Appellate Court of MD: Sixth Amendment, collateral estoppel, medical malpractice

Criminal; Sixth Amendment

BOTTOM LINE: Where a defendant charged with attempted murder tried to cross-examine the victim about his mental health, the trial court did not err in denying this line of questioning. He did not adequately proffer evidence showing these questions were relevant. And any probative value it might have had was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

CASE: Nensala v. State, No. 703, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed Feb. 2, 2026) (Judges Leahy, Zic, EYLER, D).

FACTS: M.B. was stabbed while at his place of work in Lanham. A former co-worker, Pascal S. Nensala, was indicted for attempted first-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder, first-degree assault and second-degree assault in the stabbing. A jury convicted him on all counts. On appeal, he primarily argues the circuit court committed reversible error by denying cross-examination of M.B. about his mental health history.

LAW: Whether the trial court erred or abused its discretion involves two sub-questions. First, did the defense adequately proffer evidence relevant to M.B.’s credibility? And second, if so, did the trial court abuse its discretion in deciding that the potential for unfair prejudice in the use of that evidence for cross-examination substantially outweighed its probative value for assessing M.B.’s credibility?

Regarding the first question, notwithstanding that the appellant and M.B. had known each other and worked at the same location for years, the appellant’s theory of defense was that M.B. must have hallucinated or been under a delusion that he was the stabber.
Therefore, defense counsel needed to proffer evidence capable of impeaching M.B.’s credibility by showing that M.B. had a mental health condition that could have caused him to hallucinate or suffer the delusion that the person who stabbed him was the appellant, when it was not.

Defense counsel’s proffer to the court lacked anything to connect M.B.’s bipolar disorder to an impairment of his ability to perceive reality at any time, let alone during the stabbing, or to accurately recall the central facts of the stabbing. Given the essential nature of bipolar disorder as a mood disorder, simply declaring that M.B. had been diagnosed with that disease could not suffice to show that he had hallucinated that the appellant had stabbed him or was deluded into thinking that.

No effort was made to obtain any such records of M.B. There was nothing in evidence or proffered to be added to the evidence to support M.B.’s ever having suffered a psychotic episode as part of his bipolar disorder. Indeed, when M.B. was asked whether he had heard voices in his head (a question that lacked foundation), he answered that he had not. The appellant’s proffer to support cross-examining M.B. about his diagnosis of bipolar disorder was legally insufficient to show that the disorder was relevant to his credibility. That reason alone warrants upholding the trial court’s ruling.

Even if the proffer that M.B. had bipolar disorder had been adequate, the trial court properly exercised its discretion to prohibit cross-examination on that topic because any probative value it might have had was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. In the absence of any evidence that M.B. had ever suffered from hallucinations or delusions, cross-examination about bipolar disorder so as to imply that that disease could or would have interfered with his ability to perceive who was stabbing him would unfairly prejudice his testimony in the eyes of the jurors.

The appellant next contends the evidence was legally insufficient to prove the elements of attempted first-degree murder or attempted second-degree murder. Specifically, he argues that the state failed to prove specific intent to kill M.B., a necessary element of both crimes, and deliberation and premeditation, necessary elements of attempted first-degree murder. The court disagrees.

The appellant finally contends the sentencing judge abused her discretion by punishing him for rejecting the state’s plea offer and instead exercising his right to a jury trial. He maintains that this court should recognize plain error based on the sentencing court’s comment that, before trial, the state had made a “generous offer” to him. He interprets this comment as showing that the sentencing court was punishing him for rejecting the plea offer and choosing to exercise his right to a jury trial. The court finds no merit in this argument.

At sentencing, the judge made no reference to the appellant’s decision to reject the plea offer and proceed with trial. The court’s sole reference to the “generous offer” made before trial came in response to defense counsel’s comments that the appellant seemed to have followed a confused thought process in deciding to reject the plea offer and that his primary motivation seemed to be a desire to avoid incarceration. There was no suggestion in anything the sentencing judge said that the appellant’s decision to proceed with trial instead of agreeing to a plea deal factored into her sentencing determination.
Appellant’s remaining arguments also lack merit.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County affirmed.

Insurance; collateral estoppel

BOTTOM LINE: Where a state administrative agency found an insurance carrier had no duty to defend an underlying suit, that decision was entitled to collateral estoppel in a subsequent action brought by the same policyholder against the same carrier for the same coverage dispute.

CASE: In the Matter of Justin Holder, No. 1627, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed Feb. 5, 2026) (Judges NAZARIAN, Albright, Kenney).

FACTS: After Erie Insurance Exchange’s and Erie Insurance Company denied any duty to defend Justin Holder in a lawsuit filed against him by his neighbors, he filed an administrative complaint with the Maryland Insurance Administration, or MIA. Following a contested hearing at which Mr. Holder and Erie testified, the MIA found that Erie didn’t owe Mr. Holder coverage or a defense for the Estes suit because the complaint solely alleged intentional injuries that were not covered by the policies.

Ten months later, Mr. Holder filed a second administrative complaint with the MIA. He alleged that Erie did not act in good faith in denying coverage. The MIA granted Erie’s motion for summary decision, reasoning that an insurer cannot be liable for denying coverage or a defense if it didn’t ultimately owe coverage or a defense, regardless of how the insurer came to that decision.

