Appellate Court of Maryland: Juvenile court, sex offender registry, ’employer’ liability

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Civil Procedure; personal jurisdiction

BOTTOM LINE: Where five foreign entities did not have sufficient contacts with Maryland under the long-arm statute, the circuit court did not err in dismissing a lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction.

CASE: OHI Asset HUD Delta, LLC v. REIT Solutions II, LLC, No. 1720, Sept. Term, 2022 (filed Jan. 28, 2026) (Judges Wells, Nazarian, TANG).

FACTS: OHI Asset HUD Delta LLC, a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business in Maryland, filed a single-count complaint for declaratory relief in the circuit court against five foreign entities. The appellees moved to dismiss, arguing that their contacts with Maryland were insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. After a hearing, the court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint.

LAW: The appellant contends that Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc., or CJP, § 6-103(b)(1)  applies, conferring specific personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state appellees because they transacted business in this state. The court disagrees.

The appellees have no offices, do not solicit business and have no registered agents in Maryland. Although CSE was based in Maryland when the sale and leaseback took place, there is no evidence that the appellees engaged in any activities in Maryland to solicit, initiate or negotiate the sale and leaseback of the nursing facilities or the corresponding execution of the promissory notes. Additionally, there is no indication that the appellees signed these documents in Maryland or visited the state in connection with these agreements.

The appellant’s interest payments, the management of the master lease in Maryland and later communications from Maryland to the out-of-state appellees were not purposeful contacts in Maryland that demonstrate that the appellees intended to avail themselves of the benefits and protections of Maryland law. While courts have sometimes found that defendants transacted business in this state by paying or corresponding with a plaintiff located in Maryland, these cases typically also involved purposeful contacts with the state by the defendant, which are absent here.

The inclusion of the Maryland choice of law clause in the notes is not dispositive of the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the appellees. Instead, it “is one factor that a court may take into account in determining whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is justified, but it is no more than that.” In sum, this court is not persuaded that the appellees “purposefully directed [their] activities at residents of the forum” or that the appellant’s declaratory action “arise[s] out of or relate[s] to” activities directed at the state. Moreover, the appellees’ contacts with Maryland are so limited that exercising personal jurisdiction over them would violate the concept of fair play and substantial justice.

The appellant maintains that the forum selection clause in the subordination agreement confers jurisdiction over the appellees in Maryland. Although the appellees were not signatories to the subordination agreement, the appellant contends that the “closely related” doctrine supports its contention that the Maryland forum selection clause in that agreement binds the appellees. In the court below, appellant did not specifically frame its arguments using the closely related doctrine, as it does for the first time on appeal. In any event, the doctrine does not apply.

The dispute did not stem from the subordination agreement, which contains the Maryland forum selection clause, and the appellant does not seriously argue otherwise. The subordination agreement and the promissory notes differ in subject matter and create distinct obligations for different parties. The subordination agreement pertains to the sale and assignment of the appellees’ affiliates’ leasehold interests to Gulf Coast. The appellant’s claim for declaratory relief arises from the promissory notes. The appellant is not seeking a declaration of any rights or liabilities under the subordination agreement.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County affirmed.

Criminal; jury instruction

BOTTOM LINE: Where the trial court refused to instruct the jury on perfect and imperfect defense of others, the testimony supported the instruction and the failure was not harmless, the murder and related convictions were vacated.

CASE: Jefferson v. State, Case No. 509, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed Jan. 29, 2026) (Judges Wells, BERGER, Lazerow).

FACTS: Malik Dujuan Jefferson accompanied Jackson Alexander Garcia to purchase marijuana from Jose Osvaldo Genao Romero. After picking up Genao, who was wearing a Louis Vuitton crossbody bag, from his residence, Garcia drove Jefferson and Genao to a nearby neighborhood where an altercation ensued. As the altercation spilled out of the vehicle and on to the street, Jefferson stood by as Garcia and Genao tussled. At some point, Jefferson fired a single fatal shot that killed Genao. Jefferson was convicted of second-degree murder, use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence and robbery.

