

Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 24-C-24-001064

UNREPORTED*

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 1902

September Term, 2024

IN THE MATTER OF CLARENCE JOHNSON

Tang,
Albright,
Hotten, Michele D.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

Opinion by Albright, J.

Filed: April 14, 2026

*This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).

Appellant, Clarence Johnson, is an employee of Appellee, Johns Hopkins Hospital.¹ In September 2022, Mr. Johnson fell and was injured after changing into scrubs in a work locker room. At the time, Mr. Johnson had a prior history of right knee instability and osteoarthritis. The Workers’ Compensation Commission denied Mr. Johnson’s temporary total disability claim, concluding that his injury did not arise out of his employment.² On appeal, after hearing argument on the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City reached the same conclusion. Here, Mr. Johnson asks us to “reconsider” our law on the compensability of idiopathic injuries such as his. He also claims that the circuit court erred in concluding that his injury was not compensable.³ We affirm.

¹ Johns Hopkins Hospital is insured by Appellee Johns Hopkins Health System Corporation. We refer to both appellees here collectively as “Johns Hopkins.”

² The Workers’ Compensation Commission also found that the accidental injury was not in the course of Mr. Johnson’s employment. Here, the parties agree that the injury was in the course of employment.

³ Mr. Johnson presents the following two questions:

1. Is the case law barring the compensability of certain injuries due to “idiopathic falls” unless they occur in unusually hazardous conditions in the employment must be [sic] reconsidered in light of *Harris v. Board of Education*, 375 Md. 21 (2003)?
2. Did the Circuit Court err in finding that [Mr. Johnson] did not suffer an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment?

BACKGROUND

The Incident

The following sequence of events comes from Mr. Johnson’s testimony before the Workers’ Compensation Commission (“the Commission”). On September 9, 2022,⁴ Mr. Johnson was employed by Johns Hopkins Hospital as a Central Sterile Manager. This role requires Mr. Johnson to manage surgical instruments across different buildings and hospitals. Mr. Johnson has a medical history of osteoarthritis and instability in his right knee.

On the morning of the injury, Mr. Johnson was called to go into the Central Sterile unit in the Zayed building on the Johns Hopkins campus to get in touch with a supervisor. In order to enter the Central Sterile unit, Mr. Johnson was required to be in scrubs, so he went to the locker room in the Weinberg Building to change. That room is approximately 8 by 12 feet.

In the locker room, Mr. Johnson set his book bag with his laptop down atop a nearby trashcan and put his scrubs on. He was on his phone. He put his phone in his pocket. He shut his locker door. He then reached for his book bag. As he did, Mr. Johnson felt his right knee give out and fell forward into a wall. Mr. Johnson struck the

⁴ The record reflects some confusion as to the actual date of injury, with various filings by both parties alternating inconsistently between 2022 and 2023. Mr. Johnson’s Brief states that the date of injury is September 9, 2023. Johns Hopkins’ Brief states that the date of injury is September 9, 2022. We use the 2022 date because the earliest attached document, the medical treatment records for Mr. Johnson’s injury, indicate that it took place in 2022.

wall, sustaining neck and back injuries. Mr. Johnson lay on the floor for 30 minutes before receiving medical assistance.

Workers' Compensation Commission Hearing

Mr. Johnson filed for temporary total disability on October 13, 2023.⁵ Mr. Johnson's hearing took place on February 12, 2024. At the hearing, Johns Hopkins indicated that the only disputed issue was whether Mr. Johnson's claim was compensable. Johns Hopkins agreed that Mr. Johnson was involved in an accident, that the treatment he received for his injury was reasonable and necessary, and that "if [the Commission found] the case compensable, the TT [temporary total disability] [was] fine." Mr. Johnson then testified about the accident. Regarding his related medical history, Mr. Johnson explained that his knees had given out before, that he had received injections into his right knee as far back as 2013, and that he had "an advanced history of osteoarthritis." After the accident, Mr. Johnson was unable to work, at least through the date of the Commission hearing.

