U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4^th Circuit

Bankruptcy; embezzlement: Where the debtor established a good-faith belief that certain funds belonged to her, that precluded a finding of embezzlement. As such, she prevailed in an adversary action brought by a creditor. Martin v. Parker, Case No. 23-2084 (filed July 1, 2025).

Criminal; constructive possession: Where the defendant arranged for delivery of the methamphetamine, guaranteed its price, promised that he could arrange delivery of more, told the confidential informant that “we sent that other dude to Texas to pick up what you ordered” and told the government agent that he could “send” somebody else to pick up more meth “right now,” his conviction for constructively possessing the meth was affirmed. United States v. Cabrera-Rivas, Case No. 22-4331 (filed June 30, 2025).

Criminal; breach of plea agreement: Where the plea agreement’s text, the plea colloquy and the heightened scrutiny afforded plea agreements showed that a paragraph in the parties’ plea agreement contained the “total relevant conduct” to which the parties stipulated, the government breached the agreement when it successfully sought enhancements based on facts not contained in that paragraph. United States v. Craig, Case No. 22-4230 (filed June 30, 2025).

Damages; mootness: Where a plaintiff obtained compensatory damages as redress for his injury, he lost the ability to recover nominal damages for that same injury. Hammons. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation, Case Nos. 23-1394 (L), No. 23-1452  filed June 24, 2025).

Employment; religious failure to accommodate: Where the district court did not have the benefit of a recent decision from this court when it dismissed an employee’s religious failure to accommodate claim under Title VII, the case was remanded so the district court could reassess its dismissal decision. Chinnery v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States Inc., Case No. 24-1697 (filed June 23, 2025).

Negligence; causation: Where a woman claimed she suffered a nerve injury after receiving two vaccine injections, but CVS was immune for its administration of one of the injections, and the woman presented no evidence from which a jury could find which injection caused her injury, CVS prevailed at summary judgment. Watts v. Maryland CVS Pharmacy LLC, Case No. 23-2025 (filed July 1, 2025).

Prisons; due process: Where an inmate alleged his due process rights were denied at a hearing that resulted in $15 being deducted from his prison trust account, his suit was reinstated. Although the district court reasoned that “small fines routinely assessed at disciplinary hearings do not trigger due process protections” because they do not impose an “atypical and significant hardship,” the inmate had a property interest in his funds. Brown v. Stapleton, Case No. 23-6824 (filed July 1, 2025).

Prisons; PLRA three-strikes: Where the district court applied § 1915(g)’s three-strike rule to deny in forma pauperis status to an inmate, it erred. In one of the prior suits, the federal district court abstained under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and Younger abstention does not count as a § 1915(g) strike. Burrell v. Shirley, Case No. 23-6791 (filed July 1, 2025).

Maryland Supreme Court

Appeals; pendente lite: Maryland appellate courts have held that cases involving interlocutory orders for the payment of money in the form of pendente lite child support and alimony are appealable. But where a request for pendente lite child support and alimony is denied, there is no right to immediate interlocutory appeal. Adelakun v. Adelakun, No. 35, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed July 1, 2025).

Damages; investment opportunity: Where a party was wrongly denied the opportunity to invest in a company at its inception, the measure of damages is the fair value of the interest it would have acquired, valued on the date of the breach, minus the price it would have paid to acquire it. Maryland Indoor Play LLC v. Snowden Investment LLC, No. 29, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed July 3, 2025).

Employment; de minimis rule: The de minimis rule applies to claims under the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law and the Maryland Wage and Hour Law. Martinez v. Amazon.com Services LLC, Misc. No. 17, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed July 3, 2025).

Employment; workers’ compensation: Where the adult, non-dependent daughter of a man killed on a jobsite sued the employer for wrongful death, her suit was dismissed. Although the daughter was unable to receive death benefits under the Maryland’s Workers’ Compensation Act, its exclusivity provision barred her wrongful death suit. Ledford v. Jenway Contracting Inc., No. 3, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed July 1, 2025).

Taxation; voter involvement: Where individuals proposed an amendment to the Baltimore City Charter that would have imposed a decreasing cap on the city’s real property tax rate, it ran afoul of a Charter provision prohibiting any voter involvement in setting property tax rates. Frederick III v. Baltimore City Board of Elections, No. 35, Sept. Term, 2023 (filed July 1, 2025).

Zoning; hearing: Where the District Council downzoned several properties at a work session without giving their owners notice and an opportunity to be heard, as required by both state and county laws, it erred. County Council of Prince George’s County v. Robin Dale Land LLC, No. 38, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed July 3, 2025).

Maryland Appellate Court

Domestic Relations; marital estate calculation: Where the circuit court  did not account for various assets and miscalculated the parties’ marital estate, it erred in reaching its monetary award conclusion. Sims v. Sims, No. 1787, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed June 30, 2025).

Employment; “employee”: Where a county administrator was an “employee” under Title VII, the Board of County Commissioners for Charles County had a legal obligation to take remedial action when it became aware that he had been subjected to a hostile work environment by a County Commissioner on account of his race. Coates v. Charles County Board of Commissioners, No. 1623, Sept. Term, 2023 (filed NAZARIAN, Friedman, Zic).

Habeas corpus; immediate release: Where the Supreme Court of Maryland has not overturned the traditional requirement that a habeas petitioner must assert a possibility of immediate release, and the inmate here did not allege that he had a possibility of immediate release at the time of filing, his habeas petition was denied. Beckwitt v. State, No. 1473, Sept. Term, 2023 (filed June 30, 2025).

Parent and Child; ADA: The Department of Social Services is generally required under the Americans with Disabilities Act to make reasonable accommodations for parents with disabilities in rendering reunification efforts in CINA cases, as long as the parents make such disabilities, as well as the accommodations they require, known to the Department. In re: Z.F. & B.F., Nos. 1609, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed July 1, 2025).

Zoning; substantial evidence: Where substantial evidence supported a Zoning Board’s conclusion that the proposed “residential use” of a village center in Columbia would overwhelm the center’s other uses, it was affirmed. In the Matter of HRVC Limited Partnership, No. 0543, Sept. Term, 2023 (filed July 1, 2025).

U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4^th Circuit

Bankruptcy

embezzlement

BOTTOM LINE: Where the debtor established a good-faith belief that certain funds belonged to her, that precluded a finding of embezzlement. As such, she prevailed in an adversary action brought by a creditor.

CASE: Martin v. Parker, Case No. 23-2084 (filed July 1, 2025) (Judges Wilkinson, Gregory, BENJAMIN).

FACTS: In state court, Dan G. Martin prevailed against Deborah Faye Parker in an action for breach of contract. Instead of paying the judgment, Deborah filed for personal bankruptcy.

Dan then initiated an adversary action against Deborah. After trial, the bankruptcy court ruled that Dan’s judgment against Deborah was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4)’s embezzlement exception. Deborah appealed to the district court, which reversed the bankruptcy court’s embezzlement finding and entered judgment for Deborah.

LAW: Embezzlement requires the plaintiff to prove: “(1) that the funds were rightfully in the possession of the Debtor; (2) that the Debtor appropriated the funds for a use other than that for which it was entrusted; and (3) circumstances indicating fraud.”

It is not enough to show that the debtor took property belonging to the plaintiff without consent and without lawful justification. The plaintiff must show that the debtor had a fraudulent or unlawful intent, directed at the plaintiff, at the time of the claimed misappropriation. Where the debtor’s dominant purpose is to benefit herself, rather than to harm the creditor, fraudulent intent is not established. Indeed, one can wrongfully appropriate property under a mistaken belief of entitlement without giving rise to a claim of embezzlement.

Here, the bankruptcy court’s fraudulent intent analysis rests on a clear factual error that undermines its embezzlement finding. The bankruptcy court was correct that Deborah read and understood Morton’s will. But it misstated other facts relevant to Deborah’s mindset when she liquidated the accounts on which she was a joint account holder. Said differently, the bankruptcy court misstated facts crucial to whether Deborah had a good-faith belief that the funds in question were hers.

The bankruptcy court implied that, when Deborah contacted the bank, she hid the existence of both Morton’s will and the agreement. The evidence on this point, however, was undisputed—Deborah did tell the bank about both documents. And it was with knowledge of Morton’s will and the agreement that the bank reassured Deborah that the funds in the joint account belonged to her, not Dan. Similar can be said of Deborah’s beliefs as to Morton’s certificates of deposit, annuities and life insurance policy.

The bankruptcy court’s omission of these details from its analysis matters. The bankruptcy court held that because Deborah knew the terms of Morton’s will, Deborah’s not turning over the funds to Dan at Morton’s death was the “very definition of embezzlement.” But the bank told Deborah that her status as a joint account holder entitled her to liquidate the disputed funds. Deborah therefore established a good-faith belief that the funds in question were hers, precluding an embezzlement finding.

