4th Circuit: Social Security; Sixth Amendment; gross negligence

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Administrative; Social Security disability benefits

BOTTOM LINE: Where an administrative law judge found an applicant’s subjective testimony about her fibromyalgia symptoms to be unsupported by medical and other evidence, it erred. ALJs may not rely on objective medical evidence – even as just one of multiple factors – to discount a claimant’s subjective complaints regarding symptoms of fibromyalgia.

CASE: Hultz v. Bisignano, Case No. 23-2259 (filed Dec. 15, 2025) (Judges GREGORY, Young) (Judge AGEE concurs in part and dissents in part).

FACTS: Crystal Hultz suffers from a host of medical conditions, including fibromyalgia. Many of her conditions have been partially or essentially resolved, but she testified that her fibromyalgia lingers, causing her to be bedridden for days and dependent on her family for everyday living.

Hultz applied for Social Security disability benefits, but was denied. Ultimately, the administrative law judge, or ALJ, found her subjective testimony about her symptoms to be unsupported by medical and other evidence. The district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision.

LAW: In Arakas v. Commissioner, 983 F.3d 83 (4th Cir. 2020), this court held that ALJs may not rely on objective medical evidence even as just one of multiple factors to discount a claimant’s subjective complaints regarding symptoms of fibromyalgia. It reiterated that claimants are “entitled to rely exclusively on subjective evidence to prove that [their] symptoms were so continuous and/or severe that they prevented [the claimant] from working a full eight-hour day.”

This court found that the ALJ in Arakas failed to adhere to this standard when he required that her subjective descriptions of her symptoms to be supported by objective medical evidence. It noted that this “type of legal error is particularly pronounced in a case involving fibromyalgia—a disease whose symptoms are entirely subjective.”

Under Arakas, the ALJ here failed to apply the correct legal standard when the decision heavily relied on objective medical criteria to assess Hultz’s fibromyalgia. First, the ALJ used objective medical criteria, such as reliance on mobility devices and the involvement of organs and body systems, to determine whether her fibromyalgia met a listing such as for inflammatory arthritis.

Second, when discounting Hultz and her grandmother’s testimony, the ALJ stated—in language that is nearly identical to the reversed ALJ decision in Arakas—that the ALJ did so because “the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.”

The ALJ’s decision also fails to be supported by substantial evidence. Policy interpretation SSR 96-8p states that an ALJ’s “assessment must be based on all the relevant evidence” and must include a “narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts . . . and nonmedical evidence[.]” Here, although the ALJ provided somewhat of a narrative regarding how the evidence supported the decision, the opinion is better characterized as a summary of the medical record than as a detailed analysis of fact and law.

Ms. Hultz also argues that under the Treating Source rule, the ALJ erred in giving little weight to the opinions of Ms. Hultz’s treating physicians, in particular that of Dr. Nasseri. The court agrees. The ALJ’s reasons for dismissing Dr. Nasseri’s opinion do not indicate that the ALJ properly weighed each factor under the Treating Source rule.

Turning to the remedy, awarding benefits without remand is appropriate if the record “clearly establishes the claimant’s entitlement to benefits and another ALJ hearing on remand would serve no useful purpose.” In this case, the court finds sufficient evidence to warrant reversal. The facts of this case—namely Hultz’s subjective complaints of fibromyalgia symptoms, corroborated by her grandmother’s testimony and supported by the medical record as a whole—compel the conclusion that Hultz is entitled to disability benefits.

Reversed and remanded for calculation of benefits.

CONCUR/DISSENT: In Arakas, this court held that “ALJs may not rely on objective medical evidence (or the lack thereof)—even as just one of multiple factors—to discount a claimant’s subjective complaints regarding symptoms of fibromyalgia[.]” As the majority correctly notes, the ALJ in this case transgressed that directive on its way to concluding that Hultz was not disabled. And if that’s where the majority stopped its analysis, I would have been constrained by Arakas to join its decision in full.

But rather than simply vacate the ALJ’s decision and remand for reconsideration of Hultz’s claim, it went a step further, opting to outright reverse the ALJ’s decision and deem Hultz entitled to disability benefits in the first instance. In doing so, it departed from the process courts typically employ when an ALJ errs. Because I have concerns about this action—and about the ramifications of the Arakas decision more generally—I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.