LAW: Jefferson contends that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on perfect and imperfect defense of others because his statements to the detectives, which were played for the jury, if believed, were sufficient to support the legal theory that he acted in Garcia’s defense.

There is no dispute that the requested defense of others instruction was a correct statement of law that was not covered elsewhere in the instructions provided to the jury. Therefore, the only issue is whether the instruction was, in fact, applicable to the facts adduced at trial. It was.

There was sufficient evidence which, if believed, could have led the jury to find that Jefferson, either reasonably or unreasonably, believed that Garcia was in immediate or imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm. Second, the jury could have concluded that Jefferson used either a reasonable or unreasonable level of force against Genao. Third, and finally, the jury heard Jefferson’s statement to the detectives that he only took Genao’s Louis Vuitton crossbody bag because he thought it belonged to Garcia and that he never intended to rob Genao.

A defendant requesting either a perfect or imperfect defense of others instruction must also adduce evidence that the person on whose behalf they intervened was an innocent party; that is that the person defended was “not the initial deadly aggressor or the person who escalated the [confrontation] to the deadly level.” Jefferson contends that whether Garcia was the initial aggressor and whether Genao escalated the confrontation to the deadly force level were questions for the jury, and that the trial court erred in resolving those factual issues in the state’s favor.

The state agrees with Jefferson that it was the jury’s role to resolve the factual discrepancies. This court agrees with Jefferson and the state and concludes that the trial court erroneously usurped the jury’s role as factfinder.

The state nevertheless argues that the errors were harmless. The court disagrees. The jury could have concluded that the robbery occurred after Genao was shot. In such a case, the trial court’s error may well have affected the verdict because the jury could have found that defense of others was applicable. Indeed, the jury’s notes during deliberation underscore this conclusion.

Jefferson next contends that, because he was not advised that he had been charged with first-degree murder, his Miranda waiver was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary.  Jefferson reasons that, without knowing the charges lodged against him, his purported waiver was made without full knowledge of the nature of his circumstances and the consequences of his waiver. Further, Jefferson asserts that the officers violated Maryland Rule 4-212(e) by failing to inform him of the charges against him, and that such a violation should be a weighty factor in the voluntariness analysis. The court disagrees.

The mere fact that Jefferson was unaware of the pending first-degree murder charges is not dispositive of whether Jefferson’s Miranda waiver was valid. The record demonstrates that Jefferson was aware of the nature of his Miranda rights and waived them knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily with an understanding of the consequences of waiving those rights, namely that his incriminating statements could be used against him. The trial court did not err in admitting Jefferson’s custodial statements to the detectives.

Finally Jefferson takes issue with the firearm examiner’s testimony that “[a]ll firearms possess individual markings that make it unique to that firearm” and that such markings on the ballistics evidence were consistent with such markings on the test fired cartridge cases and bullets. But any such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury in the present case was presented with Jefferson’s admission that he shot Geano and subsequently gave the gun to Garcia.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County vacated.

Criminal; transfer to juvenile court

BOTTOM LINE: Where the circuit court denied a 16-year-old defendant’s motion to transfer his first-degree murder case to the juvenile court, and the record showed it was exceptionally thorough when it considered whether transfer was in the interest of the child or society as required by statute, its decision was affirmed.

CASE: Carini v. State, Case No. 543, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed Jan. 29, 2026) (Judges Berger, Beachley, Sharer).

FACTS: This case arises from the denial of a motion to transfer to juvenile court filed by Jospeh Michael Carini. Carini was 16 years old at the time he committed the offense. Following the denial of the motion, Carini entered a conditional guilty plea in the circuit court and was convicted of attempted first degree murder. The conditional guilty plea preserved Carini’s right to appeal the denial of his transfer motion.