For his part, Dan did not introduce any evidence to rebut or undermine Deborah’s good-faith belief that the funds in question rightfully belonged to her. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court erred in finding that Deborah embezzled Dan’s money, and the district court correctly reversed the bankruptcy court’s judgment for Dan.

Affirmed.

Criminal

constructive possession

BOTTM LINE: Where the defendant arranged for delivery of the methamphetamine, guaranteed its price, promised that he could arrange delivery of more, told the confidential informant that “we sent that other dude to Texas to pick up what you ordered” and told the government agent that he could “send” somebody else to pick up more meth “right now,” his conviction for constructively possessing the meth was affirmed.

CASE: United States v. Cabrera-Rivas, Case No. 22-4331 (filed June 30, 2025) (Judges DIAZ, Thacker) (Judge WYNN concurs/dissents).

FACTS: A jury found Cristian Cabrera-Rivas guilty of two drug offenses arising from a meth deal gone awry.

LAW: Cabrera-Rivas first contends that the magistrate judge erred by finding him competent, and the district court erred by denying him a second competency hearing. The court disagrees.

Cabrera-Rivas was competent to stand trial if he had a “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a sufficient degree of rational understanding and [had] a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Cabrera-Rivas’s only affirmative evidence came from his attorneys and his wife. It is not clearly wrong to conclude that their testimony showed an angry and frustrated man, not an incapacitated one.

Cabrera-Rivas also argues that the magistrate judge wasn’t authorized by Congress to finally decide his competency. But Cabrera-Rivas didn’t question the magistrate judge’s authority in the district court or in his opening brief. This court thus reviews under a plain error standard, and finds none.

Cabrera-Rivas also claims that the district court erred by denying him a post-trial competency hearing. The court again disagrees. The court found that although Cabrera-Rivas didn’t always give direct answers during his testimony, nothing suggested that he couldn’t understand what was happening around him. There was no clear error in that factual conclusion, nor was there anything “arbitrary” or “capricious” in the district court’s “exercise of discretion” to deny a second competency hearing.

Cabrera-Rivas next argues the government couldn’t prove that he joined in a conspiracy because his “uncontroverted testimony” was that he thought he was collaborating with the government. The problem with this argument is that Cabrera-Rivas offered no evidence of his intent other than his own words. And juries don’t have to believe testimony from self-interested defendants; instead, they can infer intent from circumstantial evidence.

Cabrera-Rivas also argues that he can’t be convicted for conspiring “only with a government agent.” The jury could reasonably have discredited Cabrera-Rivas’s self-serving testimony and judged Cabrera-Rivas by his words and actions during the drug deal. And relying on that evidence, the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt

that Cabrera-Rivas intended to source meth for Hector and Rios and formed an agreement with Ramos-Garcia to that end.

Cabrera-Rivas next argues that he didn’t possess any methamphetamine—he never touched Ramos-Garcia’s meth, never exercised control of it and never knew much about the meth trade. The court, however, agrees with the government that there’s sufficient evidence to find that Cabrera-Rivas constructively possessed the meth that Ramos-Garcia brought to sell to Rios and Hector.

Cabrera-Rivas arranged for delivery of the meth; he guaranteed its price; he promised Hector that he could arrange delivery of more; he told Hector that “we sent that other dude to Texas to pick up what you ordered” and he said to Rios that he could “send” Ramos-Garcia to pick up more meth “right now.”

This evidence could persuade a reasonable jury that Cabrera-Rivas had some control over Ramos-Garcia’s actions. At the very least, a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Cabrera-Rivas was “engaged in a concerted effort to transport and distribute” the two kilograms of meth. A jury could also find that Cabrera-Rivas had a “working relationship” with Ramos-Garcia that “would enable” Cabrera-Rivas “to assure delivery.”

Cabrera-Rivas next contends that the district court should have ordered a new trial because the government violated his due process rights by destroying his taped interview. The court disagrees. The tape wasn’t Brady evidence. But even if it were, Cabrera-Rivas still learned of its destruction in time to exploit that fact during the trial. The officer explained that the tape was erased on direct examination, defense counsel cross-examined him on the issue and counsel stressed that fact in his closing argument.

Finally, the court rejects Cabrera-Rivas’s argument that the district court should have instructed the jury on public authority, innocent intent, outrageous conduct and entrapment by estoppel affirmative defenses.

Affirmed.

CONCUR/DISSENT: I join in the opinion except for Part II, where the majority overlooks well-established precedent from the Supreme Court and this court to deny Cabrera-Rivas the remedy that the Constitution compels—review of his competency by an Article III judge.

Criminal

breach of plea agreement

BOTTOM LINE: Where the plea agreement’s text, the plea colloquy and the heightened scrutiny afforded plea agreements showed that a paragraph in the parties’ plea agreement contained the “total relevant conduct” to which the parties stipulated, the government breached the agreement when it successfully sought enhancements based on facts not contained in that paragraph.

CASE: United States v. Craig, Case No. 22-4230 (filed June 30, 2025) (Judges DIAZ, Quattlebaum, Rushing).

FACTS: Dehaven Craig pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On appeal, Craig argues that the government breached the parties’ plea agreement by successfully seeking two Sentencing Guidelines enhancements based on facts outside the agreement’s stipulated-to relevant conduct provision.

LAW: The best reading of the plea agreement is that the parties stipulated to Craig’s total relevant conduct for sentencing purposes. In federal sentencing parlance, the phrase “total relevant conduct” refers to all facts that are relevant to sentencing. Yet nowhere in the relevant conduct stipulation are there facts to support the enhancements the government obtained. And while the government was right to inform the probation officer and the district court of facts (not mentioned in the stipulation) that were relevant to Craig’s sentencing, it overstepped by seeking enhancements based on those facts.

Given the context in sections 6B1.4 and 1B1.3, the most reasonable interpretation of the prefatory clause in paragraph nine of the agreement is that the parties stipulated to all facts that were relevant to Craig’s sentencing. Indeed, the Guidelines sections mentioned in that clause reference a defendant’s relevant conduct for sentencing purposes, not (as the government argues) to establish guilt.

The government may well have intended paragraph nine to recite (without limitation) agreed-upon facts to support Craig’s guilty plea, leaving any enhancements for another day. And if the paragraph had read “the parties agree on the following facts to support Craig’s conviction,” then this court would have no trouble adopting the government’s position. But to do so here would require it to ignore the prefatory clause that the government chose to include. The court does not interpret plea agreements that way.

The parties’ statements during the plea hearing further support the court’s interpretation of the agreement. The government told the court that “[p]aragraph [nine] contains the parties’ stipulation to [Craig’s] total relevant conduct.” And when the court asked Craig whether he understood that the parties had “stipulated and agreed [to the facts in paragraph nine] to be the relevant conduct stipulation set forth in your plea agreement,” Craig answered yes. Tellingly, the government never objected to the court’s characterization of the agreement.

Considering the plea agreement’s text, the plea colloquy and the heightened scrutiny afforded plea agreements, the court finds that paragraph nine contained the “total relevant conduct” to which the parties stipulated. The government thus breached the agreement when it sought enhancements based on facts not contained in paragraph nine.

The government next argues that a separate provision of the plea agreement (paragraph eleven) and the government’s independent duty of candor to the district court required it to seek the enhancements. The court disagrees.

To be sure, paragraph eleven reserves the government’s right to correct any inaccuracies or inadequacies in the presentence report to “enable the Court to exercise its sentencing discretion.” And the government, like any party, has a duty of candor to the court. Yet that duty, at least here, can’t excuse commitments the government made in the plea agreement.

The government didn’t breach the plea agreement when it told the probation officer and the district court it believed that the gun was stolen and connected to another felony. That’s consistent with its duty of candor. But the government crossed the line when it advocated for two enhancements based on those allegations—which fell beyond the total relevant conduct stipulation—and thus deprived Craig of the benefit of his bargain.

“Although the Government has a duty to provide the sentencing court with relevant factual information and to correct misstatements, it may not hide behind this duty to advocate a position that contradicts its promises in a plea agreement.” In this circumstance, the court is required to remand for resentencing before a different district court judge.

Vacated and remanded.

Damages

mootness

BOTTOM LINE: Where a plaintiff obtained compensatory damages as redress for his injury, he lost the ability to recover nominal damages for that same injury.

CASE: Hammons. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation, Case Nos. 23-1394 (L), No. 23-1452 (filed June 24, 2025) (Judges Quattlebaum, Rushing, HEYTENS).

