Appellate Court of MD: Jury instruction, common-law marriage, freedom of information, more

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Criminal; jury instruction

BOTTOM LINE: Where two men convicted for various crimes stemming from a violent attack argued the trial court should not have given a flight instruction, this argument was rejected. The state proffered “some evidence” from which the jury could infer they departed from the scene in a manner suggesting that “the leaving was done with a consciousness of guilt and pursuant to an effort to avoid apprehension or prosecution based on that guilt.”

CASE: Johnson, Jr. v. State, Case No. 772, Sept. Term, 2024; Johnson v. State, Case No. 881, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed April 2, 2026) (Judges BERGER, Friedman, Robinson).

FACTS: Terance Johnson Jr. and Teriquo Johnson were convicted by jury for various crimes stemming from an altercation outside of Frank’s Den, a bar and liquor store in Glen Burnie, on March 12, 2023, that left Jamie Marshall-Bates with a traumatic brain injury.

LAW: Appellants argue that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to instruct the jury on two mitigation defenses. First, Terance contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it answered the jury’s question concerning whether hot-blooded response to adequate provocation applied to his first-degree assault charge in the negative. According to Terance, evidence that Bates knocked him out was sufficient to generate a hot-blooded response instruction. As a result, the trial court was required to answer the jury’s question in the affirmative.

Second, appellants contend that the trial court abused its discretion by withdrawing the requested mutual combat instruction. Appellants reason that there was “some evidence” that appellants and Bates shared a mutual intent to fight; the instruction, therefore, was generated. Further, appellants maintain that, to the extent the requested instruction was incorrect as to the allocation of the burden of proof, the trial court bore the burden of propounding a correct instruction because the mutual combat instruction requested was relevant and raised an arguable defense. This court rejects both arguments, because neither mitigation defense applies to first- or second-degree assault.

Next, appellants argue that the trial court abused its discretion by instructing the jury on flight. Appellants do not contend that the flight instruction given by the trial court was an incorrect statement of law or that the substance of the instruction was sufficiently covered by other jury instructions. The only question then is whether the instruction was applicable under the facts of the case. This court’s review of the record leads it to conclude that the state proffered “some evidence” from which the jury could infer that appellants departed from the scene in a manner suggesting that “the leaving was done with a consciousness of guilt and pursuant to an effort to avoid apprehension or prosecution based on that guilt.”

The court next finds that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to convict Terance of first-degree assault. First, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that Terance acted with the intent to cause serious physical injury to Bates at either the outset or the end of the fight. Similarly, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that Terance caused offensive physical contact with or physical harm to Bates.

Notably, the trial court found such evidence insufficient to support the attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder charges and accordingly granted Terance’s motion for judgment of acquittal on those charges. That does not mean, however, that such evidence was similarly insufficient to sustain the jury’s conviction of first-degree assault.

Teriquo was charged and convicted of rogue and vagabond under CR § 6-206(b), which prohibits “be[ing] in or on the motor vehicle of another with the intent to commit theft of the motor vehicle or property that is in or on the motor vehicle.” On appeal, Teriquo argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for two reasons.

First, Teriquo contends that the state failed to prove that the vehicle with which Teriquo interacted was in fact Bates’s vehicle. Teriquo reasons that, because he was charged with rogue and vagabond based on his interaction with Bates’s vehicle specifically, the state had the burden of proving that the vehicle in question did in fact belong to Bates and that it should have done so with direct evidence such as a Motor Vehicle Administration record. Second, Teriquo argues that, because the surveillance video does not clearly show what he was doing in the vehicle or what his intent was, there was insufficient evidence for the jury to convict him of rogue and vagabond. The court rejects both arguments.

Judgments of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County affirmed.

Domestic Relations; retirement pay calculation

BOTTOM LINE: Where the wife argued the circuit court erred when it resolved a dispute over her former husband’s military pension, this argument was rejected. When a member’s retirement pay is earned through a combination of active and reserve duty, it is appropriate for a court to utilize points rather than months of service to calculate a spouse’s share of the marital property portion of a service member’s military retirement benefits.

CASE: Campbell v. Campbell, No. 911, Sept. Term, 2023 (filed April 3, 2026) (Judges Graeff, Tang, MEREDITH).