Regarding the compensability of Mr. Johnson's injury, the parties did not dispute that Mr. Johnson's injury was an idiopathic fall. Rather, Mr. Johnson argued that the caselaw barring compensation for idiopathic falls was "inconsistent with *Harris v. Board*

⁵ Under the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act, an injury is categorized as temporary total, temporary partial, permanent total, or permanent partial based on industrial loss of use and the expectancy to recover. *Wal-Mart v. Holmes*, 416 Md. 346, 353 n.2 (2010). Mr. Johnson's claim was for temporary total disability. In essence, a temporary total disability is one that is "temporary in duration but total in extent[.]" *Holmes*, 416 Md. at 353 n.2. In other words, where the claimant is completely unable to perform any tasks for which they were "accustomed and qualified to perform before the injury" for some duration. *Bullis School v. Justus*, 37 Md. App. 423, 438 (1977).

of Education, [375 Md. 21 (2003).]” He concluded that “[i]t is an accidental injury as the result of an untoward event, neither expected nor intended.” Johns Hopkins contended that “all the doctors agree that this is a buckle or giving way that led to this. And there’s no causal relationship opinion to the contrary.” Ultimately, the Commission denied Mr. Johnson’s claim, finding that “the claimant did not sustain an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment as alleged to have occurred on September 9, 202[2].”⁶

Mr. Johnson’s Appeal to the Circuit Court

After Mr. Johnson appealed the Commission’s decision to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, both sides moved for summary judgment and stated that the facts were undisputed. Regarding how the accident happened, both sides relied exclusively on Mr. Johnson’s testimony before the Commission.

⁶ Mr. Johnson’s original claim raised four issues:

1. Did the employee sustain an accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment?
2. Is the disability of the employee’s neck and low back the result of accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment?
3. Temporary total disability from September 9, 202[2] to present and continuing
4. Payment of medical expenses

Because the Commission determined that Mr. Johnson “did not sustain an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment[,]” it concluded that Mr. Johnson’s three remaining issues were “moot.”

Johns Hopkins identified the undisputed facts in a Statement of Undisputed Material Facts and relied on it both to support its summary judgment motion and oppose Mr. Johnson's.

1. The Claimant was an employee of Johns Hopkins Hospital on September 9, 2022.
2. The Claimant's job title was Central Sterile Manager.
3. The Claimant was present in the locker room where the subject incident happened.
4. The Claimant was in the locker room for the purpose of changing into his scrubs, prior to entering a sterile environment.
5. The Claimant sustained a fall while in the locker room and hit his head on the wall.
6. The Claimant had completed the act of changing into his scrubs prior to the fall.
7. The Claimant was not holding anything at the time of his fall.
8. The Claimant had a prior history of right knee instability.
9. The Claimant had a prior history of osteoarthritis in the right knee.
10. The Claimant's treating physicians documented his history of right knee instability.

Mr. Johnson identified the undisputed facts in a paragraph and relied on it both to oppose Johns Hopkins' summary judgment motion and support his summary judgment motion.

On the undisputed facts of this case, Mr. Johnson was acting in the course of his employment at the time of the injury. His job was manager of central sterile at Johns Hopkins Hospital and involved managing instrumentation for the surgical department at Johns Hopkins and managing the production of gastric scopes at Johns Hopkins and Bayview Hospitals. On the day of the accident he arrived at

work at about seven o'clock and went to the Weinberg Building to talk to his supervisors and was then called to get in touch with his supervisor for the Zayed building. He was unable to reach the supervisor at the Zayed Building so he had to put his scrubs on so that he could go into the Zayed Building because the Zayed Central Sterile is a sterile site. He went into the locker room in the Weinberg Building to change, taking with him his book bag with his computer. The room is about 8x12. He opened his locker, changes into his scrubs, closed the locker and put his phone in his pocket and shut his locker door. He took a step to reach for the book bag which was on top of the trash can and as he reached for it his knee went out[.] He tried to brace himself against the wall but couldn't catch himself and struck his head[.]

(citations omitted).

Where the parties differed was in their legal argument. Johns Hopkins argued that because Mr. Johnson's injury arose out of an idiopathic condition, and not his employment, it was not compensable. Citing *Youngblud v. Fallston Supply Co., Inc.*, 180 Md. App. 389 (2008) and *CAM Constr. Co., Inc. v. Beccio*, 92 Md. App. 452 (1992), Johns Hopkins maintained that "when no facts show that one's employment caused a claimant to injure himself, and there is nothing in the record which shows the idiopathic condition was somehow made more hazardous by the workplace, an injury is not compensable under the [Workers' Compensation] Act."