FACTS: Jesse Hammons is a transgender man who has been diagnosed with gender dysphoria. As treatment for that diagnosis, Hammons’s doctor recommended that he undergo a hysterectomy. The doctor scheduled the surgery to take place at the University of Maryland St. Joseph Medical Center, a hospital owned by the University of Maryland Medical System.

Shortly before the scheduled hysterectomy, Hammons’s doctor called the hospital’s chief medical officer to discuss the procedure. During that call, the chief medical officer said doctors “cannot do transgender surgery” at St. Joseph’s, and later explained that performing gender-affirming hysterectomies would be “inconsistent” with a set of ethical healthcare directives guiding Catholic hospitals.

Hammons filed a complaint alleging that the defendants’ conduct violated the Establishment Clause, the Equal Protection Clause and Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act. The district court dismissed both constitutional claims but awarded Hammons compensatory damages on his statutory claim in an amount Hammons stipulated to.

Hammons appeals, arguing that the district court erred in dismissing his constitutional claims. The defendants filed two motions to dismiss the appeal, arguing that Hammons “lacks standing to appeal” and the “case is quintessentially moot.”

LAW: Hammons argues that he has standing to appeal because he sought two categories of relief that he did not receive from the district court: “retrospective declaratory relief ” and nominal damages. The first part of that argument fails because a backward-looking declaratory judgment cannot “[b]y itself . . . be the redress that satisfies the third standing prong” without “some further concrete relief that will likely result from the declaratory judgment.” And Hammons’s nominal damages argument fails because a plaintiff cannot recover both nominal damages and another type of damages to redress one underlying injury.

To be sure, the Supreme Court has emphasized that nominal damages are a “concrete” remedy that “independently provide redress” to an injured plaintiff. At the same time, not every successful plaintiff is eligible for nominal damages. Nominal damages are generally “awarded by default.” Because “every legal injury necessarily causes damage,” nominal damages may be awarded to redress harm “even if [a particular plaintiff] cannot or chooses not to quantify that harm in economic terms.”

But a plaintiff may also lose the ability to recover nominal damages: Nominal damages are available only until “the plaintiff establishes entitlement to some other form of damages, such as compensatory or statutory damages.”

Here, Hammons proved his entitlement to and was awarded “some other form of damages.” After the district court granted summary judgment to Hammons on liability for his § 1557 claim, the parties stipulated that Hammons’s “compensatory damages total $748.46,” and the district court ordered the defendants to pay that amount plus prejudgment interest to compensate Hammons for the harms caused by the cancellation of his surgery. Once Hammons obtained compensatory damages as redress for his injury, he lost the ability to recover nominal damages for that same injury.

In a post-argument letter, Hammons cites Schneider v. County of San Diego, 285 F.3d 784 (9th Cir. 2002), holding that a plaintiff who had been awarded just compensation as redress for a violation of the Takings Clause was nonetheless entitled to nominal damages to redress a violation of the Due Process Clause. But “the proper use of letters filed under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j) is to alert the court to new authority that has come to a party’s attention after briefing or oral argument,” not “to advance new arguments couched as supplemental authorities.” In any event, Schneider does not move the needle here.

At oral argument, Hammons asserted a new theory: that he has standing to appeal the district court’s dismissal of his constitutional claims because prevailing on those claims would permit him to receive a type of damages (emotional distress damages) that were not available under § 1557. The court declines to consider that late-breaking argument because Hammons did not present it in any of his briefing before this court.

So ordered.

Employment

religious failure to accommodate

BOTTOM LINE: Where the district court did not have the benefit of a recent decision from this court when it dismissed an employee’s religious failure to accommodate claim under Title VII, the case was remanded so the district court could reassess its dismissal decision.

CASE: Chinnery v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States Inc., Case No. 24-1697 (filed June 23, 2025) (per curiam).

FACTS: Naisha Tyiese Chinnery appeals the district court’s order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss her religious discrimination, failure to accommodate and retaliation claims, brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Chinnery challenges only the district court’s dismissal of her failure to accommodate claim on appeal, asserting that the district court reversibly erred when it required, at the motion to dismiss stage, more detailed allegations regarding the sincerity of her religious beliefs.

LAW: In a recent decision that issued after the district court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss here, this court clarified that for a failure to accommodate claim to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must adequately allege that “her professed [religious] belief is (1) sincerely held and (2) religious in nature.”

The court explained that the first prong, sincerity, “seeks to determine an adherent’s good faith in the expression of her religious belief and provides a rational means of differentiating between those beliefs that are held as a matter of conscience and those that are animated by motives of deception and fraud.”

“The second prong, religious in nature, limits the factfinder’s inquiry to a determination whether the beliefs professed are, in the claimant’s own scheme of things, religious.” “Therefore,” the court continued, “it follows that the claim of the adherent that her belief is an essential part of a religious faith must be given great weight.”

Here, Chinnery alleged, in part, that she “is a faithful Christian,” that she informed defendant “that ‘anything that is unholy, unpure [sic], violates my body, faith and devotion to God” and that her “Christianity and devoted belief in the most High God is to continue to abstain from anything unpure [sic]” because her “blood is sacred and life is found in the blood.” Chinnery also alleged she informed defendant that her “sincerely-held Christian beliefs do not allow [her] to place any foreign substances or be assaulted by a foreign body being inserted into my nasal passages (i.e., covid test) as [her] body is the temple of the Holy Spirit and is to remain pure.”

In part because the district court did not have the benefit of this court’s decision, the court vacates that portion of the district court’s order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss Chinnery’s failure to accommodate claim, and remands so the district court may reassess its dismissal of that claim.

Vacated and remanded.

Negligence

causation

BOTTOM LINE: Where a woman claimed she suffered a nerve injury after receiving two vaccine injections, but CVS was immune for its administration of one of the injections, and the woman presented no evidence from which a jury could find which injection caused her injury, CVS prevailed at summary judgment.

CASE: Watts v. Maryland CVS Pharmacy LLC, Case No. 23-2025 (filed July 1, 2025) (Judges Diaz, HARRIS, Berner).

FACTS: At a CVS pharmacy in 2017, Amanda Watts was given two shots, one with the Pneumovax 23 vaccine and one with the Boostrix vaccine. According to Watts, both vaccines were negligently administered, in the same improper location in her arm. Watts was eventually diagnosed with complex regional pain syndrome, or CRPS, a chronic pain condition that can result from nerve injury, which she attributes to CVS’s negligence.

But CVS is immune from suit for its administration of Boostrix under the federal National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986. Accordingly, Watts’s complaint against CVS alleged only that it was negligent in its administration of Pneumovax. The district court granted summary judgment to CVS because Watts presented no evidence from which a jury could find that it was CVS’s administration of the Pneumovax vaccine, rather than the Boostrix vaccine, that caused her injury.

LAW: A result of CVS’s federal-law immunity for Boostrix, Watts cannot recover unless there is evidence from which a jury could find that her injuries were caused by her Pneumovax shot and not by the Boostrix shot given at the same time and in the same spot on her arm. Here, the court agrees with the district court that a jury could do no more than “guess” as to that crucial element of Watts’s case.

As the district court explained, the original deposition testimony of Watts’s own causation expert, Dr. Chhatre, was that one of Watts’s two shots caused her injury – but that he could not determine which one. The best he could do was opine that if the shots were not given in precisely the same spot, and if it were possible to identify which injection site was the “focus of residual pain and redness,” then he could identify the corresponding injection as the cause of Watts’s CRPS condition. But there is no evidence tying one or the other of Watts’s shots to the inflammation at the injection site, as the district court noted, and thus no way for Dr. Chhatre to determine causation.

Watts’s other expert witness, Ms. Ryle, was a pharmacist retained by Watts to opine only on the standard of care, and clarified at her deposition that she was not an expert on causation. But she did answer questions about causation, and for the sake of completeness, the court notes that nothing in her testimony could have supported a jury finding that Watts’s injuries were caused by her Pneumovax injection.

The court reaches the same conclusion even if it adds to the evidentiary record Dr. Chhatre’s post-deposition opinion that the two injections together caused Watts’s CRPS, with each contributing to her injury. What the record would support is only a finding that CVS’s Boostrix injection, for which it is immune, did indeed cause Watts’s injury, albeit in combination with the Pneumovax injection.

As the district court put it, Watts would still be relying for liability “upon the Boostrix vaccine as a second, separate negligent act” – something she cannot do consistent with the federal Vaccine Act. And Watts’s own theory is that her injury was “indivisible” and not capable of apportionment, entitling her to recover for the full extent of her harm – which means she has presented no evidence from which a jury could estimate the share of her harm attributable to the Pneumovax shot.

Affirmed.