FACTS: Kelly Marie Harrigan Campbell was divorced from Kevin John Campbell in 2009. Prior to entry of the judgment of divorce, the parties had negotiated a marital settlement agreement that addressed the division of their marital property, including, but not limited to, husband’s military retirement benefits. The marital settlement agreement was incorporated, but not merged, into the judgment of absolute divorce.

Approximately nine years after the parties’ divorce, husband retired from the military. The parties disagreed about the portion of husband’s military retirement benefits wife was entitled to receive, and they filed competing motions in the circuit court.

The circuit court agreed with husband’s assertion that the correct computation entitled wife to receive 15.96 percent of husband’s gross disposable military retired pay, and, on at least two separate occasions, the court entered an order to that effect. The court also ordered husband to pay wife backpay for past-due amounts.

LAW: Husband first argues that wife’s appeal of the orders entered on April 3, 2023, and May 8, 2023, should be stricken as untimely because those orders were final orders which wife failed to appeal within 30 days following the entry of the orders, as required by Md. Rule 8-202(a). This court disagrees.

The April 3, 2023, signed hearing sheet and May 8, 2023, back pay order were not final judgments because neither order adjudicated all claims of all parties. Wife’s appeal, filed within 30 days after the June 6, 2023, entry of the Amended Military Retired Pay Order, was timely as to that order and the interlocutory orders that led to the entry of that order.

Next, during circuit court’s oral ruling at the March 31, 2023, hearing, that eventually led to the entry of the Amended Military Retired Pay Order on June 6, 2023, the judge observed that the court had entered two previous judgments addressing the division of husband’s military retirement pay, on Dec. 14, 2021, and March 3, 2022. The court stated: “this [c]ourt does not have the authority to make the req[ue]sted substantive changes to the military retired pay division order. As a result the substantive provisions to that order stand.” Wife asserts that this statement of law was an error that warrants reversal and remand. This court disagrees.

In the absence of fraud, mistake or irregularity, a court has limited authority under Maryland Rule 2-535 to exercise revisory power over a judgment more than 30 days after the judgment was entered. Consequently, the judge who was asked in this case to modify a judgment that had been entered more than 30 days before the motion seeking revision was filed was appropriately circumspect about the court’s authority to make the requested substantive modification.

Second, even though the court’s previously-entered judgment included a provision that retained jurisdiction to modify the order to make it acceptable under the Uniformed Former Spouses’ Protection Act, that sort of provision does not authorize revision of a final judgment if the prior order does not need to be modified in order to comply with the “DFAS requirements for distribution of the spousal share[.]” Here, the circuit court did not err when it concluded that the order for payment of wife’s share by DFAS did not require the substantive modification sought by wife, and consequently, the substantive provisions of the March 3, 2022, order should stand.

Turning to the merits, the dispute in this case is about how to calculate the fraction of husband’s total retirement pay the parties agreed would be marital property, one-half of which would be paid to wife. Wife’s position is that federal law precludes the use of the computation she agreed to at the time of the divorce.

This court is not persuaded that federal law prohibits enforcement of the computation set forth in the parties’ marital settlement agreement. As such, it holds that when a member’s retirement pay is earned through a combination of active and reserve duty, it is appropriate for a court to utilize points rather than months of service to calculate a spouse’s share of the marital property portion of a service member’s military retirement benefits.

Appellee’s motion to partially strike notice of appeal denied. Judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County affirmed. 

Evidence; common-law marriage

BOTTOM LINE: Where there was evidence supporting the circuit court’s determination that a man who died intestate was not in a common-law marriage, its decision was affirmed.

CASE: In Re: The Estate of Sam Duraiswamy, No. 1758, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed April 3, 2026) (Judges Leahy, RIPKEN, Kehoe).

FACTS: Sam Duraiswamy died intestate in 2021. This appeal arises from a decision of the circuit court determining that decedent was not the common-law husband of Diane Adams, also deceased.

LAW: The Adams Estate contends that the orphans’ court erred by permitting the Montgomery County Board of Education to remain as an interested party after the blood heirs were located. It further asserts that the orphans’ court erred in appointing counsel to represent the blood heirs and ordering that their attorneys’ fees be paid out of the Duraiswamy Estate.