LAW: The juvenile court does not have jurisdiction over a child who is at least 16 years old and is alleged to have committed specified crimes, including first-degree assault and certain firearms offenses. In these cases, “original jurisdiction over the juvenile lies in the adult court.” When such charges have been brought against a juvenile in the circuit court, the juvenile court may obtain jurisdiction pursuant to a “reverse waiver” if the circuit court grants a motion in accordance with § 4-202 of the Criminal Procedure Article, or CP.

To determine whether transfer to the juvenile court is in the interest of the child or society as required by CP § 4-202(b)(3), the circuit court must consider: (1) the age of the child; (2)            the mental and physical condition of the child; (3) the amenability of the child to treatment in an institution, facility, or program available to delinquent children; (4) the nature of the alleged crime and (5) the public safety. Carini asserts that the court did not properly address the five factors, as it was “‘unduly influenced’ by the nature of the alleged offenses and concerns for public safety.”

Carini further alleges that the court “fail[ed] to meaningfully consider [Carini’s] ‘amenability . . . to treatment’ in a juvenile facility,” and simply gave “lip service” to the amenability factor. The state argues that the court gave significant and appropriate consideration to each of the five factors, and concluded, in aggregate, that Carini did not meet his burden of persuasion to warrant transfer to the juvenile court. The court agrees with the state.

The court heard testimony from several expert and lay witnesses for the defense, a witness for the state, and reviewed submitted exhibits. The court then went on to address each of the five factors, while specifically noting that “the Court cannot consider each of the five factors under the statute in isolation.” After its lengthy discussion of the five factors, the court made its final determination.

The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Carini’s reverse waiver motion. The circuit court did exactly what was required of it by this court’s case law when it denied Carini’s motion to transfer to juvenile court. The court’s discussion of each of the factors, and specifically Carini’s amenability to treatment, was exceptionally thorough.

The court clearly did not merely give “lip service” to the amenability factor. There is no support in the record for Carini’s contention that the court overemphasized the nature of the crime or the public safety. All of the factors must be considered in context, and with an eye towards amenability to treatment in the juvenile system. That is precisely what the circuit court did in this instance. The court, therefore, in no way abused its discretion in denying Carini’s motion to transfer to the juvenile court.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County affirmed.

Criminal; Md. Rule 5-404(b)

BOTTOM LINE: Where a man charged with multiple crimes arising out of the robbery of a postal service worker and the theft of her “arrow key” argued the trial court erred by admitting evidence of two more USPS arrow keys found in a vehicle he abandoned, this argument was rejected.

CASE: Jordan v. State, No. 2437, Sept. Term, 2023 (filed Jan. 30, 2026) (Judges Riken, Kehoe, HARRELL).

FACTS: On June 21, 2022, when Lakesha Fowlkes, a United States Postal Service, or USPS, motor carrier was robbed at gunpoint. During the ensuing weeks, a unique USPS “arrow key” stolen from her was used in a series of mailbox thefts. A jury convicted Teshan Dion Jordan of robbery with a dangerous weapon, use of a firearm in a crime of violence, theft and related crimes committed during the Fowlkes robbery and mailbox theft scheme.

LAW: Jordan contends that the trial court erred in admitting two other stolen USPS arrow keys found in another vehicle abandoned by Jordan because that information “was not intrinsic to the charged crimes” and did not fall within one of the specified exemptions to Md. Rule 5-404(b).

The state first argues that Jordan did not preserve his appellate challenge to the admission of the other keys evidence. The court disagrees. Jordan challenged consistently the admissibility of the other keys evidence under Rule 5-404(b) on the ground that jurors might infer that he committed other crimes or bad acts to acquire those two stolen arrow keys.

Turning to the merits, the court agrees with Jordan that the other keys evidence does not fit neatly into the intrinsic evidence theory applied in Odum v. State, 412 Md. 593 (2010), because it was not “so connected” to the Fowlkes robbery and mailbox thefts that those charged crimes “form a single transaction” that “cannot be fully shown or explained without evidence of” these other keys.