Prisons

due process

BOTTOM LINE: Where an inmate alleged his due process rights were denied at a hearing that resulted in $15 being deducted from his prison trust account, his suit was reinstated. Although the district court reasoned that “small fines routinely assessed at disciplinary hearings do not trigger due process protections” because they do not impose an “atypical and significant hardship,” the inmate had a property interest in his funds.

CASE: Brown v. Stapleton, Case No. 23-6824 (filed July 1, 2025) (Judges Wynn, RICHARDSON, Heytens).

FACTS: Demmerick Brown is an inmate at Red Onion State Prison in Virginia. In August 2020, right at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, Brown walked from his cell to the barber shop to get a haircut and shave. He was wearing a facemask, as was required by prison policy. After Brown sat down, the barber told Brown to remove his facemask. Brown complied. The next day, Brown received a disciplinary charge for failing to wear a mask in violation of prison rules.

Brown was entitled to a hearing where he could contest his disciplinary charge. In preparation, Brown sought to fill out the forms that he believed would allow him to present evidence and call witnesses at the hearing. Despite being assured that he would be given the necessary forms, he never received them, even after multiple requests.

At the disciplinary hearing, Brown again pointed out his lack of forms and requested the hearing be postponed until he could fill out the appropriate paperwork. The hearing officer denied his request and proceeded with the hearing. Brown was found guilty of violating the prison’s facemask policy and had $15 deducted from his prison trust account as a fine.

Brown sued three Red Onion prison officials, claiming they violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court dismissed the suit, agreeing with several non-binding district court opinions that “small fines routinely assessed at disciplinary hearings do not trigger due process protections” because they do not impose an “atypical and significant hardship.”

LAW: In Henderson v. Harmon, this court considered whether “deducting a sum of money from [a Virginia prison inmate’s] trust account as restitution for an assault” nearly six years after the assault was a violation of due process. This required the court to first determine whether the inmate had a property interest in his trust account at all. The court concluded that he did: “Henderson has a protected property interest in his prison trust account.”

This conclusion was unsurprising. Property interests “are created . . . by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.” By statute, the Department of Corrections “shall establish for each inmate a personal trust account,” and the “[f]unds in an inmate’s personal trust account shall be paid to the inmate upon parole or final discharge.” So Virginia state law has created these prison trust accounts and vested in its inmates a legitimate claim of entitlement to the funds in those accounts. That creates a property interest.

There is no express limitation in Virginia state law that permits fines to be deducted freely from prison trust accounts for disciplinary infractions. So the general property interest that Virginia inmates have in their prison trust accounts by statute applies to this case, and the $15 fine assessed against Brown’s account deprived him of that property interest. The Fourteenth Amendment does not allow that deprivation to occur without due process.

The officials contend that the question of whether Brown was deprived of a property interest is governed by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). Yet Sandin by its own terms is about deprivations of liberty interests. Money is instead indisputably a property interest. And Sandin is silent on how to handle property interests; indeed, the opinion fails to use the word “property” even once. Nor does the reasoning of Sandin extend cleanly to property interests.

The officials also contend that the $15 fine was so de minimis that it does not qualify as a deprivation. The court need not decide whether a de minimis exception to the Due Process Clause exists to reject this argument. Fifteen dollars may be a sum of small consequence outside prison walls, but it is of great significance within them: the amount is more than a week’s worth of wages at Red Onion State Prison. So even if a de minimis floor exists for property interests, Brown’s fine does not fall below it. The Due Process Clause applies here.

Vacated and remanded.

Prisons

PLRA three-strikes

BOTTOM LINE: Where the district court applied § 1915(g)’s three-strike rule to deny in forma pauperis status to an inmate, it erred. In one of the prior suits, the federal district court abstained under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and Younger abstention does not count as a § 1915(g) strike.

CASE: Burrell v. Shirley, Case No. 23-6791 (filed July 1, 2025) (Judges Thacker, Harris, QUATTLEBAUM).

FACTS: Joel Aaron Burrell had filed at least three prior lawsuits by the time he filed the underlying action. The Prison Litigation Reform Act relevantly prohibits a prisoner from bringing a civil action or appeal in forma pauperis if he has, on three prior occasions while incarcerated, brought an action or appeal that was dismissed for frivolousness, maliciousness or failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Here, the district court concluded that three of Burrell’s prior suits were dismissed for failure to state a claim. So, the court applied § 1915(g)’s three-strike rule to deny in forma pauperis status. Then, because Burrell had not paid the filing fee, the court dismissed the action. Burrell argues that two of the prior suits did not constitute § 1915(g) strikes.

LAW: In Burrell’s first case, the federal district court abstained under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The first question is whether a dismissal based on Younger abstention is a dismissal “on the grounds that [the action] . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted[?]” The court concludes the answer is no.

A district court abstaining under Younger never assesses whether the complaint states a viable claim for relief; instead, it determines that good-faith, ongoing state proceedings offer an adequate opportunity for a plaintiff to litigate his constitutional claims, and it therefore dismisses the federal case. Younger abstention is more like absence of jurisdiction or failure to exhaust.

Amicus states Younger abstention is not a jurisdictional dismissal. That point is correct. Amicus then argues that if it’s not a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, it must be a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim. This is where amicus goes astray. Following that logic, a dismissal for failure to exhaust—which also is not jurisdictional—would count as a strike. But this court has concluded that dismissal for failure to exhaust is not a § 1915(g) strike.

In sum, the first case was not dismissed because of a failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Nor was it dismissed for frivolousness or maliciousness. The district court erred by counting it as a § 1915(g) strike.

In the second case, the federal district court twice dismissed Burrell’s complaints for failure to state a claim, but gave him 30 days to file a third amended complaint. When he failed to do so, the district court dismissed Burrell’s suit “for noncompliance with a court order.” It again flagged that Burrell’s second amended complaint lacked sufficient factual allegations regarding delay of medical care. And it grounded its dismissal in the court’s inherent authority to manage its docket.

Several circuits have determined that straight failure-to-prosecute and failure-to- comply dismissals are not § 1915(g) strikes. That makes sense. When a case is dismissed because a plaintiff refuses to file a necessary form, it is not dismissed on the grounds of failure to state a claim for relief, frivolousness or maliciousness.

But Burrell’s second suit was not a straight failure-to-prosecute or failure-to-comply dismissal. When another circuit confronted this circumstance, it explained that the plaintiff’s “failure to file an amended complaint did not negate the determination already made by the [district] court that the complaint that he had filed, and on which he effectively elected to stand, failed to state a claim.”

Other circuits have applied this same approach when an appellate court finds an appeal frivolous and then the appellant fails to prosecute or pay the filing fee. The court agrees that “when (1) a district court dismisses a complaint on the ground that it fails to state a claim, (2) the court grants leave to amend, and (3) the plaintiff then fails to file an amended complaint, the dismissal counts as a strike under § 1915(g).”

Despite this, the district court erred by counting it as a strike in this case. That’s because the three-strike rule requires a court to consider if “on 3 or more prior occasions” an action was dismissed on the specified grounds. Burrell filed this suit on June 23, 2022. The district court dismissed the second case action on June 29, 2022. So it was not a “prior” dismissal on the date Burrell filed this action.

Vacated and remanded.

Maryland Supreme Court

Appeals

pendente lite

BOTTOM LINE: Maryland appellate courts have held that cases involving interlocutory orders for the payment of money in the form of pendente lite child support and alimony are appealable. But where a request for pendente lite child support and alimony is denied, there is no right to immediate interlocutory appeal.

CASE: Adelakun v. Adelakun, No. 35, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed July 1, 2025) (Justices Fader, WATTS, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, Killough).

FACTS: This case involves whether an appeal of an interlocutory order denying a request for pendente lite child support and alimony is authorized under Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud., or CJ, Proc § 12-303(3)(v), which provides that a party may appeal from an interlocutory order entered by a circuit court in a civil case “[f]or the sale, conveyance, or delivery of real or personal property or the payment of money, or the refusal to rescind or discharge such an order, unless the delivery or payment is directed to be made to a receiver appointed by the court[.]”

The Appellate Court of Maryland dismissed the appeal, holding that an interlocutory order denying pendente lite child support and alimony is not appealable as an order for the payment of money pursuant to CJ § 12-303(3)(v).

LAW: Maryland appellate courts have held that cases involving interlocutory orders for the payment of money in the form of pendente lite child support and alimony are appealable. This Court has not previously addressed whether an interlocutory order denying pendente lite child support or alimony is appealable under CJ § 12-303(3)(v).

By its plain language, CJ § 12-303(3)(v) authorizes an appeal of an interlocutory order “[f]or . . . the payment of money.” In other words, the plain language states that an order for the payment of money is appealable. In contrast, an order that is not for the payment of money, i.e., a denial of an order for the payment of money, is not mentioned as appealable under CJ § 12-303(3)(v).