The Adams Estate did not object to the Board’s continued participation at the February 2024 or August 2024 hearings, at which time the blood heirs were ascertained. Having failed to object to the Board’s participation after the blood heirs were identified, that argument as raised by the Adams Estate on appeal is not preserved for this court’s review, and it declines to exercise its discretion to address the issue.

The issues surrounding the appointment of counsel to the blood heirs are unpreserved for the same reason. The Adams Estate did not object to the appointment of counsel for the blood heirs at the February or August 2024 hearings, or to the orphans’ court’s order that the attorneys’ fees for appointed counsel be paid out of the Duraiswamy Estate.

The Adams Estate next contends that the orphans’ court erred by permitting the blood heirs to present argument and introduce evidence at the August 2024 hearing. The court disagrees. The blood heirs had not been identified at the time of the September 2023 evidentiary hearing and, consequently, were not and could not be permitted to participate in that hearing.

Given that their interest in the Duraiswamy Estate was antagonistic to the interest of the Adams Estate, the orphans’ court believed it important to provide them an opportunity to be heard. Further, the Adams Estate was not improperly prejudiced by the orphans’ court’s decision to reopen evidence, given that the Adams Estate was permitted to recall D.K. Adams in response to the evidence introduced by blood heirs.

The orphans’ court ruled that three pieces of evidence were inadmissible at the hearings: (1) the patient information sheet; (2) the car dealership statement and (3) the bridal shower statement. The court ruled that the patient information sheet was inadmissible hearsay, and that the two statements were inadmissible under the Dead Man’s Statute located at Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article § 9-116. It did not err with respect to the first two rulings. While this court is not satisfied that the bridal shower statement was barred under the Dead Man’s Statute, any error was harmless because the orphans’ court ruled that, even had it been admitted, it would not have been sufficient to satisfy the court that D.E. Adams and decedent were common-law spouses.

Although D.K. Adams’ testimony established a degree of cohabitation at the D.C. apartment starting in the mid-1980s, the evidence also showed that D.E. Adams and decedent maintained separate residences and did not always cohabitate. The court emphasized that most of D.K. Adams’ testimony and all of S. Adams’ testimony pertained to their reputation as a married couple after they were living in Maryland, which had limited relevance to the issue of whether they entered into a common-law marriage while they cohabitated in Washington, D.C.

Significantly, the orphans’ court reasoned that even if it had admitted (and credited) the excluded testimony discussed in the prior section, the statements allegedly made by decedent and D.E. Adams would not have tipped the scales. The court reasoned that there was also evidence weighing against the existence of a common-law marriage, namely, the absence of any evidence of financial entanglement between the parties.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County affirmed.

Freedom of information; executive privilege  

BOTTOM LINE: Where a requester argued the government agency waived its ability to rely on a claim of executive privilege in responding to a request under the Maryland Public Information Act, because it was not cited in the custodians’ affidavits or the Vaughn index, this argument failed. The agency preserved its position in response letters and court pleadings.

CASE: In the Matter of the Ferndale Volunteer Fire Company, Inc., No. 1008, Sept. Term, 2023 (filed April 2, 2026) (Judges Wells, Leahy, TANG).

FACTS: Ferndale Volunteer Fire Company Inc. filed a complaint in the circuit court, asking the court to compel the Anne Arundel Fire Department, the Anne Arundel County Executive Office and their respective custodians of records to produce withheld records and award Ferndale damages and costs under the Maryland Public Information Act, or MPIA.

The County voluntarily produced some of the requested records; however, it argued that other records (e-mails) were properly withheld and/or redacted. Ferndale filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking the release of the e-mails. After conducting an in camera review, the court effectively granted the motion in part and ordered the County to produce some of the e-mails. At the same time, it denied the motion in part, approving the redaction of 15 e-mails.

Ferndale appealed from the court’s order, challenging the part that approved the redaction of 15 e-mails. The unresolved issues still pending before the circuit court are Ferndale’s request for damages and litigation costs.

 LAW: The circuit court’s order resolved the request for injunctive relief made by Ferndale regarding the remaining documents specified in the two-count complaint. However, the order is not a final judgment because the claim for damages remained pending when the appeal was noted. Despite this, this court holds that the order approving the redaction of the 15 e-mails under the MPIA is appealable as an order refusing an injunction under Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, or CJP, § 12-303(3)(iii).