However, the state, acknowledging a need to adduce circumstantial evidence to prove Jordan’s identity as Nichols’s accomplice in the Fowlkes robbery and Mattocks’s accomplice in the mailbox thefts, proffered the evidence that police found two other unique arrow keys that had been stolen inside the black GLC that Jordan abandoned in the grocery store parking lot when he and Mattocks fled from police.

This court concludes that evidence of the other keys was probative of identity because the presence of two stolen arrow keys in the black GLC abandoned by Jordan made it more likely that Jordan, not Mattocks, was the common denominator between the robbery and the theft scheme, with a financial motive to obtain Fowlkes’s arrow key to use in his mailbox theft scheme.

The other keys evidence was also probative of Jordan’s identity by establishing his modus operandi for the mailbox theft scheme. This court agrees with the trial court that using an arrow key stolen from a USPS mail carrier to steal repeatedly from mailboxes along the postal route linked to that key constitutes a sufficiently distinctive modus operandi to constitute earmarked or signature crimes.

The second step in the Rule 5-404(b) analysis is to determine whether the state established Jordan’s involvement in the prior bad acts by clear and convincing evidence. The court finds that it did. Finally, the court finds, at the third step of the Rule 5-404(b) analysis, that the other keys evidence was more probative and necessary than unfairly prejudicial.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Howard County affirmed.

Criminal; sex offender registry 

BOTTOM LINE: Where a man convicted of failing to register as a sex offender claimed he “just forgot, literally,” this argument was insufficient to avoid conviction. The record reflects that he had knowledge of his legal duty to register and had knowledge that if he did not register by his next registration date on August 1, he would be violating the statute.

CASE: Hammond v. State, No. 0615, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed Jan. 30, 2026) (Judges Nazarian, KEHOE, Raker).

FACTS: Following a bench trial, Andre Jerome Hammond was convicted of knowingly failing to register as a sex offender in violation of § 11-721 of the Criminal Procedure, or CP, Article.

Around the time of Mr. Hammond’s re-registration date, he was grieving the loss of many family members and suffering from a worsening depression. On the date of his registration deadline, Mr. Hammond attended the funeral of a family member with whom he had a very close relationship, and he “just forgot, literally.” At trial and now on appeal, the parties dispute whether a defendant who forgets to timely register due to extenuating circumstances can be convicted under CP § 11-721.

LAW: Mr. Hammond argues that the trial court erred in convicting him of knowingly failing to register under the Maryland Sex Offender Registration Act, or MSORA, after finding as a fact that extenuating circumstances caused him to forget to register. The state argues that Mr. Hammond did not preserve this issue for appellate review. The court disagrees.

Defense counsel explicitly made the legal argument in a motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the state had “proven that this is a violation, he did not register by the expiration date, but [the state] did not prove that this is a knowing violation.” As such, the trial court was put on notice of the issue and had ample opportunity to address it: the issue is preserved.

Turning to the merits, the parties disagree over the definition of the word “knowingly” in CP § 11-721(a). Whether this court relies on the Criminal Law Article definition (awareness of circumstance, i.e., obligation to timely register), the Model Penal Code definition (practical certainty of what constitutes a violation), the Supreme Court definition (proof of knowledge of facts of the offense) or Black’s Law Dictionary definition (consciousness or awareness), the outcome is the same.

The record reflects that Mr. Hammond had knowledge of his legal duty to register (awareness of the law) and had knowledge that if he did not register by his next registration date on August 1st, he would be violating the statute (awareness of the relevant facts and circumstances). This comports with other jurisdictions’ recognition that the bar for knowledge is low and awareness suffices. To put it plainly, an individual does not necessarily need to know that they violated CP § 11-721, just that they were supposed to register (aware of your duty) and did not.

Given the lack of definition within CP § 11-701 et seq., Mr. Hammond argues that the statute is ambiguous, and so the rule of lenity should apply. The court disagrees. There is insufficient ambiguity in MSORA rising to the level of grievousness mandating application of the rule of lenity as requested by Mr. Hammond.

