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CSA overturns conviction in Charles Village murder (34795)

CSA overturns conviction in Charles Village murder (34795)

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A defendant who was convicted of murder after being removed from the courtroom for misconduct is entitled to a new trial, the Court of Special Appeals has held.

It will be the third trial for Mohammad Biglari, who was sentenced to life in prison in 1994 for the 1991 slaying of his Charles Village neighbor, Barbara Elizabeth Halsey. Because evidence was improperly admitted in the 1994 proceedings, a second trial was held in Baltimore City Circuit Court in 2002 — with similar results.

On Friday, however, the intermediate appellate court vacated Biglari’s second conviction, holding that he should have been given the opportunity to return to the courtroom after being ejected by the judge in the second trial.

WHAT THE COURT HELD
Case: Biglari v. State, CSA No. 2271, Sept. Term 2002. Opinion by Murphy, C.J. Filed April 30, 2004.Issue: Is a defendant entitled to a new murder trial, where he was removed from the courtroom for disruptive conduct but was never given the chance to return?Holding: Yes; reversed and remanded. The defendant’s removal from the courtroom left him unrepresented during the jury instructions and closing arguments; he should have been advised that he would be permitted to return and deliver a closing argument if he promised to comply with applicable rules of evidence and criminal procedure. Counsel: Nancy S. Forster for appellant; Annabelle L. Lisic for appellee.RecordFax: #4-0430-00 (20 pages)

Because Biglari was representing himself, his removal “left the defense unrepresented during the instructions and closing argument phases of the trial,” Chief Judge Joseph F. Murphy wrote for the court. “[Biglari] should have been advised that he would be permitted to deliver a closing argument if he promised to comply with the applicable rules of evidence and criminal procedure.”

The court confirmed that a trial judge may remove a disruptive defendant from the courtroom to maintain decorum, according to Kathryn Grill Graeff, chief of the criminal appeals division in the attorney general’s office.

“The court held, however, that the defendant must be advised of the opportunity to return upon a promise to behave,” she said.

Counsel from the public defender’s office could not be reached for comment.

After firing his lawyer during the 2002 trial, Biglari began pontificating to the jury when directed by the court to call a witness. He was warned that he would be removed to another room, with a closed-circuit television to watch the case, if he continued to ramble.

Biglari did not heed the warning and was taken out of the courtroom for the rest of the proceedings. The jury convicted him of first-degree murder and a related handgun crime.

The appellate court noted that a defendant has the right to be present at every stage of a trial.

The Supreme Court has “‘stated that a trial judge confronted with a difficult defendant can (1) bind and gag the defendant and keep the defendant in the courtroom; (2) cite the defendant for contempt; or (3) ‘take him out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly,’” Murphy wrote, citing the 1970 case of Illinois v. Allen.

After delivering jury instructions, Murphy wrote, the circuit court should have advised Biglari of his right to take exceptions to the instructions and that his right to present a closing argument was contingent upon his promise to conduct himself properly. Further, it should have “informed [Biglari] that if he did promise to conduct himself properly, he could remain in the courtroom for the closing arguments,” Murphy wrote.

The appellate court rejected Biglari’s argument that the trial judge’s refusal to appoint an interpreter deprived him of state law and constitutional rights, since there was ample evidence that he “could understand and communicate in English, could understand the charges against him, and was capable of helping to present his defense,” Murphy wrote.

Biglari’s first language is Persian, although he has been in this country for more than 10 years.

The court also found that Biglari made an effective waiver of his right to counsel, and that there was no abuse of discretion in allowing the trial to continue after counsel had been discharged.

“[T]he court complied in all respects with the requirements of Rule 4-215, which protects the defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel,” Murphy wrote. “After finding that [Biglari] did not have a meritorious reason to discharge counsel, the circuit court read Rule 4-215(e) to appellant, and told appellant that the trial would proceed if counsel was terminated.”