An order denying a request to enjoin the agency from withholding a record under the MPIA—thereby allowing the agency to withhold the record—is a refusal to grant an injunction. Although the part of the order in question did not explicitly deny an injunction, it effectively constituted such a denial by stating that the fifteen e-mails at issue were “properly withheld” by the County. Therefore, this refusal to grant an injunction falls within the scope of CJP § 12-303(3)(iii) and is appealable.

Turning to the merits, Ferndale argues that the County waived the executive privilege by not asserting it in the custodians’ affidavits or the Vaughn index. This court disagrees. Ferndale did not raise this issue below. Accordingly, the claim that the County waived its assertion of the executive privilege was not preserved.

Even if preserved, this court would conclude that the County did not waive the claim of executive privilege. The County satisfied the requirement of making a formal claim of the executive privilege because it asserted in both its response letters and in its Memorandum, which were incorporated by reference in its answer and opposition to

Ferndale’s partial motion for summary judgment, that the executive privilege protected the disputed e-mails.

However, this court is compelled to remand this case, without affirming or reversing, for the circuit court to clarify and articulate the grounds for concluding that the County’s redactions of the 15 e-mails were proper. The order does not make clear which privilege under which statutory exemption(s) applied to which of the 15 e-mails in reaching its decision.

Case remanded to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.

Freedom of information; personnel records

BOTTOM LINE: Where the Washington Post sought use-of-force records from the Ocean City Police Department, and the agency failed to demonstrate that including the names of officers in the reports would convert them into “personnel records” that are exempt from disclosure under the Maryland Public Information Act, disclosure was ordered.

CASE: Mayor and City Council of Ocean City v. The Washington Post, No. 774, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed April 3, 2026) (Judges LEAHY, Zic, Eyler, Deborah).

FACTS: In response to intensifying public unrest over police brutality cases in Maryland and across the nation, the Maryland General Assembly enacted “Anton’s Law.” At the time, records related to police misconduct were mostly classified as personnel records and, therefore, generally not subject to disclosure under the Maryland Public Information Act, or MPIA.

Except for records of a “technical infraction,” Anton’s Law removed these records from their prior classification as personnel records under the MPIA. Public access to various police records at issue in this appeal turns on the meaning of certain amendments to the MPIA under Anton’s Law.

The Post filed suit in the circuit court, seeking, among other things, an order compelling the full release of the use-of-force, or UOF, reports and UOF reviews responsive to the Post’s MPIA requests. Following a hearing, the circuit court held that neither the UOF reports nor the UOF reviews responsive to the Post’s MPIA requests were exempt from disclosure under the MPIA as “personnel records,” and ordered their full release.

LAW: Ocean City contends that UOF reports and UOF reviews are personnel records that must be withheld under the MPIA, “provided such records are not and do not become part of records of administrative or criminal investigations or misconduct” which, Ocean City admits, would render the records subject to disclosure under Anton’s Law.

Records contained in an investigatory, hearing or disciplinary file subject to review under GP § 4-351(a)(4)—that may previously have been protected from disclosure because they qualified as personnel records—will no longer qualify as personnel records protected from disclosure under the MPIA. However, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Maryland Dept. of State Police v. Maryland State Conf. of NAACP Branches, 430 Md. 179 (2013), teaches that other compulsory exemptions and redactions may still apply.

More precisely, records that fall within the category defined under GP § 4-311(c)(1), while subject to “discretionary” review under GP § 4-351(a)(4), may also contain documents or portions of documents that are protected from disclosure under other provisions of the MPIA, such as “shielded records” under GP § 4-327. Indeed, Anton’s Law amended GP § 4-351 to specify that records custodians “shall” redact portions of any such records that contain “medical information[,] . . . personal contact information[,] . . . or information relating to the family” of the subject of the records requested.

Here, Ocean City failed to demonstrate that including the names of officers in the UOF reports would convert them into “personnel records” exempt from disclosure under the MPIA. The UOF reports, including the names of the officers who filed them, are not exempt from disclosure as personnel records under GP § 4-311(a) because: (1) they are created to meet statutory reporting requirements and not created in a performance review setting; (2) they are not used as personnel records and (3) officers do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information contained in the UOF reports given that the Ocean City Police Department, or OCPD, makes available, upon request, the more detailed incident reports that correspond to each UOF report.

