Appellate Court of MD: Second Amendment, reformation, tolling

Constitutional; Second Amendment

BOTTOM LINE: Where the trial court held that Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-133(d), which prohibits possession of a regulated firearm by those under 21 years of age, was unconstitutional, it erred.

CASE: State v. Fields, No. 784, Sept. Term, 2022 (filed July 2, 2026) (Judges GRAEFF, Tang, Beachley).

FACTS: Terrell Henry Fields was charged with multiple offenses, three of which related to a loaded .40 caliber handgun the police found in his  vehicle. At the time, Fields was 20 years old, and he did not possess, nor had he ever applied for, a permit to carry a handgun. He filed a motion to dismiss based on New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). The circuit court granted the motion and dismissed the charges against Fields.

LAW: Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety, or PS, § 5-133(d) prohibits possession of a regulated firearm by those under 21 years of age. Fields contends that PS § 5-133(d)(1) is unconstitutional. He asserts that “the text of the Second Amendment protects the right of individuals under 21 to bear arms,” and “[t]he Founding Era did not impose a relevantly similar burden on the Second Amendment rights of individuals under 21” as Maryland’s statute.

The first step in the analysis under Bruen is whether the plain text of the Second Amendment covers appellee’s conduct. The question here is whether appellee, who was 20 years old at the time of his arrest, was part of “the people” that the Second Amendment protects. Although other courts have addressed this issue, this court adopts the approach adopted by courts will “assume without deciding that [individuals under 21] are part of ‘the people’ and are therefore covered by the [Second] Amendment’s text.”

Once there is a showing that a defendant’s conduct is entitled to protection under the Second Amendment, the government bears the burden to show that the challenged regulation “is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Courts in other jurisdictions have reached differing conclusions. Based on this court’s review of this caselaw, it concludes that the burden that PS § 5-133 imposes on the Second Amendment right of 18-to-20-year-olds is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.

Appellee points to founding-era militia laws as support for his argument that “the historical record demonstrates that persons aged under 21 regularly possessed firearms.” The law requiring service in the militia, however, does not support a tradition of possession of guns by minors for a couple of reasons. “[A]lthough many colonies permitted or even required minors to own and possess firearms for purposes of militia service, nothing like a right for minors to own and possess firearms has existed at any time in this nation’s history.” Moreover, the disconnect between militia service and a right to bear arms is further shown by state laws enacted to address the problem related to the inability of minors to purchase firearms required for their militia service.

At bottom, PS § 5-133(a) addresses the same problems as historical regulations restricting access to firearms, i.e., it limits access to individuals under the age of 21 because they lack the judgment and reason required to safely and responsibly purchase and possess firearms. PS § 5-133(d) is also consistent with historical restrictions in “how” it burdens the right of individuals under 21 to bear and carry arms.

PS § 5-133(d) is similar to, and less restrictive in some ways than, the law at the Founding. Accordingly, PS § 5-133(d) is constitutional as applied to individuals who are 18 to 20 years of age, and the circuit court erred in dismissing the charges against appellee based on violations of that statute.

The state contends that the circuit court also erred in dismissing the two counts charging violations of CR § 4-203, which prohibits the transportation of a loaded handgun in a vehicle on public roads, subject to exceptions, which included possession with a permit. The state acknowledges, however, that in 2019, when appellee was arrested, an applicant had to show a “good and substantial reason,” or GSR, to wear, carry, or transport a handgun and that Bruen held this requirement unconstitutional.

It nevertheless asserts that appellee lacked standing to challenge CR § 4-203 because he did not offer any evidence that he applied for a permit or that doing so would have been futile. For purposes of this opinion, this court will assume, without deciding, that appellee has standing to challenge his conviction.

Despite this, the invalid GSR provision was severable, leaving in place a permitting scheme that made appellee’s conduct criminal. Appellee has not shown that CR § 4-203 was facially unconstitutional or unconstitutional as applied to appellee. The circuit court erred in dismissing the counts charging violations of CR § 4-203.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County reversed.

Contract; reformation

BOTTOM LINE: Where the trial court reformed the parties’ marital settlement agreement to correct a mistake that occurred during the drafting process, and which was accompanied by fraud or inequitable conduct by the unmistaken party, it did not err.

CASE: Brvenik v. Kavanagh, Nos. 1187 & 2058, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed July 1, 2026) (Judges Zic, TANG, Kenney).

FACTS: Jason Brvenik and Brooke Kavanagh, were divorced pursuant to an order of judgment of absolute divorce entered on July 20, 2023. The judgment incorporated, but did not merge, the parties’ martial settlement agreement, or MSA, executed on July 12, 2023. Each side was represented by counsel who negotiated the terms of the MSA.

On Dec. 29, 2023, Ms. Kavanagh requested that the court reopen the case and reform the MSA due to a clerical error in the language affecting the calculation of her equity in the lake house. Mr. Brvenik opposed the motion. Following a hearing, the court reformed subsection iii.B to “put the parties back in the position that they would have been in.”

LAW: Mr. Brvenik does not dispute that parol evidence is admissible where there is a claim of mistake. Instead, he contends that testimony and other evidence about the deletion of the phrase “reduced by” were settlement discussions, and the court admitted the evidence in violation of Maryland Rule 5-408. This court disagrees.

Ms. Kavanagh did not seek to admit the evidence to prove the validity or invalidity of a claim. Instead, she was offering the evidence “for another purpose.” Specifically, Ms. Kavanagh was offering it to show that the deletion of “reduced by” in subsection iii.B was a mistake. Thus the court did not err in admitting evidence of any settlement discussions to show mistake.

