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ANTWON J. LIMBERRY v. STATE OF MARYLAND
We will construe Mr. Limberry’s motion liberally and treat it as a petition to reopen a closed post-conviction proceeding. But that doesn’t get him very far: on that posture, he was required to file an application for leave to appeal the circuit court’s denial of his motion within thirty days, and he failed to do so.
JAMONTE FLETCHER v. STATE OF MARYLAND
Appellant argues that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave when the officers approached him and activated their emergency lights on their patrol cars. The officer’s show of authority did not ripen into a seizure because the officers had not restrained appellant physically nor had appellant submitted to the officers’ show of authority.
CALVIN PARNELL v. STATE OF MARYLAND
Calvin Parnell, appellant, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis and Motion to Vacate Guilty Pleas, arguing that in 2000, he “unintelligently, unknowingly, and involuntarily” entered into a guilty plea agreement, which resulted in the collateral consequence of an increased minimum sentence in a subsequent federal court proceeding.
JODY LEE MILES v. STATE OF MARYLAND
On January 20, 2015, the Governor formally commuted the sentences of Maryland’s four remaining death row inmates to LWOP. Accordingly, we hereby dismiss this appeal as moot.
DAMERUM BURROUGHS v. STATE OF MARYLAND – ON REMAND
The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of this Court as to Burroughs and remanded for further consideration in light of Nalls and Melvin v. State. For the reasons that follow, we shall hold that the issue has not been preserved for our review
JOHN DOE v. STATE OF MARYLAND ET AL.
Notwithstanding the Department of Corrections' written assurances to the contrary, there is currently a judgment requiring Doe to register as a sex offender—a judgment that, in light of Doe I and Doe II, is wrong.
GARY STOKES v. STATE OF MARYLAND
By twice indicating his acceptance and satisfaction with the jury as empaneled, without qualification, appellant waived appellate review of his claim that the State exercised its peremptory challenges in violation of Batson; however, his convictions should have merged for sentencing purposes.
STEVEN CARVER v. STATE OF MARYLAND
Bcause the Court of Appeals addressed the same issue about Kopera’s perjury and held, in Douglas v. State, 423 Md. 156, 165 (2011), that a hearing was required, we conclude that the circuit court erred in denying Carver a hearing on his petition for a writ of actual innocence.
JUAN SYLVESTER BARNES v. STATE OF MARYLAND
Defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the indictment had to be dismissed on the grounds of double jeopardy due to the fact that appellant had been convicted and sentenced in Washington County for the crime of possessing the same firearm
KENT MARTIN BELL v. STATE OF MARYLAND
1. Did the court err in failing to dismiss the charges against [Bell] due to a violation of his Constitutional right to a speedy trial? 2. Did the trial court abuse [its] discretion by declining to excuse a juror after she disclosed an emotional reaction to the testimony of the state’s primary witness?
RAY GLASGOW v. STATE OF MARYLAND
Though the delay in this matter was protracted, the reasons for it were generally reasonable. Appellant did assert his right to a speedy trial, but did not demonstrate the most significant type of prejudice, viz., impairment of his defense.
DEONTRAE LUCAS, et al. v. POLICE OFFICER HAYES I340, et al.
More than three years after the plaintiffs suffered injury, they filed an amended complaint in which they added “Police Officer Fuller [badge no.] H059,” and “Police Officer Williams [badge no.] H319.” The first names of Officers Fuller and Williams were not provided.