Mr. Hammond has a history of receiving notice at several prior registration appointments, demonstrating Mr. Hammond’s knowledge, or at the very least, proof of the probability of such knowledge. Furthermore, evidence was admitted at trial that Mr. Hammond had been previously convicted for knowingly failing to register in 2016. Mr. Hammond’s conviction provides notice, further supporting the notion that Mr. Hammond’s failure was knowing.

This court disagrees with Mr. Hammond’s contention that mens rea can be negated by a factual finding that the defendant simply forgot. It agrees with courts in other jurisdictions which have held that when a defendant “forgets,” they still have the requisite mens rea to establish a failure to register. Allowing mens rea to be negated by a temporary lapse in memory will have far-reaching consequences, hindering prosecution of sex offenders who recidivate. Even including the limiting principle—that only involuntary conditions can negate mens rea—presents difficult line-drawing problems this court is not prepared to address at this juncture.

While the court acknowledges the archival legislative history of this statue is scant, certainly, the legislature did not intend to open the floodgates and excuse all sex offenders struggling with depression from their obligation to timely register. Nor could the legislature have intended to excuse anyone who merely says, “oops, I forgot”—no matter how disingenuous. However, the court agrees with the state that a trial court is permitted to consider a defendant’s forgetfulness as mitigation at sentencing, as the trial court did here.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Charles County affirmed.

Domestic Relations; exceptions to magistrate’s recommendation  

BOTTOM LINE: Where the circuit court overruled a father’s exceptions to a magistrate’s recommendation that the mother be awarded sole legal and primary physical custody of the parties’ minor child and recommended father pay child support, it did not abuse its discretion.

CASE: Okafor v. Ojih, No. 1131, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed Jan. 30, 2026) (Judges WELLS, Leahy, Harrell).

FACTS: Elvis Okafor appeals from a circuit court decision which overruled father’s exceptions to a magistrate’s recommendation that Rosemary Ojih be awarded sole legal and primary physical custody of the parties’ minor child and recommended father pay child support. The court ratified the recommendations and issued an order of court.

LAW: Father requested use of an electronic copy of the magistrate’s proceedings, rather than a transcript. Under Rule 9-208(g), when asking the court to accept an electronic recording of the magistrate’s hearing instead of a transcript, father was required to file (1) an affidavit of indigency and (2) a motion asking the court to accept an electronic recording of the hearing as the transcript.

The docket entries show father’s completed affidavit of indigency (with an estimated costs of the transcript), a motion to accept the electronic recording instead of a transcript and a blank order for a judge to either direct the circuit court’s Office of Digital Recording to prepare the electronic copy of the proceedings before the magistrate or direct father to obtain and pay for a transcript of any relevant testimony within 10 days.

The circuit court stated, however, that father did not comply with 9-208(g) as he had not completed “a transcript request form.” Rule 9-208(g) does not, however, require the requesting party to complete a “transcript request form.”

If the circuit court was referring to the blank form that father filed with his motion to accept an electronic copy of the hearing, then that form is designed for a judge to rule on whether the court was going to allow an electronic recording of the magistrate’s hearing in lieu of a written transcript. Father should not have filled out this form.

If the court was referring to another form, this court does not see where “a completed transcript order form” is required under the Rules when a party asserts they cannot pay for a written transcript of a magistrate’s hearing. Under Rule 9-208(g)(4), if the court denies the movant’s request to use the electronic recording, then the movant has 10 days to request, obtain and pay for as much of the transcript testimony as is necessary to address the exceptions, otherwise the court may dismiss the exceptions. This court, however, does not do not read this Rule as mandating the moving party to complete “a transcript request form,” as the court stated.

As a result of the foregoing, at the exceptions hearing in this case, the court had neither an electronic copy of the hearing nor a transcript of what transpired before the magistrate. It is difficult to say whether this was father’s fault or not. To the court’s credit, however, rather than dismissing the exceptions, the court allowed father to state the basis of his exceptions.