Mother contends, however, that the word “for” in the phrase “for the payment of money” is ambiguous and has a broader meaning that encompasses both positive and negative determinations and includes “[w]ith respect or regard to; on the part of” the payment of money. Stated otherwise, mother appears to argue that the word “for” in the phrase “for the payment of money” could mean pertaining to or involving and does not require that, to be appealable under CJ § 12-303(3)(v), an order actually direct the payment of money.

The court disagrees. When CJ § 12-303(3)(v) is read as a whole, it is evident that the word “for” can only be interpreted to mean an order directing the actual payment of money, not the denial of a request for the payment of money. The plain meaning of CJ § 12-303(3)(v)—that only an order directing the payment of money is appealable—is even more clear when considered within the context of other provisions of CJ § 12-303(3).

Mother maintains that CJ § 12-303(3)(v) must be construed in conjunction with Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law, or FL, § 12-101(a) and that permitting interlocutory appeals only from orders granting pendente lite child support but not orders denying such support “would thwart the General Assembly’s intent . . . to impose a presumption of pendente lite child support[.]” Nothing in the text of either statute, however, permits this court to adopt mother’s position.

Although the plain language of CJ § 12-303(3)(v) is unambiguous and the court’s analysis could end at this point, this holding is supported by the circumstance that the legislative history of the provision contains no evidence of an intent by the General Assembly to treat the meaning of the language “[f]or . . . the payment of money” differently in the context of pendente lite orders in family law cases or to permit immediate appeals of interlocutory orders denying the payment of money.

And Maryland case law confirms that this court has held that CJ § 12-303(3)(v) provides a right of appeal only from interlocutory orders that direct a party to pay a specific sum of money to another person and that neither this court nor the Appellate Court has expanded the meaning of “[f]or . . . the payment of money” to encompass orders that do not direct a party to pay a specific sum of money.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed.

Damages

investment opportunity

BOTTOM LINE: Where a party was wrongly denied the opportunity to invest in a company at its inception, the measure of damages is the fair value of the interest it would have acquired, valued on the date of the breach, minus the price it would have paid to acquire it.

CASE: Maryland Indoor Play LLC v. Snowden Investment LLC, No. 29, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed July 3, 2025) (Justices Fader, Watts, Booth, Biran, GOULD, Eaves, Killough).

FACTS: This case asks what is the appropriate remedies when a party breaches a contractual right to notice of an opportunity to invest in a company at its inception. Here, the investor (Snowden Investment LLC) was denied that right with respect to two separate companies. The circuit court awarded specific performance as to one and compensatory damages as to the other. The appellate court affirmed.

LAW: This court must first determine whether the court applied the correct measure of damages. It did not.

Maryland law recognizes two categories of damages, and how damages are calculated depends on which category is claimed. A claim for the “value of the other party’s performance” is one for direct losses, or general damages, measured as “the difference between the contract price and the fair market value at the time of breach.” Consequential damages are “calculated as losses that ‘may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time of making of the contract.’”

Here, Snowden’s expert, Robert Rosenthal, measured the consequential damages after the breach. That was incorrect. Snowden’s claimed damages belong in the general damages category, and thus, the rule governing general damages should have been applied. The circuit court erred in finding otherwise.

There was a second mistake. General damages are properly measured by the “price a willing buyer would offer, and a willing seller would accept, on the open market.” Thus, for Ashburn, damages should have been calculated based on the fair value of the interest Snowden would have acquired, valued on the date of the breach, minus the price Snowden would have paid to acquire it.

Snowden maintains that Mr. Rosenthal properly measured damages by using “fair value” instead of “fair market value.” The Appellate Court agreed. It court reasoned that if dissenting stockholders are compensated for their interests at fair value, then Snowden, who was denied the opportunity to invest in the first place, should be similarly compensated.

But compensating Snowden based on a fair value would put it in a better position than it would have reasonably expected but for the breach of its investment right. That, of course, is not the purpose of contract damages. That’s why contract damages are based on the fair market value, not fair value. Snowden’s damages calculation was legally deficient for another reason: Mr. Rosenthal measured the damages not at the date of breach, but almost three years later.

Turning to specific performance, the founders argued before the Appellate Court, among other things, that specific performance was not available as a matter of law because Snowden failed to establish that it was ready, willing and able to invest in and comply with the same terms and conditions as have the existing equity holders of Boomerang. The Appellate Court rejected that argument, holding that the only performance required of Snowden was to “be available to receive the notice and offer.” Snowden makes that same argument before this court. This court disagrees.

The investment right was intended to afford Snowden the right to invest at the beginning, when its prospects for success were speculative and uncertain, not to take a “wait and see” approach while the other members did the work, bore the risk and weathered the COVID-19 pandemic. When the case went to trial, Boomerang had been in business for over four years. To grant specific performance at that stage, the court had to, as close as reasonably possible, attempt to put Snowden in the position it would have been had it been a member of Boomerang since the beginning.

At a minimum, that means ascertaining not just the initial capital contributions, but any additional ones. And once it determined all the terms and conditions for Snowden to be admitted on equal footing as the other members, the court needed to determine whether Snowden was ready, willing and able to pay its full share as an equal member and satisfy any applicable non-monetary conditions. It did not make this showing.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland vacated in part and reversed in part.

Employment

de minimis rule

BOTTOM LINE: The de minimis rule applies to claims under the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law and the Maryland Wage and Hour Law.

CASE: Martinez v. Amazon.com Services LLC, Misc. No. 17, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed July 3, 2025) (Justices Fader, Booth BIRAN, Gould Killough) (Justices WATTS, Eaves dissent).

FACTS: The phrase “de minimis non curat lex” – often referred to as the “de minimis doctrine” or the “de minimis rule” – is an “age-old maxim” that has been translated as “the law doth not regard trifles.”

Estefany Martinez sued Amazon.com Services LLC to recover the value of the wages associated with the time between when she stopped getting paid each day and when she swiped out to exit the facility after completing the post-shift security screening process.

The United States District Court for the District of Maryland has certified the following question to this court: “Does the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex, as described in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946) and Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 571 U.S. 220 (2014), apply to claims brought under the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law and the Maryland Wage and Hour Law?”

LAW: Ms. Martinez argues that the General Assembly has not adopted or incorporated the de minimis doctrine into the Maryland wage laws. She relies on the wage laws’ definition of “[w]age” as “all compensation that is due to an employee for employment,” which she contends is inconsistent with an intent to exclude even de minimis amounts of time spent at work.

The court concludes that a de minimis rule applies to the Maryland wage laws. The court acknowledges that neither the phrase “de minimis,” nor a description of the de minimis doctrine using other words, is present in the plain language of the wage laws. However, the text of the Fair Labor Standards Act also lacks any reference to the de minimis rule. Yet, the Supreme Court held in Anderson that the de minimis rule is applicable in “comput[ing]” the “workweek,” i.e., in determining whether an employee has been “required to give up a substantial measure of his time and effort,” in which case “compensable working time is involved.”

Because the plain language of the wage laws does not resolve the interpretive question before this court, it must “search[] for legislative intent in other indicia, including the history of the legislation or other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative process.” That search leads to the conclusion that, when the General Assembly enacted the wage laws, it intended a de minimis rule to apply to those laws.

Against this backdrop of the Maryland Wage and Hour Law, or MWHL’s, substantial and consistent incorporation of the FLSA’s provisions, the court concludes that, when the General Assembly enacted the MWHL in 1965, it intended also to incorporate the de minimis rule that was understood to apply to the FLSA following Anderson. Had the General Assembly not intended a de minimis rule to apply to the MWHL’s provisions concerning the compensability of work (and to the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law when it enacted that law a year later), this court believes it would have said so. Ms. Martinez’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive.

Certified question of law answered as set forth above.

DISSENT: In my view, the Majority’s holding that “the de minimis doctrine applies to claims brought under the Maryland Wage Laws” is incorrect. The federal de minimis doctrine has not been adopted into the MWHL or the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law nor should it be incorporated by this court into either.

Employment

workers’ compensation

BOTTOM LINE: Where the adult, non-dependent daughter of a man killed on a jobsite sued the employer for wrongful death, her suit was dismissed. Although the daughter was unable to receive death benefits under the Maryland’s Workers’ Compensation Act, its exclusivity provision barred her wrongful death suit.

CASE: Ledford v. Jenway Contracting Inc., No. 3, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed July 1, 2025) (Justices Fader, Booth, EAVES, Getty) (Justices WATTS, Biran dissent) (Justice KILLOUGH, Biran dissent).

