Maryland Family Law Maryland family law opinions and commentary
BOSTON, MA — Where a plaintiff was awarded summary judgment in a dispute with her former in-laws over real property, that judgment must be vacated to the extent it predicted Massachusetts law regarding the effect of a divorce on a creditor’s interest in property owned by the entirety.
“At its core, this diversity action is a dispute between [the plaintiff] and her former in-laws, the [defendants], over real property located in western Massachusetts. But after several state court proceedings, that central dispute has morphed into complicated questions of state procedural and property law. Below, the district court addressed many of these legal issues to grant [the plaintiff] summary judgment. In so doing, it resolved unsettled questions of Massachusetts law related to property owned by tenants by the entirety and the meaning of ‘necessaries’ under Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 209, §1 (‘Chapter 209’). We view the district court’s decision as a mixed bag. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. …
“[The plaintiff] brought claims for a declaration and an injunction that would prevent the Trust from proceeding with a sheriff’s sale of an interest in the Property. Whether she is entitled to this relief requires resolution of multiple issues.
“The first is whether the loan represented by the promissory note is valid as to [the plaintiff]. If it is not and instead is the result of a ‘conspiracy’ between [the defendants and their son] ‘to encumber a marital asset,’ then it may not be the basis for obtaining a lien on the Property that would dispossess [the plaintiff] of it. Feldman v. Feldman, 480 N.E.2d 45, 47-48 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (citation modified). Below, the district court acknowledged that this was a threshold issue but determined that there was a genuine dispute of material fact that prevented it from being resolved on summary judgment. …
“Nevertheless, the district court granted [the plaintiff] summary judgment on other grounds. To do so, it held that even if the loan were valid, [the plaintiff’s] divorce and the Family Court’s distribution of the Property to [the plaintiff] extinguished the [William G. Wendt 2022 Family] Trust’s interest in the Property.
“Resolving the case in this manner required the district court to predict Massachusetts law in an area that touches on delicate and complex issues related to divorce and tenancies by the entirety. Below, we explain why the district court should have declined to address this unsettled and difficult issue of Massachusetts law while potentially dispositive factual disputes remained live. Based on this consideration, we vacate the order to the extent it predicted Massachusetts law regarding the effect of a divorce on a creditor’s interest in property owned by the entirety. We then turn to two additional concerns raised by the Trust. First, whether [the plaintiff] is precluded from challenging the validity of the loan as it pertains to her because of the judgment entered in the Default Suit; and second, whether the Wendt Parents effected a valid execution on [their son]’s interest in the Property prior to [the plaintiff’s] divorce. We reject the Trust’s arguments. …
“To briefly sum up our analysis so far, the district court prematurely predicted a difficult and unsettled issue of Massachusetts law to grant [the plaintiff] summary judgment. We vacate that portion of the decision so that the court can resolve the potentially dispositive factual dispute relating to the validity of the loan as to [the plaintiff]. We also reject the Trust’s contentions that there are legal impediments to the court’s undertaking of this factual inquiry. …
“This opinion covers many disparate areas of law. Accordingly, we summarize our holdings.
“First, we hold that the district court prematurely resolved an unsettled and complicated question of Massachusetts law regarding the interaction between a creditor’s interest in a property, divorce, and a tenancy by the entirety. We therefore vacate that portion of the summary judgment order and remand for factual findings as to whether the purported loan is valid with respect to [the plaintiff].
“Second, we hold that neither Rule 60(b) nor related preclusion considerations prevent [the plaintiff] from challenging the loan insofar as it affects her interests. Relatedly, we conclude that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the loan is valid with respect to [the plaintiff].
“Third, we affirm on alternative grounds the district court’s determination that the Wendt Parents did not validly complete an execution against [their son]’s interest in the Property prior to the divorce.
“Fourth, we hold the domestic relations exception does not prevent the district court from adjudicating the Trust’s counterclaims. And finally, we hold that there are disputes of material fact as to whether the purported loan (assuming its validity as to [the plaintiff]) was spent on necessaries.
“On remand, the district court should conduct further proceedings to determine whether the loan is valid with respect to [the plaintiff] and (if required) resolve the factual disputes related to the necessaries issue. If the loan is invalid as to [the plaintiff], then the case is over, and [the plaintiff] is entitled to judgment on all claims and counterclaims. If, however, the loan is valid as to [the plaintiff], then the district court should conduct further proceedings to determine whether all or part of the loan was spent on necessaries, resolving or certifying to the SJC any unsettled legal questions that must be answered to make that determination. Only if the necessaries issue does not resolve the Trust’s asserted interest in the Property should the court decide, or certify to the SJC, the legal question concerning the effect of [the] divorce on that interest. …
“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s order in part, reverse it in part, and vacate it in part. We remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
Cosel v. Wendt (Lawyers Weekly No. 01-175-26) (40 pages) (Aframe, J.) Appealed from a decision by Mastroianni, J., in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Christopher M. Hennessey, with whom Cohen Kinne Valicenti & Cook, David H. Rich and Todd & Weld were on brief, for the defendant-appellant; Dennis M. LaRochelle, with whom Cain Hibbard & Myers was on brief, for the plaintiff-appellee (Docket No. 25-1575) (Aug. 11, 2026).