Mr. Johnson repeated the argument that he made before the Commission. Specifically, he pointed to *Harris*, and its conclusion that an accidental injury need not arise from an "unusual activity" in order to be compensable. He argued that "the cases on idiopathic fall[s] require that the effects of the fall are not compens[a]ble unless there is some enhanced risk due to the employment they are inconsistent with the [Supreme Court's] holdings in *Harris* . . . and cannot be regarded as good law." He added that

Youngblud was wrongly decided and that the central tenant of *Beccio* with regards to idiopathic injuries was effectively reversed by *Harris*.⁷

The Circuit Court’s Summary Judgment Ruling

After a hearing,⁸ the circuit court granted Johns Hopkins’ motion and denied Mr. Johnson’s. The circuit court rejected Mr. Johnson’s argument that *Harris* altered the law on compensability of idiopathic injuries.

However, the key to assessing whether an injury arose out of employment is the causal connection between the accidental injury and employment. The *Harris* test does not deal with an alleged workplace injury where claimant also suffered from an idiopathic condition. The *Watson* case held that where an employee’s injury resulted from a fall is contributed to by some factor peculiar to the employment, it arises out of the employment within the means of [T]he [A]ct. Although the fall has its origins solely in some idiopathic of the employment, *Youngblud* – simpl[e] tasks of daily life such as walking through the workplace or taking stairs in the workplace are not peculiarities of employment.

Mr. Johnson followed with this timely appeal.

⁷ We do not consider the two other arguments that Mr. Johnson made below but does not repeat here. Md. Rule 8-504(a)(6) (requiring that an appellate brief contain “[a]rgument in support of the party’s position on each issue.”).

First, he contended that *Youngblud* and *Beccio* were inconsistent with *Mulready v. Univ. Rsch. Corp.*, 360 Md. 51 (2000) because they employ the “increased risk test,” under which “the employee [must] be exposed to a quantitatively greater degree of risk than the general public.” 360 Md. at 59. Mr. Johnson contended that the court in *Mulready* instead adopted the “positional risk test,” under which an injury “arises out of employment if it would not have occurred if the employee’s job had not required him to be in the place where he was injured.” *Id.* We address the “positional risk test” below.

Second, he argued that under *Montgomery Cnty. v. Maloney*, 245 Md. App. 369 (2020), “[t]he stronger the facts are to show that an injury ‘arose out of employment’ the more relaxed the requirement that the injury be shown to be ‘in the course of employment’ and vice versa.” 245 Md. App. at 387.

⁸ Before the circuit court, both sides reiterated that the facts were undisputed. Called on first, Mr. Johnson stated “. . . the basic fact here, uncontested . . . [.]” Johns Hopkins stated “[t]he facts really are not disputed.”

DISCUSSION

I. Mr. Johnson's Contentions

Mr. Johnson contends that the circuit court erred in granting Johns Hopkins' summary judgment motion and denying his. First, Mr. Johnson contends that *Harris* requires that we reconsider the bar on workers' compensation for injuries due to "idiopathic falls" unless they occur in an unusually dangerous condition in the employment. As we understand it, Mr. Johnson argues that because *Harris* removed the "unusual activity" requirement from the Act's "accidental injury" definition, such that an "accidental injury" need not arise from an "unusual activity," so, too, did *Harris* remove the idiopathic condition restriction on what constitutes an injury that "arises from employment." Under these circumstances, Mr. Johnson concludes, *Youngblud* was wrong to continue the idiopathic injury restriction on compensable injuries.

Second, Mr. Johnson argues that because he was "changing into scrubs" at the time he was injured, his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment, and the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Johns Hopkins and in denying his motion for summary judgment.

After reviewing the appropriate standards of review, and the law in this area, we will take up Mr. Johnson's second argument first and then return to his first argument.

II. Standards of Review

"The general rules pertaining to the proper entry of summary judgment apply with equal force on appeals from decisions of the [Workers' Compensation] Commission." *Com. Union, Inc. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co.*, 110 Md. App. 45, 51–52 (1996).