FACTS: John Ledford was employed by Jenway Contracting Inc. In February 2021, while in the course of his employment, Mr. Ledford tragically fell from a retaining wall and suffered fatal injuries. At the time of Mr. Ledford’s death, he was survived by his adult, non-dependent daughter, Summer Ledford. As a non-dependent, Ms. Ledford was unable to receive death benefits under the Maryland’s Workers’ Compensation Act, so instead she filed a claim against Jenway under Maryland’s Wrongful Death Act, or WDA, codified at § 3-904 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, or CJP.

Jenway moved to dismiss Ms. Ledford’s complaint on the grounds that the Act limits its liability to two groups of people, injured workers and their dependents, and that neither of the Act’s two exceptions applied to permit Ms. Ledford’s WDA claim to go forward. The circuit court agreed, dismissing Ms. Ledford’s complaint, and the Appellate Court affirmed.

Ms. Ledford challenges whether § 9-509’s exclusivity provision bars a deceased covered employee’s non-dependent, adult child from pursuing claims against the deceased covered employee’s employer. And if it does, she contends it conflicts with Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

LAW: Section 9-509(b) prohibits only “a covered employee or the dependents of a covered employee” from bringing an action against an employer outside of the Act. Because non-dependent children are not mentioned in that subsection, Ms. Ledford believes that they are not subject to that prohibition.

But the prefatory language of L&E § 9-509(a) permits an exception to an employer’s limited liability only to the extent that it explicitly is stated in the Act. Therefore, despite the Act’s silence as to non-dependents in subsection (b), Ms. Ledford cannot point to—and this court cannot find—any other exception within the Act that extends an employer’s liability to an adult, non-dependent child’s wrongful death claim.

Additionally, the plain language of § 9-684 specifically states that, when a covered employee dies without dependents, the employer’s (or its insurer’s) “liability” is “limited to” medical costs and funeral benefits. From §§ 9-684 and 9-689, the General Assembly specifically contemplated situations where a covered employee dies without dependents. In that instance, the General Assembly ensured that no one else, i.e. non-dependents, would be burdened with any sort of expense (medical or burial) for a covered employee’s work-related fatality. That the Act contemplates people in Ms. Ledford’s shoes is persuasive evidence that she—and others similarly situated—were not forgotten when the grand bargain was struck. Indeed, they were intentionally considered and incorporated into the Act.

Ms. Ledford argues that funds paid pursuant to L&E §§ 9-684 and 9-689 do not qualify as “compensation” because they are merely reimbursements that may or may not pass through the hands of the non-dependent individual. The court finds her argument unconvincing.

For the aforementioned reasons, the plain language of the Act’s exclusivity provision forecloses a wrongful death action from a non-dependent child of a deceased covered employee. This interpretation is in line with previous cases in which this court has made clear that the exclusivity provision protects compliant employers from outside liability for a covered employee’s injury or death, regardless of the identity of the party bringing suit.

Ms. Ledford argues that construing the Act’s exclusivity provision as barring her wrongful death claim would violate Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The court disagrees.

The Act’s exclusivity provision currently codified in § 9-509 was enacted over a century ago, at a time when non-dependent children had no rights under the common law, the WDA or any other law to sue a parent’s employer for damages arising from a workplace accident resulting in death. In 1997, when the WDA was revised to extend rights generally to non-dependent children, the exclusivity provision had been firmly established for more than eight decades, precluding all claims against the employers of the parents of those non-dependent children outside of the workers’ compensation system.

As a result, non-dependent children in Maryland have never enjoyed the right to sue their parent’s employer for damages arising from a workplace accident resulting in death. The remedy Ms. Ledford seeks is, therefore, not a traditional remedy. Indeed, it is a remedy that has never existed at all in Maryland. Accordingly, it is not protected by Article 19.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed.

DISSENT: I would hold that compensation under the Act is as the plain language of the Act states in § 9-509—the exclusive remedy for a covered employee and a covered employee’s dependents for accidental personal injury incurred by a covered employee. It is not the exclusive remedy for a covered employee’s non-dependent children. The circuit court, therefore, erred in dismissing Ms. Ledford’s complaint. For the above reasons, respectfully, I dissent.

DISSENT: No Maryland Supreme Court decision has, until now, extended § 9-509 immunity in a case brought by someone who is ineligible for benefits under the Act. The majority advances no rationale or legislative history demonstrating that, in enacting the 1997 amendment to the Wrongful Death Act, the General Assembly intended the Workers’ Compensation Act to extinguish the independent cause of action it had just created. It simply asserts that to be the case. Permitting adult non-dependent children to hold employers to account for their wrongful acts does not upset any reciprocal trade-off – it merely honors the separate, statutorily conferred remedy the General Assembly crafted for them in 1997 for the death of a parent. I respectfully dissent.

Taxation

voter involvement

BOTTOM LINE: Where individuals proposed an amendment to the Baltimore City Charter that would have imposed a decreasing cap on the city’s real property tax rate, it ran afoul of a Charter provision prohibiting any voter involvement in setting property tax rates.

CASE: Frederick III v. Baltimore City Board of Elections, No. 35, Sept. Term, 2023 (filed July 1, 2025) (Justices Biran, GOULD, Eaves, Killough) (Justices FADER, Booth, Harrell concur).

FACTS: Appellants proposed an amendment to the Baltimore City charter that would have imposed a cap on the city’s real property tax rate that incrementally decreased over seven years. The Election Director concluded that the proposed amendment would conflict with section 6-302(a) of the Tax-Property Article, which vests authority to set the property tax rate with the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.

The circuit court agreed, holding the amendment was “not proper Charter material because it is in violation of Tax-Property § 6-302(a) and allows the citizens of Baltimore to establish the tax rate, leaving nothing for the City Council to legislate because they would be required to lower the tax rate every year[,]” thereby “not leav[ing] any discretion in the hands of the City Council.”

LAW: Appellants contend that the amendment is a valid cap on the property tax rate that complies with § 6-302(a) of the Tax-Property Article. They argue that this court’s decision in Board of Supervisors of Elections of Anne Arundel County v. Smallwood, 327 Md. 220 (1992), approved tax caps as proper charter material, holding that “a limitation on the power of a legislative body to raise revenue is at the heart of the form and structure of our government and thus is proper charter material.”

In 1929, the General Assembly granted to Baltimore City the power to set rates for taxing real and personal property. So, although Smallwood and Hertelendy provide useful and interesting discussions on where to draw the line under § 6-302 between lawful and unlawful voter involvement in setting property tax rates, here, Chapter 555, applicable only to Baltimore City, prohibits any voter involvement. Section 6-302(a) must be construed with that statutory limitation in mind. Because the amendment was initiated by the voters, it would have violated § 6-302(a).

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City affirmed.

CONCUR: I join the majority opinion in full. I write separately to add my view that, if the issue is presented in a future case, it may be appropriate to reconsider aspects of our holding in Board of Supervisors of Elections of Anne Arundel County v. Smallwood, 327 Md. 220 (1992).

Zoning

hearing

BOTTOM LINE: Where the District Council downzoned several properties at a work session without giving their owners notice and an opportunity to be heard, as required by both state and county laws, it erred.

CASE: County Council of Prince George’s County v. Robin Dale Land LLC, No. 38, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed July 3, 2025) (Justices Fader, Watts, BOOTH, Biran, Gould, Eaves, Battaglia).

FACTS: This zoning case is before this court after 16 years of litigation in the circuit court and the Appellate Court of Maryland. The underlying dispute involves a 2009 comprehensive rezoning by the Prince George’s County Council, sitting as the District Council, concerning two subregions of the County located in the Maryland-Washington Regional District.

Prior cases resulted in three court-ordered remands to the District Council for further proceedings. After each remand, aggrieved property owners petitioned for judicial review. In each instance, the circuit court and/or the Appellate Court determined that the remand proceeding failed to comply with the court’s remand instructions.

In the underlying petition for judicial review, several property owners asserted that the District Council improperly downzoned their properties at a work session without giving them notice and an opportunity to be heard, and in a manner inconsistent with the Appellate Court’s remand instructions in Bazzarre v. County Council of Prince George’s County Maryland, No. 1016 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 30, 2017). The circuit court agreed with the property owners, reversed the District Council and remanded the case once again for further proceedings. The Appellate Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment in a reported opinion.

LAW: The first issue is whether a countywide rezoning that occurred in 2021 constituted a substantive change in the law that rendered moot the property owners’ assertions of error arising from the 2019 rezoning proceeding. The answer is no.

The 2021 countywide process was not a comprehensive rezoning as described in this court’s case law. The process, which was established by local zoning laws, and with additional limitations imposed by the General Assembly, was intended to effectuate the technical and non-substantive transition of the approximately 300,000 properties in the county located within the Regional District from the zoning districts that existed in the prior zoning ordinance to the most similar zoning districts that had been established in a new zoning ordinance. This court agrees with the Appellate Court that this technical, non-substantive process did not render the property owners’ assertions of error arising from the 2019 work session moot.