Criminal; Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights

BOTTOM LINE: Where a man who was arrested and jailed, after he traveled from the United States to Pakistan with hopes of joining in jihad in Afghanistan, argued the United States violated his Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights by not seeking his extradition earlier, his argument was rejected.

CASE: United States v. Chaudhry, Case No. 24-4471 (filed Dec. 16, 2025) (Judges King, Wynn, QUATTLEBAUM).

FACTS: Umar Farooq Chaudhry traveled from the United States to Pakistan with hopes of joining in jihad in Afghanistan. But after arriving in Pakistan, Chaudhry was arrested, tried and convicted by Pakistani authorities of terrorism-related offenses. He then spent the next decade in a Pakistani prison.

After his release, he was extradited to the United States to face similar charges. Chaudhry moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the United States violated his Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights by not seeking his extradition earlier. Such an analysis requires balancing (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his rights and (4) prejudice to the defendant. The district court rejected that argument, finding that, while the first factor favored Chaudhry, the remaining factors did not.

LAW: The Supreme Court has suggested that, depending on the nature of the charges, a delay becomes presumptively prejudicial for purposes of the first factor when it approaches one year. The question here is whether the court should measure the length of delay from Chaudhry’s criminal complaint, Red Notice and arrest warrant in 2009, or from Chaudhry’s subsequent indictment in 2017?

The district court determined it was unnecessary to resolve the issue in this case because the first factor favors Chaudhry whether the length of delay is measured from 2009 or from 2017. This court agrees with the district court that it is not necessary to resolve this issue here. Consequently, the first factor weighs in Chaudhry’s favor.

Turning to the reason for delay, the government argues that it believed making a formal extradition request before the completion of Chaudhry’s prison sentence would have been futile. The district court found that determination to be reasonable. This court finds no error in the district court’s conclusion.

The plain language of the treaty indicates that Pakistan would not have extradited Chaudhry prior to the completion of his sentence. Second, the history of the United States’ extradition requests to Pakistan also supports the government’s futility argument.

The district court also found that the government made a reasonably diligent, good-faith effort to secure Chaudhry’s return to the United States. Once again, this court finds no error in that determination.

Chaudhry nevertheless argues that his conviction in Pakistan was “fraudulent” and “illegitima[te]” and contends that this undermines the government’s claim that the Pakistani prosecution was an acceptable reason for delay. However the charges Chaudhry was convicted of in Pakistan—conspiring to commit acts of terrorism in Pakistan and providing financial support to a terrorist organization in Pakistan—appear to be similar to those he pled guilty to in the United States. Alternatively, if Pakistan went to the trouble of fabricating evidence against Chaudhry to support a conviction, this court sees no reason why it would then consent to extraditing him prior to the completion of the prison sentence stemming from that conviction.

Turning to the third element, this court does not fault Chaudhry for failing to assert his speedy trial rights before learning of the charges against him. However his subsequent conduct shows he was not diligent in pursuing his rights. Indeed, Chaudhry tried to avoid trial from the moment he learned of the charges pending against him.

Finally the Supreme Court has suggested that long periods of delay caused by the government’s negligence may cause a presumption of prejudice and thereby relieve the defendant of needing to make a showing of actual prejudice. Nevertheless, because the delay in this case was not caused by government negligence, Chaudhry must show actual prejudice to carry his burden.

Chaudhry contends that, because of the delay, he lost the opportunity to serve his U.S. and Pakistani sentences concurrently. But Chaudhry has not provided any reason to suspect that he could have served his sentences concurrently. Beyond that, Chaudhry received a time-served sentence predicated, in part, on the fact that he had already served 10 years in a Pakistani prison.

Chaudhry next argues that he was forced to suffer inhumane prison conditions in Pakistan. Yet his suffering those prison conditions cannot be attributed to the United States and was not caused by the delay.

Chaudhry finally argues that the delay impaired his ability to mount a defense because, during those 10 years, one of his co-defendants suffered a severe mental breakdown and could no longer serve as a witness. But Chaudhry has not identified what he would have testified on or even if that testimony would have been exculpatory. Without any additional information, Chaudhry’s vague and speculatory assertions of harm are insufficient to demonstrate actual prejudice.

Affirmed.