At that time, as he does in this appeal, father disagreed with the magistrate’s factual findings and assessments of credibility. The circuit court had before it the magistrate’s detailed report and deferred to her fact-finding. This is entirely proper. After this court’s review of the record, it cannot say the magistrate’s factual finding and assessments of the witnesses’ credibility were clearly erroneous.

In its written findings and order on the exceptions, the circuit court, as it must, made an independent assessment of the evidence in light of father’s exceptions. The court then submitted its own findings in an order. Considering father’s allegations of error and the court’s findings, this court sees no abuse of discretion in the court overruling father’s exceptions.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County affirmed.

Employment; “employer” liability

BOTTOM LINE: Where the circuit court granted judgment in favor of one of the owners of a construction company on the plaintiffs’ unpaid overtime claims, it erred. There was legally sufficient evidence upon which the jury could have concluded that she was an “employer” under the relevant law.

CASE: Morales v. Bryant Concrete Construction, Inc., Nos. 488 and 549, Sept. Terms, 2023 and 2024 (filed Jan. 28, 2026) (Judges Arthur, TANG, Harrell).

FACTS: Employees, who were formerly employed by Bryant Concrete Construction Inc., filed a complaint against the company and its owners (Kyrone Bryant and Subrena Bryant). They asserted claims for unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act, or FLSA, Maryland Wage and Hour Law, or MWHL and the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law, or MWPCL.

During the jury trial, the court granted judgment in Subrena’s favor. The jury then returned a verdict in the employees’ favor against the company, awarding them compensation for unpaid overtime. However, the jury declined to award the employees enhanced damages under the MWPCL. Following this, the employees asked the court to award them liquidated damages under the FLSA and MWHL, but the court denied this request.

LAW: The employees argue that the circuit court erred by granting judgment in favor of Subrena. They contend that Subrena held “employer” status under the wage laws.

To determine whether an individual qualifies as an employer, both Maryland and federal courts apply the “economic reality test,” which examines “four factors to determine an individual’s level of ‘control’ over an employee.” The factors are “whether the alleged employer (1) had the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment, and (4) maintained employment records.”

The court erred in granting judgment in favor of Subrena on the basis that there was no evidence upon which a jury could find that she was an “employer.” The evidence established that Subrena was a 51% owner and vice president of the company. While ownership alone is not enough to classify an individual as an “employer,” there was evidence indicating that Subrena’s involvement extended beyond merely being the majority owner.

She testified that she “r[an] the office” while Kyrone “r[an] the field.” She stated that she had the authority to hire and fire employees, set their pay rates and establish conditions of employment. She participated in the hiring process by setting up payroll for new employees and managed payroll for the company. Furthermore, she was responsible for entering the employees’ hours daily and distributing paychecks. She also maintained the employees’ employment records, including personnel and payroll records. Based on all this, there was legally sufficient evidence to generate a jury question that some factors of the economic reality test were met, upon which the jury could have concluded that Subrena was an employer based on the totality of the circumstances.

In concluding that there was no evidence to support the factors of the economic reality test, the court emphasized that Subrena did not actually exercise the power to hire and fire employees, she did not supervise and control work schedules or conditions of employment and she did not determine the rate and method of payment. Although Subrena did not exercise these powers, this does not preclude a finding that she was an employer. Indeed, “[t]he first factor focuses on who has the capacity to hire or fire someone.”

The court’s error affected the employees’ right to have a jury decide the case, and it undermined the outcome of the proceeding by precluding the jury from considering Subrena’s personal liability. Given the context and magnitude of the error, the court’s grant of judgment in Subrena’s favor probably affected the outcome of the case and was not harmless. As a result, the judgment entered on the verdict is vacated. Because the court’s decision on liquidated damages was based on the evidence presented at trial, and the award of attorney’s fees was partially dependent on the trial outcomes, those judgments are also vacated.

The employees also argue the court erred in denying their post-trial request for liquidated damages under the FLSA and MWHL. They first argue appellees were required to plead the “good faith” defense as an affirmative defense in their answer. The court disagrees. Appellees were permitted, but were not required, to plead the affirmative defense of good faith separately. Their failure to do so does not constitute waiver of the defense.

