Supreme Court of Maryland: Fourth Amendment, reasonable suspicion

Criminal; Fourth Amendment

BOTTOM LINE: Although police detained the defendant after he was involved in a fatal accident, the court rejected his argument that his detention transformed into a de facto arrest, which was not supported by probable cause, violating his Fourth Amendment rights. The detention was to prevent him from leaving and avoid his interference into the investigation.

CASE: Singh v. State, No. 36, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed May 26, 2026) (Justices Fader, Watts, Booth, Biran, Gould, EAVES, Killough).

FACTS: Davinder Singh fatally struck two pedestrians with his vehicle around 7:00 a.m. on Nov. 8, 2022. Responding law enforcement arrived around 7:30 a.m., told Singh that he was not free to leave the scene because of his involvement in the collision. They placed Singh in the back of a police cruiser at roughly 7:43 a.m. while an investigation ensued.

As part of the police department’s protocol for responding to collisions, a drug recognition expert, or DRE, was notified. Around 8:51 a.m., a DRE (Curry) instructed him to exit the vehicle so that she could conduct standard field sobriety tests, or SFSTs. The DRE’s observations and the results of those tests all indicated that Singh had operated his vehicle under the influence of alcohol. It was at that point, around 9:13 a.m., that Singh was formally arrested and transported to the police station to undergo a breath test.

The breath test, which was conducted at 10:15 a.m., revealed an alcohol concentration of three times the legal limit. Singh pleaded not guilty to an agreed-upon statement of facts and was subsequently convicted on all 10 counts. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed his convictions.

LAW: Singh first argues that by the time Curry opened the door of the patrol car to conduct SFSTs, his detention had already transformed into a de facto arrest, which was not supported by probable cause, violating his Fourth Amendment rights. This court disagrees.

The evidence—when viewed in the light most favorable to the state—certainly permits drawing the reasonable inference that, during an active investigation at a potential crime scene, law enforcement would want to remove an individual (possibly a criminal defendant at that point) so that it can preserve evidence and conduct its investigation unobstructed. It was also reasonable for the state to characterize Singh as a flight risk and move him to a controlled environment, eliminating his risk of flight.

Singh remained in the police cruiser for slightly more than one hour. At no point did law enforcement forcefully put their hands on him, draw their service weapons and aim at him, place him in handcuffs, threaten him or use any other forceful tactics against him. In other words, law enforcement did not use any of the hallmarks traditionally associated with an arrest. Nor is there any evidence in the record that demonstrates that law enforcement had ever intended to arrest Singh prior to Curry’s formal arrest. And while Singh was detained for slightly more than one hour, the record shows that law enforcement diligently was pursuing an investigation that required specialty officers—both members from the collision reconstruction unit and a DRE. Under the totality of the circumstances, all of this was reasonable.

The court rejects Singh’s contention that his placement in a police cruiser, as a matter of law, is a show of police force and, even if it were a show of force, that it automatically elevates a detention into a de facto arrest. Contrary to his assertion, placing an individual into a police cruiser is not synonymous with the use of handcuffs. The court also rejects Singh’s argument that his placement in the cruiser was essentially involuntary and that the cruiser’s features and law enforcement’s decision to deny him water all represent forceful police tactics.

Singh next argues that law enforcement apprehended him under Courts and Judicial Proceedings, or CJP, § 10-303 when he was placed in the vehicle at 7:43 a.m. Thus, Singh argues that the breath test taken at 10:15 a.m. falls outside of § 10-303(a)(2)’s two-hour window, requiring suppression of the test results. The state argues that law enforcement did not apprehend Mr. Singh for purposes of the statute until 8:51 a.m. when Curry noticed the smell of alcohol on Mr. Singh’s person and initiated SFSTs. The court agrees with the state.

Apprehension under CJP § 10-303(a)(2) occurs when a police officer (1) “has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is or has been driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated or while under the influence of alcohol” and (2) “reasonably acts upon that information by stopping or detaining the person.”

Here, at the time Singh was informed that he was not free to leave, there was certainly reasonable suspicion that he had committed some crime, possibly multiple crimes. But while law enforcement may have had a hunch that  Singh was under the influence of alcohol, such hunches fall well below the standard for reasonable suspicion. That did not arise until Curry’s initial interaction with Mr. Singh at 8:51 a.m. Because Singh’s breath test occurred at 10:15 a.m., well within the two-hour window provided by CJP § 10-303(a)(2), the state did not violate that statute.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed.