Pursuant to Md. Rule 2-501(a), the lower court may grant summary judgment where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

“That the parties file cross-motions for summary judgment is not dispositive of the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. In that event, as indeed is the case whenever a motion for summary judgment is filed, the court must assess each party’s motion on its own merits, drawing all reasonable inferences against the moving party.” *Taylor v. NationsBank, N.A.*, 365 Md. 166, 174 (2001).

The circuit court has discretion to deny a motion for summary judgment and proceed to a trial on the merits even where “the technical requirements for the entry of such a judgment have been met.” *Webb v. Giant of Maryland, LLC*, 477 Md. 121, 135 (2021). As a result, two separate standards of review exist for the grant and the denial of motions for summary judgment. We review grants of summary judgment *de novo* for legal correctness. *Johnson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City*, 387 Md. 1, 5 (2005). By contrast, we review the circuit court’s decision to deny summary judgment for abuse of discretion. *Webb*, 477 Md. at 135–36.

III. The Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act

Under the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act (“the Act”), if a “covered employee” sustains an “accidental personal injury,” they may be entitled to compensation

for that injury from their employer.⁹ Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. (“LE”) § 9-501(a)(1) (“[e]xcept as otherwise provided, each employer of a covered employee shall provide compensation in accordance with [the Act] to . . . the covered employee for an accidental personal injury sustained by the covered employee[.]”). An “accidental personal injury” is “an accidental injury that arises out of and in the course of employment[.]” LE § 9-101(b)(1).¹⁰

“Aris[ing] out of” and “in the course of” are two legally distinct concepts. *Pariser Bakery v. Koontz*, 239 Md. 586, 590 (1965). “The words ‘in the course of employment’ refer to the time and place of an accident and the circumstances under which it occurs[.]” *Maryland Cas. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.*, 248 Md. 704, 707–08 (1968). To occur “in the course of employment,” an injury must occur “(1) within the period of employment, (2) at a place where the employee reasonably may be in the performance of his duties, and (3) while he is fulfilling those duties or engaged in doing something incident thereto.” *Montgomery Cnty. v. Smith*, 144 Md. App. 548, 577 (2002) (citing *Knoche v. Cox*, 282 Md. 447, 454 (1978)).

⁹ A “covered employee” under the Workers’ Compensation Act is “[a]n individual, . . . in the service of an employer under an express or implied contract of apprenticeship or hire . . . [except] an independent contractor in accordance with the common law . . .” LE § 9-202(a)(c). There is no contest that Mr. Johnson is a covered employee.

¹⁰ Accidental personal injuries also include those “caused by a willful or negligent act of a third person directed against a covered employee in the course of the employment of the covered employee” and “disease or infection that naturally results from an accidental injury that arises out of and in the course of employment.” LE § 9-101(b)(2) & (3).

An accidental personal injury “arises out of” the claimant’s employment when it “results from some obligation, condition or incident of employment.” *Beccio*, 92 Md.

App. at 460. In this regard,

Maryland uses the ‘positional risk test.’ . . . Under this test, ‘an injury arises out of employment if it *would not have occurred* if the employee’s job had not required him to be in the place where he was injured.’ . . . The positional risk test is essentially a ‘but for’ approach; thus, ‘an injury is compensable if it would not have happened ‘but for’ the fact that the conditions or obligations of the employment put the claimant in the position where he was injured.’

Smith, 144 Md. App at 556–57 (cleaned up) (emphasis added). But “it is not the purpose of the [] Act to impose upon the employer the obligation of a general insurer,” requiring compensation even where the injury arises from a “hazard to which the work[er] would have been equally exposed apart from his employment.” *Blake Const. Co. v. Wells*, 245 Md. 282, 289–90 (1967).

An “ ‘idiopathic condition’ refers to certain risks or conditions which are ‘personal to the claimant’ and do not themselves arise out of employment[.]” *Beccio*, 92 Md. App. at 455 n.2. Because LE § 9-101(b)(1) requires that an injury “arise out of. . . employment,” idiopathic injuries may not be compensable. “Simple tasks of daily life, such as walking through the workplace or taking stairs in the workplace to get from one place to another, are not peculiarities of employment.” *Youngblud*, 180 Md. App. at 407.