Judgments of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County vacated.

Municipal; mandatory pension participation

BOTTOM LINE: Where Harford County requires all county employees to participate in a retirement system unless they are “an official, elected or appointed for a fixed term,” a County Attorney did not fall within this exception where his term length, start date and end date are all variable.

CASE: In the Matter of Jefferson Blomquist, No. 1779, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed Jan. 29, 2026) (Judges ARTHUR, Beachley, Sharer)

FACTS: As a general rule, employees of Harford County must participate in the Employees’ Pension Retirement System.  Membership is, however, “optional” for an employee who is “an official, elected or appointed for a fixed term[.]”

The Harford County Attorney contends that he is “an official . . . appointed for a fixed term” and thus that he need not participate in the Employees’ Pension System, or EPS. The Maryland State Retirement Agency determined that he was not appointed for a fixed term. The circuit court affirmed the agency’s determination.

LAW: The parties agree that Blomquist is an official. The parties further agree that if Blomquist is not appointed for a fixed term, he must become a member of the EPS. Therefore, the issue is whether the agency correctly concluded that Blomquist is not appointed for a fixed term, within the meaning of that term in Md. Code § 23-204(a) of the State Personnel and Pensions Article.

A plain language reading of “fixed term” indicates that the County Attorney does not serve for a fixed term. The County Attorney’s term length, start date and end date are all variable, not fixed. First, under §  313 of the Harford County Charter, the County Executive has six months after an election in which to appoint the County Attorney: the County Executive need not appoint the County Attorney on any fixed date within that six-month period.

Second, the appointment of the County Attorney is subject to confirmation by the County Council. The Council may tacitly confirm the appointment by failing to act within 30 days of its submission by the County Executive. If, however, the Council rejects the appointment within 30 days of its submission, then the appointment is effectively nullified, and the County Attorney’s term comes to an end. Because the Charter envisions that the Council may reject the appointment on some indefinite date as much as seven months after the election, the end of the County Attorney’s term, like the beginning, is variable, not fixed.

Third, because the County Attorney is an at-will employee, the County Executive may remove him at any time for any reason (or at least for any reason that does not contravene a statutory limitation on the employer’s discretion or a clear mandate of public policy). It follows that the County Attorney does not have a fixed term, but one that varies as a function of the County Executive’s discretionary decision to allow the County Attorney to remain in the position.

Blomquist argues that the County Attorney’s term “mirrors that of the County Executive[,]” who unquestionably does serve for a fixed term. He is incorrect. The County Executive “serve[s] for a term beginning at noon on the first Monday in December next following election, and ending at noon on the first Monday in December in the fourth year thereafter.”

Although the current County Executive happened to appoint Blomquist on the first Monday in December following the election, the County Executive was not required to do so: he had six months from the date of the election (or about another five months) in which to make the appointment. In addition, as previously explained, the end date of Blomquist’s term was and is variable.

And, as Blomquist acknowledges, section 313 of the County Charter envisions that the County Attorney may remain in the post for up to six months after a new County Executive takes office—so the County Attorney’s potential period of service is not necessarily coterminous with that of the incumbent County Executive.

Blomquist argues that “[a]ll public officials, whether elected or appointed, may be removed from office before their fixed term expires.” He cites the Maryland Constitution, which dictates that elected officials are removed from office as a matter of law if they are convicted of certain crimes. Blomquist’s argument overlooks the fundamental distinction between an at-will employee and an official whose fixed term is defeasible only upon the occurrence of some extraordinary event, such as a criminal conviction.

Blomquist’s most compelling argument is that, because he is in his late sixties, and because he was appointed by an elected official who can serve for only eight years, he is virtually certain not to serve for 10 years and thus virtually certain never to vest in the ERS—yet, he must lend seven percent of his income to the EPS for the duration of his employment. This argument is best directed to the General Assembly.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Harford County affirmed.