Turning to the UOF reviews, the parties agree that the UOF reviews related to the June 2021 and May 2020 incidents are personnel records if they are not covered by Anton’s Law. This court now examines whether the circuit court correctly determined that the UOF reviews constitute records of administrative investigations of police misconduct that fall under the category of records described in GP § 4-311(c) and GP § 4-351(a)(4). It did.

Anton’s Law and the record on appeal leads this court to conclude that the BlueTeam program’s chain of command reviews constitute internal investigations both in function and through Ocean City’s own representations to the public. The reviews memorialize internal reviews of instances of uses of force by officers in their interactions with the public, placing them within the category of records defined under GP § 4-311(c). Accordingly, UOF reviews may not be withheld from public disclosure under the MPIA on the ground that they constitute personnel records.

However this court must vacate that part of the circuit court’s order requiring OCPD to release the UOF reviews to the Post. Although the records at issue are conditionally subject to disclosure under GP §§ 4-343 and 4-351, like all public records, the requests for their inspection by the Post remain subject to denial and redaction if the records, or any portions thereof, are by law deemed privileged or confidential, or where their inspection would otherwise be contrary to the Maryland Rules an order of a court of record, or any applicable federal or state statute or regulation.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Worcester County affirmed in part and vacated in part.

Habeas Corpus; deficient performance

BOTTOM LINE: Where an inmate moved to reopen his postconviction proceeding based on an alleged due process violation at his trial and the alleged ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel for failing to challenge those violations in his initial postconviction proceeding, the postconviction court erred when it granted his motion to reopen and ordered a new trial.

CASE: State v. Robb, No. 837, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed April 3, 2026) (Judges Berger, Arthur, KENNEY).

FACTS: In 2015, a jury found Michael Robb guilty of multiple counts, including attempted murder in the second degree. The court sentenced him to terms of incarceration totaling 70 years. Mr. Robb failed to perfect an appeal.

Mr. Robb, assisted by counsel, unsuccessfully sought postconviction relief. He, with new counsel, later moved to reopen his postconviction proceeding based on a due process violation at his trial and the ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel for failing to challenge those violations in his initial postconviction proceeding. The postconviction court granted his motion to reopen and ordered a new trial.

The postconviction court concluded that Mr. Robb was entitled to proceed on his claims that postconviction counsel performed deficiently by failing to raise in the original postconviction proceeding his right to be present at the bench during voir dire and the issue of compound voir dire questions. In addition, the postconviction court declared that Mr. Robb “was presumptively prejudiced by counsel’s unprofessional errors.”

LAW: Mr. Robb, by failing to object to the voir dire questions, waived his underlying claim that the trial court “denied Mr. Robb his constitutional right to an impartial jury by asking improper questions during voir dire[.]” Moreover, the knowing and voluntary waiver standard does not apply to Mr. Robb’s claim of voir dire error because the decision whether to object to voir dire questions undoubtedly falls within “‘the vast array of trial decisions, strategic and tactical, which must be made before and during trial.’” It was error to conclude otherwise.

The application of the knowing and voluntary waiver standard to claims that were waived led the postconviction court to err in concluding that counsel in the original postconviction proceeding performed deficiently by failing to raise those claims. The postconviction counsel’s performance was not deficient in declining to raise claims that had virtually no prospect of succeeding.

Because the postconviction court erred in its waiver and deficient performance findings, it would not be necessary to address the finding of presumed prejudice, but for completeness, this court will address it briefly. This court has not been directed to nor is it aware of any controlling appellate decisions that hold that the failure to ensure a defendant’s presence at bench conferences or that propounding of legally-erroneous voir dire questions constitute structural errors. The decisions touching on those issues suggest otherwise.

In short, the postconviction court erred in concluding the underlying errors alleged in this case represented structural error. But even if they had, prejudice should not have been presumed. Ordinarily, the burden is on a defendant to “prove prejudice when raising an ineffective assistance claim based upon an unpreserved structural error.”