In *Youngblud*, the claimant’s injury arose from an idiopathic condition. Mr. Youngblud had been diagnosed with Type I (insulin-dependent) diabetes years before he began employment with Fallston Supply Co. *Id.* at 394. Despite an extensive treatment

and management plan, Mr. Youngblud had experienced hypoglycemic episodes prior to his injury, causing lightheadedness, confusion, and loss of balance. *Id.* His office was on the second floor of his workplace, requiring him to go up and down stairs daily to perform his duties. *Id.* One day at work, Mr. Youngblud experienced the symptoms of a hypoglycemic episode while going down the stairs and fell, sustaining serious injuries. *Id.* at 395. On appeal, we concluded that even though Mr. Youngblud had to go up and down the stairs as a condition of his employment, “using the staircase [is not] an incident or hazard of his employment.” *Id.* at 407. Specifically, “[s]imple tasks of daily life, . . . are not peculiarities of employment.” *Id.*

Nonetheless, an injury resulting from an idiopathic condition may be said to “arise out of employment” if “the employment contributes to the risk or aggravates the injury.” *Id.* at 404-05. In other words, an idiopathic injury may be compensable “if the employment placed the employee in a position which aggravated the effects of a fall due to the idiopathic condition” or if “an employee’s injury resulting from a fall is contributed to by some factor peculiar to the employment.” *Id.* at 404–06.

In *Beccio*, for example, an employee who was dizzy, and carrying work-related items, tripped on debris in a darkly-lit hallway and, unable to break his fall, hit his head. 92 Md. App. at 453–54, 456. We concluded that the injury was compensable because “the darkness of the hallway might have prevented him from seeing the debris and/or breaking his fall; and that the injury was aggravated by the fact that he was carrying tools of his trade.” *Id.* at 464–65.

Likewise, in *Watson v. Grimm*, 200 Md. 461 (1952), an employee was fatally run over by his employer’s garbage truck after becoming dizzy and falling from the running board. 200 Md. at 464–65. The Supreme Court determined that the injury arose out of his employment, notwithstanding that the dizziness was idiopathic, because “his employer allowed him to ride on the truck, and especially as there was some hazard in riding on the running board.” *Id.* at 465.

IV. Analysis

We start with Mr. Johnson’s challenge to the circuit court’s decision granting summary judgment to Johns Hopkins. In his second argument, Mr. Johnson contends that at the time he was injured, he was “changing into scrubs so that he could go to the sterile site in the Zayed Building[.]” As a consequence, he argues, his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment, and it was error to grant summary judgment against him. We disagree.

At the time that he fell, Mr. Johnson was no longer “changing into scrubs.” As he testified before the Commission (and he and Johns Hopkins agreed in their summary

judgment motions), after he changed into his scrubs, and before he fell, Mr. Johnson used his phone, put his phone in his pocket, and shut his locker door.

[MR. JOHNSON’S COUNSEL]: Where did you go to change in[to] your scrubs?

[MR. JOHNSON]: In the bathroom in the Weinberg Decontam Center, which is a lo[c]ker room, also. A small – like, a small bathroom with lockers in it.

[MR. JOHNSON’S COUNSEL]: About how big is that?

[MR. JOHNSON]: I mean, it’s probably maybe – twelve by eight, maybe, I guess. I think if I layed on the floor, lengthwise, I would hit the wall and the door. Probably, about twelve by eight, I guess.

[MR. JOHNSON’S COUNSEL]: When you went into the locker room, what did you do?

[MR. JOHNSON]: I went into the locker room. Got into my locker. *Put my scrubs on. I was on my phone. I put my phone in my pocket (indicating.) Shut my locker door. Went over to reach for my book bag that was on top of the trash can. And as I went to reach (indicating,) I fell. My knee gave out or something. But I know I was going down (indicating.)*

(emphasis added). In short, Mr. Johnson had already changed into scrubs when his knee gave out.

Because there was nothing about changing into scrubs that caused, contributed to, or aggravated Mr. Johnson’s injury, Mr. Johnson’s injury was not “an accidental injury that *arises out of* and in the course of employment[.]” LE § 9-101(b)(1) (emphasis added). Again, idiopathic injuries, or injuries that result from idiopathic conditions, are not compensable because they “do not themselves arise out of employment[.]” *Beccio*, 92 Md. App. at 455 n.2; LE § 9-101(b)(1). “Simple tasks of daily life, such as walking

through the workplace or taking stairs in the workplace to get from one place to another, are not peculiarities of employment.” *Youngblud*, 180 Md. App. at 407. Mr. Johnson’s reaching for his book bag was a simple task of daily life and not a peculiarity of employment. In other words, given Mr. Johnson’s idiopathic knee condition, his knee could have gone out, and he could have been injured, whether he was reaching for his book bag at work or at home, or for an item other than his book bag while he was at home.

