MD appeals court reverses on longshoreman’s workers’ compensation claim

A longshoreman’s vessel owner cannot be held liable for negligence under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act for a traumatic brain injury the longshoreman sustained while working, the Maryland Appellate Court ruled.

The reported opinion, written by Judge Laura S. Ripken and filed earlier this month, reverses the judgment of the Baltimore City Circuit Court that found Corman Marine Construction, Inc. and two related companies liable for Matthew McGeady’s workplace accident.

Though a jury previously awarded McGeady and his wife damages totaling more than $8.5 million, the Maryland Appellate Court determined that the trial offered no evidence that McGeady’s injury was the result of what’s known as vessel negligence under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act.

The appeals court found that Corman’s president’s “mere presence as a construction supervisor” on a floating crane barge was not enough to attribute his conduct to Corman as a vessel owner.

“To hold otherwise would be to abrogate the policy bargain Congress struck in promulgating the [Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act] and contravene the guidance of the Supreme Court of the United States that the rights of workers covered under the Act should not depend on the dual capacity status of their employer,” the appellate court wrote.

Paul Bekman, counsel for the McGeadys’, said Baltimore City Circuit Judge John S. Nugent correctly denied Corman’s motion for judgment at the close of evidence, as well as Corman’s motion for new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict following trial.

“We also believe that the jury properly determined based on the evidence presented at trial that there was vessel negligence under Section 905(b) of the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act,” Bekman said in email, adding that his clients plan to appeal to the Maryland Supreme Court.

Counsel for Corman declined to comment.

Under the Act, an injured worker can pursue a negligence action against a dual capacity employer specifically in its capacity as a vessel owner, according to the opinion. A dual capacity employer means the employer and the vessel owner are the same party.

In December 2016, Corman’s president, onboard a floating crane barge, ordered the construction foreman to remove a pneumatic plug which would expel pressurized air inside of a pipe when activated. According to the opinion, the barge served as a staging area for a construction project to install a sewer pipe into the York River.

Prior to ordering the plug’s removal, Corman’s president had not read the plug’s safety manual, did not establish a safety zone and did not instruct any of the Corman employees where to be located during the procedure, the opinion states.

Once the foreman removed the plug, the plug exploded out of the pipe, hit the foreman in the chest and knocked him backward into McGeady, who struck his head on the barge’s deck. According to the opinion, McGeady’s brain injury required emergency surgery.

Later, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration compiled a report showing Corman failed to provide McGeady with safe working conditions.

In making its ruling, the appellate court pointed to the notion that while Maryland courts have not directly addressed this issue, other courts have looked to whether a plaintiff has presented evidence that the negligence was specifically related to the defendant’s capacity as a vessel, “and not merely bootstrapped by the fact that the defendant is a dual capacity employer.”

“In sum, courts have concluded that there must be some nexus between the negligent act and either the physical character of the vessel or other exclusively vessel-related operations,” the appeals court wrote.

The appellate court also found that the circuit court properly limited Corman’s cross-examination of McGeady under Maryland’s rules.