Nor is this court persuaded that the purported errors in Mr. Robb’s trial rendered the proceeding fundamentally unfair. Defendants in a criminal trial who elect to proceed without counsel, deprive themselves of ‘“many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel.’” The consequences of his decision to waive counsel were explained to Mr. Robb, and the record reflects that the trial court was doing everything it reasonably could to ensure him a fair trial.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County reversed.

Tort; defamation per se

BOTTOM LINE: Misstating sexual orientation is not defamatory per se because, absent specific circumstances pleaded in the complaint, such statements are not so self-evidently harmful to the reputation of a non-public figure that courts should excuse the need to plead and prove reputational injury.

CASE: Royall v. Dicks, No. 0597, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed April 3, 2026) (Judges WELLS, Ripken, Woodward).

FACTS: Charles M. Royall sued his former supervisors, Allen Dicks and Keith Jewell, and his former employer, C&C Meat Sales, for defamation. Royall pleads that “[t]his defamation case arises from false accusations . . . that [he] is a homosexual[,]” which continued in the aftermath of his termination, “intending to harm [his] career, damage his reputation, and cause him emotional distress, which they did. This lawsuit seeks to right those wrongs.”

Appellees jointly moved to dismiss Royall’s amended complaint, contending that neither the alleged statements by Dicks calling him a “fag,” nor the hand gesture by Jewell allegedly adopting that statement, were defamatory, either on their face or in the circumstances described. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the complaint.

LAW: Royall invokes what he claims is “the traditional rule” at common law that “calling a person a homosexual is defamatory per se.” In his view, the practice of treating a false statement about a private person’s sexual orientation as defamatory per se is “binding on this Court” and “remains the law in Maryland—as articulated by Maryland’s highest court” in Wetherby v. Retail Credit Co., 235 Md. 237 (1964)—because that decision “has never been overruled by Maryland’s highest court.”

Appellees invite this court to decide the appeal on a ground “not raised or decided in the trial court,” which is that “Royall did not sufficiently allege publication of the allegedly defamatory comment.” Because Royall pleads that the allegedly defamatory statements were intentionally published to “one or more third parties” with the understanding and intention that information would be “conveyed to a wider audience[,]” he sufficiently pleads publication.

Turning to the merits, because neither the trial court, nor the Supreme Court in Wetherby was called upon to decide whether those false statements about the plaintiffs’ sexual orientation were defamatory per se, Wetherby does not establish Maryland precedent on that question. To the extent Wetherby has been viewed as precedent for treating false statements about sexual orientation as defamatory per se, this court today corrects that misinterpretation. In turn, because there is no Maryland precedent on this question, the court addresses it next.

The premise supporting classification of these false statements as defamatory per se is that the resulting harm to reputation is so inevitable and apparent that courts should not require the plaintiff to plead and prove the actual injury. Although statements falsely alleging sexual misconduct historically have been treated as defamatory per se, changes in common experiences surrounding what behavior qualifies as presumptively harmful have notably shrunk this category.

Based on current legal and social climate, this court concludes that misstating sexual orientation is not defamatory per se because, absent specific circumstances pleaded in the complaint, such statements are not so self-evidently harmful to the reputation of a non-public figure that courts should excuse the need to plead and prove reputational injury. In turn, the motion court did not err in ruling Royall’s amended complaint does not plead a claim for defamation per se.

Royall nevertheless insists that he pleaded sufficient facts to state a claim that the statements about his sexual orientation were harmful in the circumstances alleged, i.e., defamation per quod. The court again disagrees. Although this court cannot rule out, at this pleading stage that the challenged statements were intentionally false statements about Royall’s sexual orientation, the amended complaint does not allege sufficient facts to establish the reputational injury element of Royall’s defamation claim.

Because Royall does not plead facts from which a fact-finder could conclude he suffered economic loss from two false statements about his sexual orientation by a former supervisor more than three years after his employment ended, his amended complaint does not plead a defamatory injury. Absent “some specific claim of actual harm” to Royall, “he is doing nothing more than trading in the same kinds of stereotypes that recent case law and good sense disparage.” In turn, because the amended complaint fails to allege the core reputational injury element of a defamation per quod claim, the motion court did not err in dismissing the amended complaint against all three appellees.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County affirmed.