Damages; gross negligence

BOTTOM LINE: Where a police officer found liable for gross negligence in his capacity as a private person, arising out of his brandishing a weapon at a then-16-year-old, argued the $250,000 verdict was excessive, his arguments were rejected and the verdict was affirmed.

CASE: Nicholson v. Durant, Case No. 24-1789 (filed Dec. 18, 2025) (Judges GREGORY, Agee, Young).

FACTS: In 2024, a jury awarded Jawone D. Nicholson $250,000 in compensatory damages for the emotional damages he suffered from an encounter where Damond Durant, an off-duty Baltimore City police officer, brandished a gun at then-16-year-old Nicholson. A jury found Durant grossly negligent in his capacity as a private person.

LAW: Durant first contends that Nicholson’s amended complaint did not properly plead recovery for “gross negligence as a private person.” So, as a consequence, Durant argues that he was not on notice that the jury would consider an alternative theory of recovery for gross negligence as a private person.

The court disagrees. The complaint states that “When Defendant Durant stopped, interrogated, and brandished a weapon at Plaintiff, he had no constitutional or legally valid basis for doing so. Defendant Durant’s claim that he had never seen Plaintiff before did not give Defendant Durant the authority to stop, interrogate, and use force against Plaintiff.”

The first allegation’s use of the disjunctive term “or” supports the conclusion that Nicholson pleaded that Durant’s conduct violated both his duty as a police officer and his duty as a private person: the “constitutional basis” references Durant’s duty as a state officer and the “legally valid basis” references Durant’s duty as a private citizen. The additional allegation’s use of “and,” a “coordinating junction” designed to “link[] independent ideas,” indicates that two theories of liability proceeded against Durant: one for misconduct as a police officer, and one for his general gross negligence—including negligence in his capacity as a private person for “intentional failure to perform a manifest duty.”

Nicholson also included allegations under certain state law counts that, “[i]n the alternative, Defendant Durant’s unconstitutional deprivation of Plaintiff’s liberty on the invalid basis that he had never seen Plaintiff before constitutes gross negligence, and Defendant Durant is personally liable for his conduct.” Those allegations, which are expressly and alternatively limited to personal liability for gross negligence, all followed paragraphs discussing Durant’s liability for his misconduct as a police officer.

Moreover, Durant has not articulated how the district court’s submission of this claim to the jury caused any “manifest injustice.” The district court correctly rejected Durant’s vague argument that he was barred from engaging in any discovery or moving for judgment on the claim before trial because, as the court noted, “[t]he facts giving rise to the gross negligence as a private person cause of action” were “the same as those in all other claims.”

For the first time on appeal, Durant argues that the district court did not have supplemental jurisdiction over the “gross negligence as a private person” claim where Nicholson failed to specifically plead the supplemental jurisdiction statute in his operative complaint and the complaint contained no “clearly pleaded” facts permitting the district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction on its own.

Whatever clearly pleaded allegations are necessary to allow a district court to assert supplemental jurisdiction absent an explicit reference to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the allegations in this case suffice. As discussed above, the allegations set forth in Nicholson’s complaint sufficed to put Durant on notice that a claim was proceeding against him in his personal capacity. And Durant has never indicated that the facts giving rise to the state law “gross negligence as a private person” claim differ from those giving rise to the “gross negligence claim as a police officer” claim. Additionally, Nicholson expressly included a state law gross negligence claim in his complaint.

Durant next argues that the district court failed to instruct the jury on its own as to a contributory negligence defense after Durant withdrew his request for such an instruction. He claims that the district court’s failure to provide this instruction constrained his ability to present his defense on the “gross negligence by a private person” claim.

But even assuming, for argument’s sake only, that the district court could have instructed the jury as to contributory negligence, its failure to do so was not plain error. There is no evidence in this case—and Durant does not point to even hypothetical evidence—that Nicholson was contributorily negligent.

Durant finally argues that the jury verdict was excessive because: (1) the jury heard no evidence about any medical treatment Nicholson received; (2) the district court failed to analyze inconsistencies in witness testimony bearing on Nicholson’s injuries; (3) the November 10 incident did not justify the damages awarded and (4) the district court failed to analyze the impact of counsel’s closing statement appealing to societal standards to the jury on the excessiveness of the compensatory damages award. This court does not find that any ground Durant identifies mandates remittitur of the jury’s verdict.

Affirmed.