Appellate Court of MD: Batson challenge, bad faith, Recreational Use Statute

Criminal; Batson 

BOTTOM LINE: Where the state provided race-neutral reasons to the defendant’s Batson challenge, the circuit court erred by not allowing the defendant to rebut the state’s explanations.

CASE: Yancey v. State, No. 2159, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed July 30, 2026) (Judges Wells, NAZARIAN, Harrell).

FACTS: Alfred Yancey appeals from his conviction by a jury for gun crimes. He presents for this court’s review two questions about the jury selection process for his trial.

LAW: The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights prohibit the exclusion of jurors based on membership in protected classes, the most well-known of those being race. The Supreme Court of the United States outlined a three-step process a trial court must undertake when a party challenges their opponent’s use of peremptory juror strikes in an allegedly racially discriminatory manner.

Mr. Yancey contends that the circuit court erred clearly in saying he hadn’t made a prima facie case. If this court agreed with him that the circuit court had denied his challenge at step one, the court would agree as well that the circuit court erred clearly. To its credit, the state concedes the latter point.

But once the trial court elicits a challenged party’s explanations under step two, as it did here, the question of the step one prima facie case becomes moot. The decision before this court then is the circuit court’s decision to deny Mr. Yancey’s Batson challenge at step two, because it elicited and accepted the state’s explanations as satisfactorily race-neutral and credible without allowing him an opportunity to make a case before the court made a step three finding. In so doing, it erred.

In Maryland, a challenging party must be given an opportunity during step three to rebut the challenged party’s step two explanations. The Supreme Court of the United States recently re-emphasized this point, holding this term, that a trial court’s decision not to allow rebuttal opportunity at step three compels relief. Here, the circuit court told Mr. Yancey’s counsel to step back immediately after the state offered its step two explanations without allowing Mr. Yancey an opportunity to rebut at step three. Skipping a step in a prescribed and constitutionally demanded procedure is legal error and grounds for appellate relief.

In line with precedent, the circuit court should, on remand, determine first whether “the passage of time precludes fair consideration of the relevant issues.” If so precluded, the court must “simply order a new trial.” This first-order determination includes a determination whether the circuit court is able to “reconstruct [the] jury that tried and convicted” Mr. Yancey. If the circuit court decides that “a reasonable possibility exists that reconstruction can be fairly accomplished,” including recalling and resummoning the jurors, then it shall do so and then allow Mr. Yancey opportunity to rebut the state’s explanations, i.e., to recreate the step three that didn’t occur at his original trial.

The record to that point drives the new process: the state may not supplement its previous step two explanations, and isn’t allowed do-overs or post hoc elaboration. Should the circuit court, after Mr. Yancey’s rebuttal, still find the state’s original explanations satisfactorily race neutral and credible, his convictions can, in light of this court’s resolution of his other appellate issue, stand. If, however, the circuit court is no longer convinced, it should vacate his convictions and order a new trial.

Mr. Yancey contends also that the circuit court abused its discretion in declining to ask his requested voir dire questions nine and ten. This court disagrees. As to question nine, the “bias[] directly related to the crime, the witnesses, or the defendant” that Mr. Yancey sought to investigate was whether any potential juror was predisposed to overly credit police witness testimony. But after reviewing “the record as a whole,” the court holds “th[at] matter [was] fairly covered.”

As for question ten, the circuit court refused to ask the whole question based solely on its compound form. Even so, the court finds no abuse of discretion because each of the three sub-questions were “fairly covered” as well by other questions the court asked.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City remanded without affirming or reversing.

Damages; bad faith

BOTTOM LINE: Where Anne Arundel County defended an action in bad faith and without substantial justification, the plaintiff was awarded $491,984.35 in attorneys’ fees.

CASE: Anne Arundel County, Maryland v. National Waste Managers, Inc., No. 1371, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed July 30, 2026) (Judges Berger, LEAHY, Zarnoch).

FACTS: This appeal concerns the award of attorneys’ fees in litigation that began a decade before the new millennium. Twenty-five years ago, this court declared that the protracted history of this case arises from the tireless efforts of National Waste Managers, Inc. to establish and operate a rubble landfill in Odenton, and the equally persistent opposition of Anne Arundel County to those efforts.

In January 2024, the circuit court ordered the County to pay National’s attorneys’ fees, holding that the County defended the underlying action without any legal basis which would provide a colorable or meritorious defense. The County presents four questions for review, which boil down to one: Did the circuit court err in awarding National $491,984.35 in attorneys’ fees?

