Maryland Supreme Court: Postconviction DNA, domestic relations, insurance

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Criminal; postconviction DNA

BOTTOM LINE: Where postconviction DNA testing did not yield results favorable to the defendant, there was not a “substantial possibility” that he would not have been convicted had those results been known or introduced at trial and a new trial was not warranted “in the interest of justice,” the postconviction court did not err when it denied his motion for a new trial.

CASE: Shepperson v. State, No. 36, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed July 24, 2025) (Justices Fader, Watts, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, KILLOUGH).

FACTS: In 2009, Travis Rashad Shepperson was convicted of first- and second-degree sexual offenses, use of a handgun in the commission of a felony and other robbery-related charges. In a postconviction proceeding in 2023, Shepperson sought DNA testing of a residual swab from the barrel of the handgun used during the attack on N.M. The test “results were below the limit of detection and, therefore not processed further.”

In his postconviction motion for a new trial, Shepperson argued that the absence of detectable DNA on the 2024 test conducted by Bode Technology was favorable as it contradicted the 2008 test conducted by BRT Laboratories and created a substantial possibility of a different outcome. The postconviction court denied Shepperson’s motion for a new trial, finding that the new DNA evidence did not refute the N.M.’s testimony or the state’s evidence adduced at trial.

LAW:  Under Maryland Code Criminal Procedure, or CP, Article § 8-201, a postconviction court may grant a new trial if (1) the DNA testing yields results “favorable to the petitioner,” and (2) there exists “a substantial possibility” that the petitioner would not have been convicted had those results been known or introduced at trial, or, alternatively, if the court concludes that a new trial is warranted “in the interest of justice.”

Shepperson argues that the absence of DNA on the barrel of the gun would have led jurors to discredit N.M.’s testimony that the barrel was pressed into her mouth to compel fellatio, thereby creating a substantial possibility of a different outcome. This argument falls short under both prongs of CP § 8-201 and provides no basis to conclude that the postconviction court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial.

The 2024 test was not favorable to Shepperson. At most, it could have confirmed the original result, shown that N.M.’s DNA was not present, or, as occurred here, yielded no detectable DNA. A “no detectable DNA” result, like an inconclusive one, is not “favorable” unless it casts doubt on the validity of the initial findings. Because the 2024 test neither refutes the State’s theory nor undermines the 2008 analysis, it fails the favorability prong of CP § 8-201(i).

Even if the 2024 result were deemed favorable to Shepperson, CP § 8-201(i)(2)(iii) requires a showing that “a substantial possibility exists that the petitioner would not have been convicted if the DNA testing results had been known or introduced at trial[.]” This standard demands more than conjecture; it asks whether, in light of the entire trial record, there exists a real possibility of acquittal. Shepperson did not meet that burden.

N.M. described three distinct acts—forced fellatio, vaginal rape and anal rape—and testified that the barrel of the gun was inserted into her mouth only during the second act. The jury acquitted Shepperson of the vaginal and anal rape charges. Thus, the “no detectable DNA” result from the 2024 Bode Technology test relates solely to a charge on which he was acquitted and bears no connection to his conviction for forcing N.M. to perform fellatio at gunpoint.

Nor does the 2024 Bode Technology test undermine the rest of the forensic evidence. The original 2008 BRT Laboratories test from a separate portion of the gun barrel identified N.M. as a major contributor. Swabs from the cylinder release, trigger and grips of the gun found in Shepperson’s residence—never retested—also produced mixtures in which N.M. was the major contributor. During the postconviction hearing, the DNA analyst testified that variation in yield across swab fragments is routine, especially after years of storage, and does not suggest flaws in the original testing.

CP § 8-201(i)(3) provides that “[i]f the court finds that a substantial possibility does not exists under paragraph (2)(iii) of this subsection, the court may order a new trial if the court determines that the action is in the interest of justice.” That could include, for example, ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel or a change made in the law that should be applied retroactively. Neither of those situations apply here.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County affirmed.

Domestic Relations; settlement

BOTTOM LINE: Where wife offered to settle the dispute if husband signed relevant documents by September 25, and he did not sign them until September 28, the circuit court erred when it found the offer was timely accepted and that a binding settlement was formed.

CASE: Pattison v. Pattison, No. 33, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed July 23, 2025) (Justices Fader, Watts, Booth, Biran, GOULD) (Justices Eaves, KILLOUGH).

FACTS: This contested divorce case was commenced by Todd Pattison, when he filed a complaint for an absolute divorce against Deborah Pattison, who filed a counterclaim the following month. The issue here is whether a wife’s settlement offer was timely accepted by her husband.

The circuit court found that it was timely accepted and that a binding settlement agreement was formed. Over the wife’s objection, the court entered a judgment for absolute divorce based on mutual consent. The court incorporated (but did not merge) the settlement agreement into the judgment. The Appellate Court of Maryland disagreed and reversed the judgment of the circuit court.

LAW: Whether the letter imposed a hard signature deadline does not hinge on the credibility of the parties’ respective testimony. What matters is what the cover letter said and the legal effect of its words.

The cover letter stated: “[t]his Agreement is delivered to you in settlement of the parties’ outstanding disputes on condition that the Agreement and Note be executed by [Husband] today. I will assume that we will have the final Guaranty signed by [Husband] by close of business on Monday. Please advise me via text or e-mail when [Husband] has counter-executed the Agreement and Note. Thank you.”