To the extent that Mr. Johnson now contends that he was “changing into his scrubs” at the time he was injured, such a contention would not change today’s result. In responding to a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must, in writing, “identify with particularity each material fact as to which it is contended that there is a genuine dispute” and attach the verified document or discovery response “that demonstrates the dispute.” Md. Rule 2-501(b).¹¹ Below, in opposition to Johns Hopkins’ summary judgment motion, Mr. Johnson identified nothing to suggest that he fell while he was changing into his scrubs or that he otherwise disputed the sequence of events

¹¹ Md. Rule 2-501(b) stated in full:

(b) Response. A response to a motion for summary judgment shall be in writing and shall (1) identify with particularity each material fact as to which it is contended that there is a genuine dispute and (2) as to each such fact, identify and attach the relevant portion of the specific document, discovery response, transcript of testimony (by page and line), or other statement under oath that demonstrates the dispute. A response asserting the existence of a material fact or controverting any fact contained in the record shall be supported by an affidavit or other written statement under oath.

preceding his injury. As a consequence, Mr. Johnson will not be heard to press such a contention now. Md. Rule 8-131(a) (“Ordinarily, an appellate court will not decide any other issue [other than jurisdiction] unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court[.]”); Md. Rule 8-504(b)(4) (“Reference shall be made to the pages of the record extract or appendix supporting the assertions.”); Md. Rule 8-504(c) (“For noncompliance with this Rule, the appellate court may dismiss the appeal of make any other appropriate order with respect to the case[.]”).

Regarding Mr. Johnson’s first contention, we disagree that *Harris* somehow changed Maryland’s law that in order to be compensable, an accidental injury must “arise out of . . . employment” rather than an idiopathic condition. Ms. Harris’s injury did not arise from an idiopathic condition. Instead, she suffered a lower back injury after moving and lifting a heavy box at work. *Harris*, 375 Md. at 26. Moving and lifting heavy boxes was a common work duty for Ms. Harris and she had been doing it repeatedly prior to the injury. *Id.* at 25–26. Our Supreme Court held that for an injury to be covered as an “accidental injury” under the Workers’ Compensation Act, it was not necessary for the injury to have resulted from “unusual activity.” *Id.* at 24. “Under the plain language of the statute, what must be ‘accidental’ is the *injury* and not the activity giving rise to the injury. The activity giving rise to the injury need only ‘arise[] out of and in the course of employment,’ and not be otherwise excluded by the Act.” *Id.* at 30.

But *Harris* did not sweep away the separate requirement that in order to compensable, an injury must “arise from employment” rather than the claimant’s

idiopathic condition. In *Harris*, in its attempt to maintain the “unusual activity” requirement in the Act’s “accidental personal injury” definition, the Board of Education pointed to *Standard Gas Equip. Corp. v. Baldwin*, 152 Md. 321 (1927). There, Mr. Baldwin had a pre-existing heart condition (an idiopathic condition). He died after having spilled a ladle of molten lava on himself while working in extreme heat. *Harris*, 375 Md. at 38 (citing *Standard Gas Equip.*, 152 Md. at 323–30). The court awarded a new trial because, as the court later explained in *Harris*, “[t]he issue in *Standard Gas Equipment* was whether the employee died from a pre-existing heart disease or from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment. The court in *Standard Gas Equipment* was simply setting forth a theory by which the employee’s death might not entirely be the result of a pre-existing disease.” *Harris*, 375 Md. at 39. The court in *Harris* did not suggest that injuries arising from idiopathic conditions would be generally compensable thereafter.

Moving to Mr. Johnson’s challenge to the denial of his summary judgment motion, our decision regarding Johns Hopkins’s summary judgment motion is dispositive. Because Johns Hopkins was entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Johnson’s temporary total disability claim, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying summary judgment to Mr. Johnson.

**JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR BALTIMORE CITY AFFIRMED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.**