LAW: Bad faith, for the purposes of Rule 1-341, means “vexatiously, for the purpose of harassment or unreasonable delay, or for other improper reasons.” A lack of substantial justification arises when there is no “reasonable basis for believing that the claims would generate an issue of fact for the fact finder.” Put differently, the claim or litigation position is not “fairly debatable . . . colorable, or . . . within the realm of legitimate advocacy.”

If a court finds bad faith and a lack of substantial justification, the court must assess whether the conduct “warranted” attorneys’ fees. To survive appellate review, the court must find that: (1) “the fees requested by the aggrieved party were incurred by the party requesting the fees” and (2) “the fees requested by the aggrieved party are reasonable.”

The court holds that there was sufficient evidence for the court to infer the County’s bad faith in defending this action. The record is clear that after National secured the special exception from the Anne Arundel County Board of Appeals in 1993, the County continued to exclude the landfill from its Solid Waste Management Plan for years, triggering numerous suits and appeals. The Maryland Department of the Environment, or MDE, then suspended National’s permit application, pending receipt from the County of a written statement, in line with the requirements of Environmental Article § 9-210(a)(3).

The County refused to send the statement of conformance to MDE, even after the Maryland Supreme Court affirmed the Board’s decision in 1995, until the court issued a contempt order. The County then renounced its statement less than three weeks later, with two letters advising MDE that National’s special exception had expired. The Supreme Court held that National’s special exception did not expire, as it was tolled during the litigation of this case, delaying the County’s statement of conformance until 2001.

Just as National neared the end of MDE’s permitting process in 2020, the County purchased the land necessary for National to satisfy the special exception and then notified MDE again that National was out of compliance. MDE responded accordingly, ceasing National’s application and denying the permit. National tried to work this out with the County, but the County refused to rescind the letters. National went back to court, seeking declaratory relief and mandamus. The circuit court granted summary judgment for National, directing MDE to continue its review and holding that the County’s actions violated National’s due process rights (not to mention defied two rulings of the Supreme Court). This fraught history was substantial evidence indicating bad faith.

Similarly, the circuit court was not clearly erroneous in finding that the County lacked substantial justification for its defense. The record contains ample evidence that the County’s defense (that its letters were merely “advice”) was neither fairly debatable nor colorable. None of this analysis changes because the County was “forced” to defend itself in litigation.

The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees in the amount of $491,984.35. The record clearly establishes that National incurred significant attorneys’ fees from three different law firms for the work these attorneys conducted since National began working on the complaint and petition for writ of mandamus in 2020. National had to bring suit to vindicate its rights because the County sent the 2020 letters, knowing the letters would lead to MDE’s discontinuation of its review of National’s permit, and refused to withdraw them, all without a substantial justification.

The court properly assessed the fees requested by giving due consideration to the hours quoted by National and the local rate.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County affirmed.

Negligence; Recreational Use Statute

BOTTOM LINE: Where a woman fell while visiting a cemetery, and the cemetery owner argued it owed her no duty to maintain the grounds under Maryland’s “Recreational Use Statute,” the circuit court must determine if the area where she fell was one intended to be used primarily for commercial purposes or if she sustained her injury in an area intended for recreation.

CASE: DeVaughn v. StoneMor Partners, L.P., No. 578, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed July 30, 2026) (Judges NAZARIAN, Zic, Beachley).

FACTS: StoneMor Partners, L.P. is the owner and operator of Lincoln Memorial Cemetery in Suitland and holds the cemetery open to the public. In November 2024, Lakisha DeVaughn filed a complaint against StoneMor, alleging that she tripped in a ditch on cemetery grounds during an April 2024 visit to her son’s gravesite and sustained serious injuries due to StoneMor’s failure to maintain the grounds in a safe condition.

The circuit court dismissed her complaint on the grounds that under Maryland Code §§ 5-1101 to 5-1109 of the Natural Resources Article, or NR, known commonly as Maryland’s “Recreational Use Statute,” StoneMor owed her no duty to maintain the cemetery grounds.

LAW: The Recreational Use Statute protects owners of private land who make the land available to the general public for recreational or educational use by limiting their liability for injuries due to unsafe conditions on the land. This case involves a new test of how the Recreational Use Statute applies, in this instance to cemeteries.

There’s no dispute that the cemetery is private property, nor that the public can access the cemetery. But the cemetery is available for different uses, some that are recreational or educational and some that aren’t.