Zoning; timeliness  

BOTTOM LINE: Where the circuit court held that parties objecting to a property redevelopment waited too long to file suit, because they did not object within 30 days from an October 2018 letter from the Director of Planning, it erred. The 2018 letter was not issued by the correct person and was thus not an appealable decision.

CASE: Chiusano v. Two Farms, Inc., No. 653, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed Jan. 28, 2026) (Judges Arthur, TANG, Harrell).

FACTS: Two Farms Inc. seeks to develop a property located at 1721 Reisterstown Road owned by Pikesville Hospitality Investors LLC. The developer proposes to demolish the existing hotel building and build a gas station, a Royal Farms convenience store and a full-service car wash. It applied for a limited exemption from certain review requirements in the Baltimore County Code, which would avoid the need to satisfy certain more onerous requirements of the development process, including the requirement to hold a public hearing.

Generally, locations of fuel service stations on individual sites are permitted only by special exception. However, the location of a fuel service station is permitted by right if it is integrated with and located in a Planned Drive-In Cluster. On Oct. 30, 2018, the Director of Planning, Andrea Van Arsdale, sent the developer a letter stating that “Staff has reviewed your request for confirmation as a Planned Drive-In Cluster, Type 2 as defined . . . per Bill 53-18 recently enacting the Type 2 Drive-In Cluster” and that it met the definitional criteria, subject to certain stated requirements.

On Feb. 17, 2021, appellants filed an appeal with the Baltimore County Board of Appeals, objecting to the approval of the development plan. The developer argued that any arguments regarding the designation of the proposed project as a Planned Drive-In Cluster was barred as a matter of law, because they should have been made within 30 days from the October 2018 letter. The Board agreed. The circuit court entered a judgment affirming the Board’s Opinion and Order.

LAW: The October 2018 letter was not appealable because the Director of Planning lacked the authority to determine that the proposed project satisfied the criteria of a “Drive-In Cluster, Planned” under Baltimore County Zoning Regulation, or BCZR, § 101.1. Responsibility for interpreting the BCZR lies with either the Director of the Department of Planning or, upon petition, the zoning commissioner. To the extent that the Director of Planning is involved with individual zoning decisions, that responsibility is set forth explicitly, rather than with general language like “[a]dministeringz the zoning code.”

If the County Council intended for the Department of Planning to determine whether an integral commercial development meets the criteria for Type 1 or Type 2, it could have easily explicitly stated so. To accept the Developer’s interpretation that the definition gives the Department of Planning or its director the authority to determine whether a proposed project meets Type 1 or Type 2 criteria would be inconsistent with the plain language of the BCZR and would undermine the distinct powers that the County Council gave the Director of the Department of Planning, the Director of Planning, and the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Accordingly, the letter was ineffective in determining that the proposed project met the Type 2 Planned Drive-In Cluster criteria under BCZR § 101.1. Therefore, the Director of Planning’s October 2018 letter was not an appealable decision. Even if the Director of Planning did have the authority to determine whether the Developer’s proposed project qualified for designation as a Planned Drive-In Cluster, moreover, the October 2018 letter was not a final appealable decision because at the point the letter was issued, more remained to be done before the development plan could be approved.

As the letter stated, the Design Review Panel still had to review the development plan. The letter also directed the developer to contact the Zoning Review office “to confirm whether the determination of a Planned Drive-In Cluster is within the spirit and intent of, or necessitates a change to, any existing zoning case rulings associated with the property.”

Finally, there was nothing in the record to suggest that the purported approval of the Planned Drive-In Cluster designation in the October 2018 letter was made known to the aggrieved parties. Without such notice, an aggrieved party would have no way of knowing when the appeal time started to run. If such determination in the letter were interpreted as an appealable event, then an agency could determine and approve such a designation without affording any notice whatsoever to the public. The result would vitiate an aggrieved party’s ability to challenge the decision through a timely appeal, as happened here.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County reversed.