Mr. Brvenik next argues that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that his new attorney’s post-divorce research into mutual mistake demonstrated his knowledge of a clerical error in subsection iii.B before signing the MSA. This court again disagrees.

Weighing the evidence, including the entries in the invoice as part of the overall assessment, the court found that he knew the deletion of “reduced by” was a mistake before the parties executed the MSA.

Once evidence is admitted—as the fee invoice was here without objection—the fact finder is entitled to give it “whatever weight it deems appropriate in its prerogative.” Specifically, the court was entitled to consider evidence arising after the MSA’s execution to infer Mr. Brvenik’s knowledge or state of mind prior to signing.

Mr. Brvenik also argues that the circuit court erred in reforming the MSA based on a finding of mutual mistake; his knowledge of counsel’s mistake does not convert it into a mutual mistake. Under the circumstances here, however, the distinction between unilateral and mutual mistake is immaterial because reformation is justified by a unilateral mistake accompanied by fraud or inequitable conduct by the unmistaken party.

While it is true that Ms. Kavanagh’s attorney inadvertently deleted the words “reduced by” and acknowledged it was her mistake, the court found that Mr. Brvenik was aware of the deletion and did not disclose it before signing the MSA. This non-disclosure constitutes, at a minimum, inequitable conduct, which the court implied in its oral ruling and equated to a “mutual mistake.” Therefore, the court did not err in concluding that the circumstances justified the reformation of subsection iii.B “as fully as a mutual mistake.” Decisions by courts in other jurisdictions are in accord.

Alternatively, Mr. Brvenik claims the reformed language does not reflect his intended agreement, and that the court reformed the contract without knowing if he would have agreed to remove the five percent reduction clause. This court is not persuaded. The claim that Mr. Brvenik may never have intended to enter into the MSA as reformed is immaterial. This is because his “non-disclosure” of a known mistake was “equivalent to an assertion that the writing [was] as [Ms. Kavanagh] underst[ood] it to be”—i.e., an agreement that the phrase “reduced by” was included in the provision calculating her equity in the lake house.

Finally, Mr. Brvenik contends that the court did not explicitly “announce” that it was applying the clear and convincing evidence standard. To the extent he claims the court must state the applicable standard of proof on the record, he provides no legal authority to support this argument.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Howard County affirmed.

Tort; tolling

BOTTOM LINE: Where a individual suing the state under the Maryland Tort Claims Act was a minor at the time of the conduct giving rise to the claim, the statute’s three-year filing requirement for tort actions is subject to the tolling for minors otherwise imposed by Md. Code, Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article § 5-201.

CASE: Cunningham v. State, No. 0216, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed July 2, 2026) (Judges WELLS, Friedman, Hotten).

FACTS: Cameron Cunningham sued the State of Maryland, the Department of Juvenile Services, or DJS, and the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, or DPSCS, for an alleged lack of medical care he received while in custody as a juvenile. The circuit court dismissed his suit for untimeliness under the Maryland Tort Claims Act’s, or MTCA, requirement that an action be filed within three years after the claim arose, as codified in Maryland Code, State Government Article, or SG, § 12-106(b)(3).

LAW: Md. Code, Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, or CJ, § 5-201, provides that, for tort actions brought against a private defendant, the cause of action’s relevant statute of limitations is tolled during a plaintiff’s minority. Cunningham argues the tolling provision in CJ § 5-201 applies to the MTCA’s three-year filing requirement in SG § 12-106(b)(3) because Maryland law has historically recognized the importance of tolling statutes of limitations for minors as a way to protect their legal rights. This court agrees.

Based on multiple appellate decisions, this court concludes the MTCA’s three-year filing requirement for tort actions against the state is subject to the tolling for minors otherwise imposed by CJ § 5-201. This holding reconciles the court’s longstanding adherence to preserving juveniles’ right to sue via minority tolling with the Maryland Supreme Court’s conclusion in Higginbotham v. Public Service Commission, 412 Md. 112 (2009), that SG § 12-106(b)(3) is both a statute of limitations and a condition precedent to the waiver of sovereign immunity.

Under this construction, the three-year filing requirement for MTCA actions shall be tolled for minors until they reach the age of majority, then, if the three-year period subsequently lapses, the action will be barred because the state’s waiver of sovereign immunity has “vanished.” This decision reflects this court’s constraint to the Supreme Court’s dual characterization of SG § 12-106(b)(3) in Higginbotham, while balancing the competing interests of juvenile rights and the state’s sovereign immunity.

To properly be consistent with the general statute of limitations for civil actions under CJ § 5-101, the MTCA must also be subject to the tolling for minors that applies to the general statute of limitations under CJ § 5-101. Requiring a minor child to file an action under the MTCA within three years after the cause of action arises would lead to many a “child twice victimized” that the Maryland Supreme Court has cautioned against time and again.

Lastly, this outcome properly balances the state’s significant interest in being put on notice of potential suit because the state is protected by the one-year administrative claim requirement under SG § 12-106(b)(1), which remains in effect as a condition precedent. If anything, the state will sometimes have additional time to prepare its defense in the case of a minor child because of the tolling discussed herein. The outcome today should not prejudice the state’s ability to prepare its defense. When weighing the limited nature of the state’s waiver of sovereign immunity with the core right to sue, which is stripped from juveniles without minority tolling, the juvenile right to sue wins out.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City reversed.