When one compares the technical conversion process for the countywide sectional map amendment (that contains no criteria other than ensuring that the rezonings are consistent with the decision matrix) with the criteria for sectional map amendments set forth in both the prior zoning ordinance and the new zoning ordinance (that require that the District Council consider factors that are consistent with comprehensive rezoning), it is clear that the countywide reclassification process lacks the attributes of a comprehensive rezoning.

The District Council nevertheless asserts that the Appellate Court erred in affirming the circuit court’s reversal of the District Council’s 2019 resolutions and the circuit court’s remand of the case to the District Council for further proceedings. The District Council maintains that, in enacting the 2019 resolutions, it: (1) complied with the Bazzarre remand order and (2) was not required to hold a public hearing.

The court disagrees with the District Council’s arguments. It instead agrees with the Appellate Court that the District Council erred when it enacted the 2019 resolutions without holding a public hearing as required by both state and county laws. The property owners were entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard under both state and county laws prior to their properties being downzoned.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed.

Maryland Appellate Court

Domestic Relations

marital estate calculation

BOTTOM LINE: Where the circuit court  did not account for various assets and miscalculated the parties’ marital estate, it erred in reaching its monetary award conclusion.

CASE: Sims v. Sims, No. 1787, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed June 30, 2025) (Judges NAZARIAN, Beachley, Kenney).

FACTS: After a four-day trial, the circuit court granted Rebekah Sims an absolute divorce from Cedric Sims and awarded her a monetary award, rehabilitative alimony, child support and child support arrearages and attorney’s fees. Husband challenges nearly all the court’s financial decisions, and both sides agree that errors in the calculation of the monetary award require this court to vacate that award.

LAW: The circuit court erred in finding wife’s 2017 Volvo and Noah’s Ark Investment Plan, or NAV, as nonmarital property because the parties acquired these two assets during their marriage. Wife also contends that the court didn’t address other assets that the parties stipulated as marital. These were husband’s Booz Allen Hamilton stock options held in Fidelity Investment #6226 and personal property at husband’s residence. The circuit court should determine on remand whether these assets were marital, if at all, before awarding a monetary award. On remand, the court also should review the valuation of the MidAtlantic IRA asset, the parties’ bank accounts, the total marital property valuation and the court’s dissipation calculation.

The circuit court also erred in its dissipation analysis. On remand, the court may find that by providing evidence of withdrawals occurring before Feb. 1, 2020, wife established a prima facie dissipation claim. In that case, husband would then need to demonstrate that those withdrawals were appropriate, and the court should, if inclined to agree with wife, tie those funds to the alleged dissipation.

Because the circuit court did not account for various assets and miscalculated the parties’ marital estate, it erred in reaching its monetary award conclusion. On remand, it must consider the FL § 8-205(b) factors based on the evidence, including the parties’ Rule 9-207 statement, and determine what is equitable.

Given this court’s holding regarding the monetary award, the circuit court’s alimony award must be vacated. This court notes, however, that the specific occupational bases the court cited in support of its prior rehabilitative alimony award contradicted the testimony and aren’t supported by the record. On remand, the court should revisit wife’s alimony request, and should it grant that award, should ground that award in the record before it. The court should also tie its alimony award, if granted, explicitly to the expenses that wife asserts. It should also consider wife’s charitable expense, and if the court finds it reasonable, it should connect that finding to the record before it.

Turning to the mortgage payment obligation on the marital home, husband claims that the circuit court erred in ordering him to pay the mortgage and that the additional payment functioned in essence as a separate alimony award. He adds that it stacked the financial burden against him inequitably, given the monetary, alimony and child support awards. Wife counters that this decision is permitted under FL § 8-208 explicitly and was thus within the circuit court’s discretion. The court agrees with wife.

Because the court must also vacate the child support order based on its other decisions, it offers some observations for remand. This is an above-guidelines case. The court must make explicit findings about the minor child’s reasonable expenses and must connect the ultimate conclusion (as recalibrated in light of all of these decisions) to the evidence before it, and especially to how the figure addresses the minor child’s expenses.

Additionally, the court must award the child support retroactively from the date wife filed her initial pleading unless the court finds that the award would create an inequitable result. Because the court ordered child support retroactively from May 1, 2024 and not the date wife filed her complaint, it found implicitly an inequitable result. And yet the court didn’t explain why commencing the child support retroactively from the date of wife’s initial pleading would yield an inequitable result. It must do so on remand.

Finally, in light of the other issues being remanded, this court must vacate the attorney’s fees award.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County vacated.

Employment

“employee”

BOTTOM LINE: Where a county administrator was an “employee” under Title VII, the Board of County Commissioners for Charles County had a legal obligation to take remedial action when it became aware that he had been subjected to a hostile work environment by a County Commissioner on account of his race.

CASE: Coates v. Charles County Board of Commissioners, No. 1623, Sept. Term, 2023 (filed NAZARIAN, Friedman, Zic).

FACTS: In closed session, the Board of County Commissioners for Charles County voted to take prompt and remedial action, or PRA, restricting the conduct of Commissioner Thomasina O. Coates based on the findings of an independent investigation into County Administrator Mark Belton’s personnel complaint against her. After resuming its meeting in open session, the Board amended its Rules of Procedure to include a policy statement prohibiting commissioners from engaging in “intimidating and disruptive workplace behaviors” against each other or county employees.

Two-and-a-half years later, Coates tried to cast the deciding Board vote to fire Belton. Two other commissioners objected to the validity of any Board action that included her vote. The Board authorized them to bring a civil action seeking a declaratory judgment on Coates’s authority to vote on Belton’s employment in light of the PRA. The circuit court issued a permanent injunction in their favor, prohibiting the Board from taking any action to rescind, amend or modify the PRA or to rescind the amendment to the Rules with a vote that included Coates. She appeals that judgment.

LAW: Coates asserts that the Commissioners lacked standing to bring this lawsuit because they didn’t suffer an injury from her actions. The court disagrees.

The circuit court is an appropriate venue for disputes among and between government bodies, especially where the conflict stands to impair the government’s ability to function or perform its essential duties. The court rejects Coates’s suggestion that the Declaratory Judgment Act doesn’t confer standing ever, let alone in this case. The Commissioners also had common law standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief. And the circuit court recognized correctly that the Commissioners’ duties conferred standing to seek equitable relief.

Coates also argues that the appellees were not properly before the circuit court because they failed to exhaust all administrative remedies available under employment discrimination laws. The court agrees with her, but only as to Count Four of the Commissioners’ complaint for declaratory relief under the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act. In an ideal world, the circuit court would have dismissed Count Four before deciding the Commissioners’ other equitable claims. This error wasn’t fatal to the Commissioners’ standing on their other claims because the court never exercised jurisdiction over Count Four and ultimately dismissed it.

The court next holds that the circuit court’s exercise of jurisdiction did not offend the principle of separation of powers because this case does not involve a political question. The Declaratory Judgment Act, Maryland Rules, Charles County Code, the Rules and the PRA all endowed the circuit court with the necessary standards to adjudicate the Commissioners’ claims for equitable relief.

Coates next claims that the circuit court erred as a matter of law when it accepted the PRA as a valid exercise of the Board’s administrative power and entered an injunction enforcing it. She contends that the PRA could not have been an administrative action because the Board didn’t use it to implement another law already in force and effect. The court holds that the Board had the administrative authority to take prompt and remedial action on matters affecting the county administrator’s employment and, therefore, the PRA it took on June 9, 2020, can be enforced by an injunction.

Coates takes the position, however, that Belton is not an “employee” entitled to protection under state and federal employment laws, but instead is a “political appointee.” The court finds that Belton is an “employee” under Title VII and the Board had a legal obligation to take remedial action when it became aware of the investigative conclusion that he had been subjected to a hostile work environment by Coates on account of his race.

Coates asks this court to hold that the PRA (and necessarily, the injunction) are invalid under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Her arguments hinge on the position that the PRA was a legislative action. But because the court has determined that the PRA was an administrative action rather than a law enacted by the Board, a First Amendment analysis is unnecessary.

Coates next claims that even if the permanent injunction was proper as a matter of law, there wasn’t enough evidence for the court to find that the balance of potential harm weighed in the appellees’ favor, that the appellees would suffer irreparable harm or that an injunction would be in the public interest. The court disagrees.

However the circuit court erred in a narrow procedural way. It should have entered a declaratory judgment embodying its conclusions that she was not entitled to relief as a result of its findings and conclusions on the Commissioners’ claims. The court vacates the portion of the judgment dismissing Coates’s counterclaim and remands for entry of a declaratory judgment consistent with the circuit court’s original findings and conclusions.

