Upon remand, the court must, in accordance with CP § 8-301(a)(1), evaluate whether the newly discovered evidence claimed by Mr. Hayes “creates a substantial or significant possibility that the result [of the trial] may have been different.”
1. Does appellant’s commitment order correctly reflect the sentence imposed by the trial court? 2. Was the evidence sufficient to support appellant’s conviction for second degree assault? 3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in declining to ask appellant’s requested voir dire questions?
However, Miles has another challenge pending. Filed In Queen Anne's County the same day as the executive order, he opposes the commutation and seeks to continue his appeals in hope of a life sentence with the possibility of parole.
Twenty-three years after he was convicted of murder, and after other attempts at post-conviction relief had failed, Mr. Williams filed a Petition for Actual Innocence. The circuit court dismissed the petition, without a hearing, on the grounds that it failed to satisfy several procedural requirements. On appeal, Mr. Williams contends that the circuit court erred in dismissing his petition without [...]
Convicted of a murder conspiracy and other crimes, appellant claims violations of statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights as well as evidentiary rules governing hearsay.
Day contests the motions court’s ruling that he lacked standing to challenge the seizure of the handgun from the motel room he paid for. The State agrees.
Appellant contends that the motions court erred because he was subject to the functional equivalent of interrogation without the benefit of having been read his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona,
Appellant’s contention is that theft by possession of stolen goods is not a direct result of a victim’s loss, thus restitution is improper. We agree.
Appellant argues that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave when the officers approached him and activated their emergency lights on their patrol cars. The officer’s show of authority did not ripen into a seizure because the officers had not restrained appellant physically nor had appellant submitted to the officers’ show of authority.
Appellant claims his Harford County convictions are a nullity, and hence his sentences illegal, because he was not brought to trial within 120 days after he had filed, under the Maryland Intrastate Detainer Act (“IDA”), a request for final disposition of the charges.
The officer who conducted the traffic stop of Appellant’s vehicle had a reasonable suspicion, if not also probable cause, to stop the vehicle based on his observation of Appellant’s vehicle spinning its wheels and his knowledge that Appellant’s license was suspended.
Calvin Parnell, appellant, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis and Motion to Vacate Guilty Pleas, arguing that in 2000, he “unintelligently, unknowingly, and involuntarily” entered into a guilty plea agreement, which resulted in the collateral consequence of an increased minimum sentence in a subsequent federal court proceeding.