.B.’s counsel vigorously contested K.B.’s exclusion from the courtroom.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland reversed.

Zoning; referendum

BOTTOM LINE: Where a group of citizens sought to put a Frederick County zoning ordinance over data center construction to a referendum, the circuit court correctly rejected the attempt as inconsistent with the county charter.

CASE: In the Matter of Frederick County Data Center Referendum Committee, No. 67, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed July 24, 2026) (Justices FADER, Fader, Booth, Eaves, Killough, Raker, Getty) (Justice HARRELL concurs).

 FACTS: In 2025, the Frederick County Council enacted a law, Council Bill 25-09, providing for a Critical Digital Infrastructure, or “CDI,” Overlay Zone that would permit the construction of data centers and supporting infrastructure on no more than one percent of County land. Bill 25-09 provided that the contours of the Overlay Zone would be established later “by ordinance,” which occurred soon thereafter with the Council’s enactment of Ordinance 26-01-001.

An organized group of citizens called the Frederick County Data Center Referendum Committee sought to petition the CDI Ordinance to referendum. After the Referendum Committee collected the requisite number of signatures, the Election Director of the Frederick County Board of Elections found the petition sufficient.

Several entities and three County voters challenged that finding in the circuit court. They argued both that the CDI Ordinance is not subject to referendum under the Charter and that the petition did not meet the Charter’s petition requirements because it did not contain a “full and accurate” reproduction of the challenged ordinance. The circuit court agreed with the Referendum Opponents on both issues.

LAW: Section 308(a) of the Frederick County Charter provides for the submission to referendum of “a law, or part of a law, enacted pursuant to this Charter[,]” with four inapplicable exceptions. The parties dispute both whether the CDI Ordinance is “a law” and whether it was enacted pursuant to the Charter.

The plain language of the Charter states unequivocally that the provisions and procedures governing land use in the County were not going to change under the Charter. Those procedures already provided for zoning changes to be approved by ordinance, under the authority of the Land Use Article.

The description of the legislative power afforded to the County Council in Charter 202 is consistent with that understanding. That section vests in the County Council “[a]ll the legislative powers which the County may exercise under the Maryland Constitution and laws of the State . . . subject to those powers retained by the people of the County as set forth in Section 308 of the Charter.”

But that power did not extend to zoning ordinances enacted under the authority of the Land Use Article. Thus, the power of referendum “retained” by the people of the County most naturally refers to the power to refer public local laws to referendum. There was no such existing power to refer zoning ordinances to referendum that could have been retained.

Accordingly, this court agrees with the circuit court’s conclusion that the CDI Ordinance is not subject to referendum pursuant to Charter § 308. The structure of the Charter makes clear that zoning ordinances such as the CDI Ordinance were intended to be handled in the same manner following the effective date of the Charter as they had been before that date. The legislative history of the Charter supports this interpretation.

Charter § 308(b) requires that any referendum petition shall (1) “meet the requirements of State law” and (2) “contain the full and accurate text of the law . . . that is subject to the petition” on “each paper” of the petition. Under Election Law Article § 6-201(c), each signature page must contain either “a fair and accurate summary of the substantive provisions of the proposal” or “the full text of the proposal[.]”

Here, the CDI Ordinance contained one-and-one-half pages of text and two maps attached as exhibits. The question is whether the reproductions of the CDI Ordinance on the back of each petition signature page meet the Charter standard of a “full and accurate” reproduction. They do not. Two critical features are missing from the black-and-white reproduction of the Overlay Zone map.

Judgement of the Circuit Court for Frederick County.

CONCUR: Justice Harrell advises that, because he concurs with the reasoning in part IV of this opinion, as an independent and conclusive basis for affirming the judgment of the circuit court, he would not reach or decide whether the CDI Ordinance was subject to referendum pursuant to the Charter.