Coates finally suggests that the court stymied her efforts to discover and admit evidence examining the validity of the PRA. The court disagrees.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Charles County affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded.

Habeas corpus

immediate release

BOTTOM LINE: Where the Supreme Court of Maryland has not overturned the traditional requirement that a habeas petitioner must assert a possibility of immediate release, and the inmate here did not allege that he had a possibility of immediate release at the time of filing, his habeas petition was denied.

CASE: Beckwitt v. State, No. 1473, Sept. Term, 2023 (filed June 30, 2025) (Judges LEAHY, Friedman, Beachley).

FACTS: Daniel Beckwitt filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court demanding the retroactive application of “good conduct” credits to shorten his period of probation. The circuit court denied his petition without a hearing.

LAW: The court must first assess whether it has jurisdiction to consider this appeal, given that statutory provisions conferring general appellate jurisdiction generally do not apply to habeas corpus cases. Beckwitt does not argue that the sentence handed down on March 29, 2022, was illegal. Instead, Beckwitt challenges the term of his confinement based on an allegedly erroneous application of good conduct credits by the Division of Correction.

Beckwitt’s case is analogous to Md. Corr. Inst. v. Lee, 362 Md. 502 (2001), in which the habeas petitioner did not argue that her sentence itself was illegal, but that her continued incarceration was illegal because the Division of Correction “had failed to apply its policies concerning the interpretation of ambiguous sentences.” The Supreme Court held that the petitioner’s challenge was authorized under the statutory predecessor to Criminal Procedure Article, or CP, § 7-107 because she “challenged only the legality of her confinement and not the legality of her sentence[.]” Therefore, Beckwitt’s appeal is not foreclosed under CP § 7-107.

Because “Beckwitt’s release from incarceration [had] already occurred” before he filed his habeas petition in the circuit court, the state contends that Beckwitt’s habeas challenge was, and remains, moot. The court disagrees. The standard conditions of probation, almost as a rule, significantly restrict or restrain a person’s lawful liberty. Here, Beckwitt is subject to restraints not shared by the public generally and his freedom of movement rests in the hands of his supervising agent. As such, Beckwitt’s release from active incarceration did not foreclose his habeas petition.

However Beckwitt’s habeas petition is barred because he did not allege that he had a possibility of immediate release at the time of filing. Beckwitt does not contend that his probation is illegal at this time, but that it will become illegal in the future. He does not request an immediate release from probation, or a hearing or proceeding that could immediately end his probation. If Beckwitt’s contentions are accurate, then he is entitled to be released from probation on March 29, 2027—nearly two years in the future. Accordingly, Beckwitt’s habeas corpus claim is precluded until he can allege that the state is holding him beyond his legal sentence.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County affirmed.

Parent and Child

ADA

BOTTOM LINE: The Department of Social Services is generally required under the Americans with Disabilities Act to make reasonable accommodations for parents with disabilities in rendering reunification efforts in CINA cases, as long as the parents make such disabilities, as well as the accommodations they require, known to the Department.

CASE: In re: Z.F. & B.F., Nos. 1609, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed July 1, 2025) (Judges Berger, LEAHY, Getty).

FACTS: Mother challenges the court’s decision to grant custody and guardianship of her two minor children to their maternal grandparents and close their cases under the Child in Need of Assistance, or CINA, statute. Mother argues, among other things, that the court’s finding that the Department of Social Services for Baltimore County made “reasonable efforts” to finalize the children’s concurrent permanency plans was clearly erroneous, as the Department failed to “reasonably accommodate” her autism under the Americans with Disabilities Act, or ADA.

LAW: This court cannot find a Maryland appellate opinion in a CINA case that involves a claim against the Department under the ADA. However multiple states have recognized the general principle that their state and local social services departments are required under the ADA to make reasonable accommodations for parents with disabilities in rendering reunification efforts in child abuse and neglect cases.

Most jurisdictions that discuss the ADA’s application in child abuse and neglect cases also find that a department of social services’ obligation to make “reasonable accommodations” is consistent, if not synonymous, with the requirement to provide “reasonable efforts” under state law. All the same, consistent with an ADA claimant’s burden, states generally require parents who seek accommodations for their disabilities in child abuse and neglect cases to inform the department of their specific disability and identify what accommodations are necessary.

The court holds that the Department is generally required under the ADA to make reasonable accommodations for parents with disabilities in rendering reunification efforts in CINA cases, as long as the parents make such disabilities, as well as the accommodations they require, known to the Department. Parents of children who are declared CINA have an obligation to comply with their service agreements and court orders requiring them to sign release of information forms regarding necessary educational, medical, mental health, and substance abuse services and treatment.

In this case, the juvenile court was not clearly erroneous in finding that the Department made reasonable efforts toward mother’s reunification with the children. Although mother claimed that she was diagnosed with autism early in the CINA proceedings, she did not identify the extent of her disability or the accommodations she required, and generally failed to follow up with the health care service providers recommended by the Department. Despite the uncertainty regarding mother’s disability and her needs, the record establishes that the Department made reasonable efforts to assist mother in obtaining necessary services and scheduling visitation with the children.

Second, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in awarding custody and guardianship of the children to grandparents, granting supervised visitation to mother and closing the CINA cases. The record supports the juvenile court’s finding that mother failed to make sufficient progress toward reunification over the course of the CINA proceedings. In the meantime, grandparents—especially grandmother—took care of the children, addressed their medical and psychological needs and provided them with a stable home.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County affirmed.

Zoning

substantial evidence

BOTTOM LINE: Where substantial evidence supported a Zoning Board’s conclusion that the proposed “residential use” of a village center in Columbia would overwhelm the center’s other uses, it was affirmed.

CASE: In the Matter of HRVC Limited Partnership, No. 0543, Sept. Term, 2023 (filed July 1, 2025) (Judges Ripken, ALBRIGHT, Wright).

FACTS: The Howard County Council, sitting as the Howard County Zoning Board, denied a petition filed by a real estate developer (Kimco) to redevelop the Hickory Ridge Village Center, one of the village centers in Columbia, Maryland, because it was unconvinced that the proposed “residential use” would not “overwhelm” the village center’s other “uses.” The circuit court affirmed the Zoning Board’s decision denying Kimco’s petition. Kimco challenges that decision, along with the Zoning Board’s decision not to disqualify one of its members for bias.

LAW: Kimco argues that the Zoning Board used the wrong criteria to evaluate Kimco’s petition. Kimco claims that the Zoning Board focused only on the physical attributes of Kimco’s proposed residential building, particularly its square footage and height, rather than on the “uses” of the building. An evaluation of a building’s “uses,” in Kimco’s view, requires consideration of its land area, the intensity of use and purpose. According to Kimco, these are the only relevant criteria for comparing “uses” because they appear in the Howard County Zoning Regulations, or HCZR’s, definition of “accessory use.”

Kimco’s “accessory use” argument is not preserved because it was not raised before, or decided by, the Zoning Board. And even if the argument had been preserved, the court disagrees that the analysis of whether a residential use overwhelms other uses is somehow limited by the HCZR’s definition of “accessory use.”

Turning to the merits, the court is convinced that the Zoning Board’s conclusion that Kimco’s petition did not satisfy the requirement that residential uses “support and enhance, but not overwhelm, other uses in the village center” is supported by substantial evidence. The apartment building would be the tallest structure in the Hickory Ridge Village Center, would “alter the view of the village center from adjacent roads” and “block sight lines to the retail uses,” would occupy twice the footprint of the new retail, would have inappropriate setbacks from surrounding roads and would exceed the total square footage of other uses in the Hickory Ridge Village Center by nearly 150,000 square feet.

This evidence is more than “adequate” for a “reasonable mind” to reach the conclusion the Zoning Board did here. And the fact that the Zoning Board approved redevelopment petitions for other Columbia village centers, with residential buildings sharing some characteristics with the apartment building proposed for Hickory Ridge Village Center, is not a basis to conclude that the Zoning Board’s denial of this petition was arbitrary and capricious.

Kimco finally argues that the Zoning Board’s denial of Kimco’s motion to disqualify Ms. Jung on Nov. 13, 2019, was an abuse of discretion and tainted the entire proceedings. Kimco focuses first on Ms. Jung’s conduct that pre-dated the Zoning Board hearings, second on her conduct during the Zoning Board hearings and third on what Kimco contends are Ms. Jung’s ex parte communications. The court concludes that most of Kimco’s arguments are unpreserved. As for Kimco’s arguments that are preserved, this court sees no abuse of discretion in the Zoning Board’s decision not to disqualify Ms. Jung.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Howard County affirmed.