RICHMOND, VA — Where the district court dismissed a class action suit about alleged abuses and rights violations within the West Virginia foster care system, reasoning it was powerless to provide the injunctive relief sought, it erred.
Background
Twelve children in foster care filed a class action complaint, alleging abuses and rights violations within the foster care system. In 2023, the district court dismissed the case. This court reversed, holding that neither abstention nor mootness principles precluded federal court review.
Upon remand, the district court certified plaintiffs’ proposed general class and one subclass, but denied certification to the two other subclasses. It then, on its own, dismissed the case with prejudice for lack of standing, concluding that it was powerless under the limitations inherent to Article III of the Constitution to provide the injunctive remedies plaintiffs sought. Furthermore, the district court found that not even declaratory judgment would suffice to establish redressability.
Redressability
This court’s test for redressability assesses whether “the court has the power to grant the plaintiff’s requested relief” and whether “such relief would redress the plaintiff’s injury.” The district court ended the inquiry at step one when concluded it was powerless to “order the relief Plaintiffs seek.” In so holding, it erred.
First, precedent establishes a lengthy history of institutional reform decrees in the federal court system spanning most of the last century. Second, modern, binding authority affirms the use of comprehensive institutional reform. Third, the courts may enact expansive reforms including the judicial authority to direct the use of state funds, provided the court follows the guardrails that the Supreme Court has established to guide the exercise of judicial power. Fourth, plaintiffs’ requests fall well within the boundaries of lawful injunctive relief.
Turning to the second element, the district court ruled that the requested declaratory relief would not provide a remedy, although it suggested that plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief may suffice (but it concluded the court lacked the authority to grant it). West Virginia contends that neither form of relief would be adequate. This court disagrees.
Plaintiffs’ requested injunctive relief would redress their alleged injuries. The allegations of long-term, widespread neglect offer sufficient reason to believe such problems will continue. Plaintiffs accordingly request a variety of injunctive measures that are likely to alleviate at least some of their suffering. Thus, although the district court correctly acknowledged the potential efficacy of injunctive relief, it erred when it concluded “a declaration that the actions of DHS are unconstitutional . . . fails to redress Plaintiffs’ injuries.”
Injury in fact
West Virginia urges this court to nevertheless affirm the decision of the district court in the alternative, because plaintiffs failed to establish injury in fact. Because this court has already established redressability and traceability for the plaintiff class as a whole, it need only determine whether a single named plaintiff in this case has suffered a legal injury in fact.
There is no dispute on appeal that plaintiffs have alleged past physical and psychological injuries to their constitutional and statutory rights with sufficient specificity. West Virginia, however, contends plaintiffs have not alleged future injuries capable of sustaining injunctive relief.
But past injuries with ongoing harm, as opposed to threatened future injuries, nevertheless suffice. Indeed, plaintiffs’ allegations show these effects. The pleadings allege uncured systemic policy failures that place children in positions where they suffer ongoing constitutional and statutory rights deprivations. Plaintiffs accordingly have standing.
Reassignment
Plaintiffs request that this court reassign the case to a new district judge. Despite the district court’s legal error, none of the relevant criteria applied suggest the public interest would be better served by reassignment. First, this court finds no indication that the district judge would have substantial difficulty setting aside previously expressed erroneous views. Second, reassignment is also not necessary to preserve the appearance of justice. Third, reassignment would certainly waste judicial resources, especially “in light of the lengthy history of this case.”
Cross-appeal
West Virginia filed a conditional cross-appeal to seek class decertification. Because of this court’s reversal of the district court’s dismissal, there is no longer a final judgment. Any appeal of the 2023 order certifying two of plaintiffs’ proposed classes must be considered interlocutory. Because the timeframe to challenge class certification pursuant to Rule 23(f) has elapsed, this court may not entertain this cross-appeal until a final judgment is entered below.
Reversed and remanded.
Concurring/dissenting opinion
Rushing, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority that we must reverse the district court’s judgment dismissing this case for lack of jurisdiction. I would exercise our discretion to consider the cross-appeal and resolve West Virginia’s arguments about the infirmities in the class certification order. In that respect, I dissent from the majority’s judgment.
Jonathan R. v. Morrisey, Case Nos. 25-1232, 25-1239, June 8, 2026. 4th Cir. (Floyd), from SDWVA at Huntington (Goodwin). Laura Welikson for Appellants/Cross-Appellees. Michael Ray Williams for Appellees/Cross-Appellants. VLW 026-2-212. 57 pp.
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