Criminal; reasonable suspicion

BOTTOM LINE: Where a tip to a police officer from a friend about a car parked in her neighborhood, along with the officer’s observation of the car at the scene and testimony that the location is a high-crime area, did not provide reasonable suspicion for the officer to stop the vehicle, the circuit court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress.

CASE: Kopp v. State, No. 34, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed May 26, 2026) (Justices Fader, WATTS, Booth, Biran, Eaves, Killough) (Justice GOULD concurs).

FACTS: The issue in this case is whether a tip to a police officer from a friend about a car parked in her neighborhood, along with the officer’s observation of the car at the scene and testimony that the location is a high-crime area, provided reasonable suspicion for the officer to stop Xavier S. Kopp’s vehicle. The circuit court concluded there was reasonable suspicion and denied Kopp’s motion to suppress. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.

LAW: Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, the caller advised that she observed: (1) an unfamiliar car, i.e., a black sedan; (2) stopped or parked for an extended period of time on a street in her townhome community; (3) with multiple occupants (according to Sgt. Muollo, the car was “occupied multiple times”) and (4) cell phones were going off in the car. Based on this, the caller advised that she thought the occupants of the car might be “up to illegal activity, possibly breaking into vehicles.”

Standing alone, the tip is devoid of the indicia of reliability necessary to establish reasonable suspicion, as it provided no indication of the caller’s basis of knowledge for the prediction that the occupants of the car may have been breaking into cars or were up to illegal activity and contained no information from which it could be concluded that the prediction was a reliable one.

The information that the caller provided lacked any support for the forecast that the occupants of the car may have been engaged in illegal activity or were possibly breaking into cars. And, based on the content of the tip, there was no reason to conclude that the caller was a person who had any knowledge about the occupants of the car, other than her contemporaneous observations of the car.

Based on Muollo’s testimony at the suppression hearing, the tip amounted to no more than the caller’s hunch or guess that criminal activity may have been afoot. In addition, although Muollo testified that he responded to a “call for service[,]” this was not a typical call for service to which some basic indicia of reliability might attach. And although not required to establish reasonable suspicion, there is no information that the caller had ever provided reliable information concerning criminal activity to Muollo or any other police officer.

Further, Muollo’s testimony failed to satisfy any of the factors required to establish that a stop occurred in a high-crime location as a factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis. Finally, Kopp’s movement of the car is a neutral factor that adds nothing to the determination of reasonable suspicion. Under the state’s own version of the events, there was not reasonable suspicion for the stop until Muollo turned on his vehicle’s flashing emergency lights, after Kopp’s car moved forward, meaning that up to that point, at least, Kopp was free to go.  There is no allegation that, before Kopp moved the car, Muollo had ordered Kopp to stop or directed that the car not be moved. Kopp’s movement of the vehicle cannot be considered, as the state argues, the “defiance of a police officer’s request to stop” or “flight.”

At bottom, regardless of when the stop is deemed to have occurred, the tip as corroborated by Muollo lacked the indicia of reliability required to establish reasonable suspicion to justify the intrusion, and Kopp’s movement of his car is of no consequence in the reasonable suspicion analysis. Kopp’s movement of the car was the equivalent of a person, who was free to go, choosing not to engage with a police officer. Under the totality of the circumstances, the stop was not justified by reasonable suspicion.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland reversed.

CONCUR: Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, the stop of Kopp was not supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The circumstances suggested, at most, that the car’s occupants were up to no good, but that is not enough to justify a stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

But I disagree with the majority’s analysis. In reaching its conclusion, the majority incorrectly characterizes the function of the caller’s report, discounts Muollo’s prior knowledge about crime in the area, and recasts our decision in Washington v. State, 482 Md. 395 (2022), where we acknowledged that unprovoked flight, even non-headlong, could be considered in a reasonable suspicion analysis.

None of that reasoning was necessary to reach the correct result. Reasonable suspicion is assessed under the totality of the circumstances, and a fact that is innocent or insufficient standing alone may still carry weight when it is considered in context. Thus, I respectfully concur in the judgment but do not join the majority’s opinion.