Mr. Holder then appealed this decision to the circuit court. Before the circuit court could hold a hearing on the petition, Mr. Holder filed an amended complaint that sought to add a host of civil claims under Md. Code § 3-1701 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, or CJ. Erie moved to strike the amended complaint on the ground that independent civil claims cannot be heard in a case for judicial review of an administrative action.

At an omnibus hearing, the circuit court addressed the petition for judicial review and affirmed the agency’s ruling. It also granted Erie’s motion and struck the amended complaint. The court memorialized its oral orders in writing and Mr. Holder noted a timely appeal.

LAW: Collateral estoppel requires this court to address three sub-questions: (1) when is an administrative hearing capable of creating collateral estoppel and did the first action meet the test; (2) what are the elements of collateral estoppel and did the contested hearing in the first action satisfy them and (3) if so, what effect does collateral estoppel have on Mr. Holder’s second action?

The answers: (1) yes, the contested hearing in Mr. Holder’s first action was capable of creating a collateral estoppel effect; (2) yes, the final agency decision in the first action estopped Mr. Holder’s claim that Erie owed him a duty to defend and (3) without a duty to defend, Erie cannot be liable for not acting in good faith, and the MIA entered a summary decision in Mr. Holder’s second action in favor of Erie correctly.

The court further concludes that an insured seeking to try a CJ § 3-1701 claim before a jury in circuit court cannot do so alongside a petition for judicial review of an agency hearing. The rules and factual record used for a judicial review case are different from those for a civil case. The circuit court in this case struck Mr. Holder’s amended complaint correctly because he needed to file his civil claim in a separate proceeding under the proper Rules.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Washington County affirmed.

Negligence; one satisfaction rule

BOTTOM LINE: Where a woman filed a medical malpractice suit for injuries allegedly suffered during a June 2017 emergency room visit, the trial court erred when it found those claims were barred by a release resolving a motor vehicle accident that occurred almost four years later. The motor vehicle release was temporally limited to injuries arising from the May 2021 accident; it could not have encompassed, and did not satisfy, claims for all injuries arising from the alleged malpractice in July 2017.

CASE: Oxley v. Frederick Memorial Hospital, No. 1335, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed Feb. 2, 2026) (Judges Reed, ZIC, Harrell).

FACTS: This appeal arises from the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Frederick Memorial Hospital, Paul Hess, CRNP and Michael R. DiNapoli, M.D., in a medical malpractice action brought by Diana and Dennis Oxley. The circuit court determined that the Oxleys’ claims, based on a July 19, 2017, emergency department visit, were barred by the “one satisfaction rule” based on Mrs. Oxley’s settlement of a negligence claim involving a motor vehicle accident on May 1, 2021.

LAW: Under the one satisfaction rule, once the plaintiff has obtained a full satisfaction, he or she is prevented from pursuing another who may be liable for the same damages.” Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Oxleys, the circuit court erred in applying the one satisfaction rule to the underlying medical malpractice action.

The alleged “satisfaction” here is the $100,000 payment that Mrs. Oxley accepted in the motor vehicle negligence case. Whether this payment constituted a “full” satisfaction of all injuries claimed by the Oxleys in the unresolved medical malpractice action is a more complicated inquiry. The Release’s language was expressly limited to injuries “in any way resulting from or related to the claims arising out of the [motor vehicle] accident that occurred on or about May 1, 2021[.]”

The alleged medical malpractice occurred on July 19, 2017—nearly four years before the motor vehicle accident. Given the Release’s temporal limitation, this court does not see how a plaintiff’s general settlement of claims “resulting from” or “arising out of” a 2021 accident makes that plaintiff whole for claims arising from a 2017 incident.

Based on this court’s review of the record, the circuit court did not consider whether the Release compensated for injuries arising before the May 1, 2021, motor vehicle accident. A complete application of the one satisfaction rule required the court to “study and compare” not just the medical records after the vehicle accident, but also those from July 19, 2017—which is the alleged malpractice date—through May 1, 2021.

To hold otherwise would create an absurd result: a plaintiff who settles a later-occurring accident claim would inadvertently release all prior tort claims, regardless of whether those claims involved different defendants, different incidents, different injuries or different time periods. Such a construction would effectively punish plaintiffs for settling subsequent, unrelated claims and would create a windfall for earlier tortfeasors whose alleged misconduct predated the settled claim.

As the Supreme Court of Maryland has recognized, and as appellees correctly note, the one satisfaction rule applies even when the satisfaction is fulfilled by “a paying party who has ‘no connection with the tort at all.’” But this broad principle must be read in context: it refers to situations where the paying party, though unconnected to the tort, is paying to satisfy claims arising from that particular tort. It does not mean that settling any claim releases all claims, regardless of temporal sequence or causal connection.

Here, the motor vehicle negligence Release was temporally limited to injuries arising from the May 1, 2021, accident; therefore, it could not have encompassed, and did not satisfy, claims for all injuries arising from the alleged malpractice in July 2017. Because the motor vehicle negligence Release did not represent a full satisfaction of the Oxleys’ medical negligence claims, the one satisfaction rule does not bar the medical negligence action from proceeding.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Frederick County reversed.