The letter expressly distinguishes between the Agreement and Note, which had to be signed on September 25, and the Guaranty, which could be signed on September 28. Thus, any reasonable person in the parties’ positions would understand that wife’s offer was conditioned on husband signing the Agreement and Note on September 25. Conversely, no reasonable person would perceive any flexibility in that deadline.

That wife imposed the condition in the cover letter and not within the four corners of the Agreement is also irrelevant. The withdrawal of a condition can be communicated in various ways, including through written communication. So even if wife had not imposed any condition in her cover letter, and so long as husband had not already accepted it, she could have withdrawn the offer.

The only difference here is that wife communicated the expiration of the offer in advance, when she conveyed the offer. Basic logic dictates that if the withdrawal of an offer can be (and always is) communicated outside of the proposed contract after the offer is made, so too can a deadline for accepting an offer when the offer is made.

Husband leans heavily on his contention that the circuit court found that wife knew husband could not sign the documents until Monday and that wife knew husband’s counsel was not at the office to take delivery of the settlement package. Even if those facts were true, it would not matter. An offeror’s freedom to impose any conditions on her offer is not constrained by the offeree’s ability, or lack thereof, to satisfy those conditions.

Wife’s silence after receiving the documents from husband on September 28 likewise did not constitute a waiver. When husband signed the documents on September 28, wife’s offer had already expired, and thus, there was no offer for husband to accept. Thus, wife’s mere silence, without more, was not an acceptance of husband’s counteroffer.

Husband argues that the circuit court improperly excluded evidence of the parties’ communications in the days and hours leading up to the hand delivery of the Agreement to husband’s counsel’s office. He argues that, at a minimum, this court should remand the matter for the circuit court to consider those exhibits. This court has considered all the exhibits in the record, and determines that, as a matter of law, no contract was formed due to husband’s failure to adhere to wife’s deadline, and that the evidence, including the excluded exhibits, does not support the circuit court’s waiver finding.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed.

CONCUR: In effect, the majority invalidates a fully executed, integrated settlement agreement based entirely on an excluded hearsay document – a remarkably thin evidentiary reed on which to overturn not only a signed contract but also the trial court’s supported factual findings. In my view, the trial court got it right. Given the deference owed to a trial court’s findings, and in light of Maryland’s strong policy favoring settlements and the efficient administration of justice, I would affirm the trial court’s ruling.

Insurance; anti-assignment

BOTTOM LINE: Although a homeowners’ policy contained an anti-assignment clause, the clause did not prevent the assignment of a loss to a restoration company. The company’s assignment did not purport to assign the policy, but rather the rights associated with a specific claim that arose under the policy.

CASE: In the Matter of the Petition of Featherfall Restoration LLC, No. 17, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed July 24, 2025) (Justices Fader, Watts, Booth, Biran, GOULD, Eaves, Killough).

FACTS: In this case, the court considers whether an anti-assignment clause in a homeowner’s insurance policy that prohibits an assignment of “this policy” without the insurer’s consent applies to the assignment of a post-loss claim under the policy.

Specifically, homeowners signed an “Assignment of Claim” form with Featherfall Restoration LLC in which they purported to “irrevocably transfer, assign, and set over onto Featherfall Restoration, LLC . . . any and all insurance rights, benefits, proceeds, and any causes of action under applicable insurance policies[.]” The Maryland Insurance Administration, or MIA, circuit court and Appellate Court of Maryland all held that the anti-assignment clause in the homeowners’ policy was enforceable, so the Featherfall assignment was void.

LAW: The parties dispute whether the policy’s anti-assignment clause applies to the Featherfall assignment. Featherfall contends that the Featherfall assignment did not purport to assign the policy, but rather the rights associated with a specific claim that arose under the policy. Travelers counters that the anti-assignment clause applies to “any right or claim under the Policy to which Travelers has not consented.”

According to Travelers, “[a]ny other interpretation would carve out atextual categories of assignable rights, like ‘post-loss claims’ based on ‘public policy,’ not the text of the contract.” Similarly, the MIA argues that the language of the anti-assignment clause “necessarily eliminates the power to assign a claim that exists only because of the Policy.”

Travelers and the MIA argue that the policy and a “claim” under the policy are not “conceptually distinct[.]” This court disagrees. The policy establishes the terms of the contractual relationship between Travelers and the policyholders. A claim is different. The policy uses the word “claim” to refer to specific requests for coverage or payment. For example, under “Claim Expenses,” the policy discusses how claims arising under the policy will be handled. Elsewhere in the policy, “claim” is used to refer to specific requests for coverage or payment for specific losses. The distinction between a contract and a claim arising under it is firmly embedded in Maryland law, including in the insurance context.

The distinction between a contract and a claim arising under it is also reflected in precedent from the early nineteenth century cases addressing choses in action. A chose in action is defined as a “proprietary right in personam, such as a debt owed by another person . . . or a claim for damages in tort” and a “right to bring an action to recover a debt, money, or thing.” Such rights include the right to enforce claims for breach of contract or for benefits under a contract, such as payment of money. A chose in action is therefore distinct from the contract instrument from which it arose.

Here, the policy’s anti-assignment clause does not prohibit the assignment of Claim IHV6005 to Featherfall because a “reasonable person in the position of the parties” would not have understood a prohibition on the assignment of “this policy” to include a prohibition on the assignment of a single post-loss claim. The Featherfall assignment does not purport to transfer the policy itself, the ongoing contractual relationship with Travelers or any future claims that might arise under the policy. It operated only to assign the policyholders’ rights with respect to a specific claim, not the policy itself, and was therefore not prohibited by the policy’s anti-assignment clause.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland reversed.