In the time since the circuit court decided the motions in this case, the Maryland Supreme Court issued its opinion in Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Wallace, 492 Md. 349 (2025), clarifying that whether the Recreational Use Statute relieves a landowner of liability for the injuries of a particular user doesn’t depend on the user’s subjective purpose for entering the land.

Under the applicable standard, the circuit court needs to determine as well if the area where Ms. DeVaughn fell was one StoneMor intended to be used primarily for commercial purposes (i.e., the sale of burial plots and related activities, like funerals or the visitation of loved ones’ gravesites) or if she sustained her injury in an area intended for recreation (e.g., a walking or biking path) or educational uses (e.g., an area of the Cemetery devoted to the observation of historically significant gravesites).

If the court had found first that Ms. DeVaughn was injured in an area intended for recreational or educational uses and second that she was using the land for such purposes when she was injured, it would have been proper for the court to deny her claim on the grounds that the Recreational Use Statute barred her claim against StoneMor. But if the court had found first that Ms. DeVaughn was injured in an area of the cemetery intended for commercial purposes and second that her use of the property when she was injured was consistent with those purposes even if it could be characterized as recreational as well, the court should have allowed her claim to proceed.

As a result, the court reverses the judgment of the circuit court and remands for the circuit court to apply—based on the allegations in the complaint or any additional allegations Ms. DeVaughn might raise were she to amend the complaint—the standard for determining if the Recreational Use Statute applies to her claim.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County reversed.

Search and seizure; plain odor

BOTTOM LINE: Although Maryland prohibits the search of a vehicle based solely on the odor of cannabis, where the police searched the vehicle because they smelled cannabis and because the occupants were under 21, and it is unlawful for a person to possess cannabis if the person is not at least 21 years of age, the search was lawful.

Smell of cannabis can trigger police search if it’s not the only factor, MD court rules

CASE: Sudler and Trotter v. State, Case Nos. 157 & 1399, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed July 30, 2026) (Judges GRAEFF, Friedman, Wright).

FACTS: Jaylen Ahnarie Sudler and Tizonn Roemello James Trotter appeal from the decisions of the circuit court denying their respective motions to suppress evidence recovered during a search of a vehicle. Each appellant was convicted pursuant to an agreed statement of facts, of possession of a firearm by a person under 21 years of age.

The question on review is whether the circuit court erred in denying appellants’ motions to exclude evidence discovered in violation of Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc., or CP, § 1-211, which prohibits a search of a vehicle based solely on the odor of cannabis?

LAW: CP § 1-211 clearly provides that the police may not search a vehicle based solely on the odor of cannabis. As the circuit court noted, however, there is no reported opinion by this court or the Supreme Court of Maryland addressing whether, under the terms of CP § 1-211, the police may search a vehicle based on the odor of cannabis plus the knowledge that the occupants of the vehicle are all under the age of 21.

The words of the statute provide that law enforcement may not search a vehicle based solely on the odor of cannabis. Here, the searches were not prohibited by CP § 1-211 because they were not based solely on the odor of cannabis. Instead, they were based on the odor of cannabis, plus the knowledge that the occupants of the vehicle were under 21 years of age. Because it is unlawful for a person to possess cannabis if the person is not at least 21 years of age, the statute did not prohibit the search and require that the evidence seized be excluded.

Appellants argue, however, that analysis of the legislative history of CP § 1-211 shows that it was the General Assembly’s intent for the statute to protect vehicle occupants of all ages. First, they argue that “[a] major reason the General Assembly passed §1-211 was to protect Black and Brown Marylanders from a stark and longstanding form of racial profiling,” and the legislative intent “to protect the most vulnerable group of people, minority youth, is unequivocal.” There is no dispute that this was a significant factor raised in the process of enacting the statute.

Nevertheless, CP § 1-211 did not limit all searches involving the odor of cannabis. Rather, it limited the ability to search only when it was based solely on the odor of cannabis and other factors listed in the statute. This court must apply the statute as written.

Appellants’ second point in support of their argument that the General Assembly intended for CP § 1-211 to apply to individuals under the age of 21 is that a proposed amendment adding an age limitation was considered and rejected. Appellants place too much weight on the rejected amendment.

At bottom, based the plain language of CP § 1-211, a search is prohibited if it is based solely on the odor of cannabis (or the other factors listed). If, however, there is another factor involved, the statute does not preclude a search, and it does not require that evidence obtained during the search be excluded. Here, there was odor plus knowledge that the occupants were under the age of 21, and it is unlawful for a person under 21 to possess cannabis.

Judgments of the Circuit Court for Worcester County affirmed.