Appellate Court of Maryland: Ineffective counsel; Interstate Agreement on Detainers

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Criminal; ineffective assistance of counsel

BOTTOM LINE: Where the postconviction court held the defendant’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by only objecting to a portion of a detective’s trial testimony, it erred. Because the parts of that testimony to which trial counsel didn’t object were admissible, he didn’t commit any “obvious error” by deciding not to object to them, and his decision not to object was reasonable “considering prevailing professional norms.”

CASE: State v. Prince, No. 1024, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed April 7, 2026) (Judges NAZARIAN, Kehoe, Raker).

FACTS: On Sept. 11, 2016, two men robbed a Howard County gas station at gunpoint. Using video footage from the gas station’s surveillance camera and fingerprint evidence recovered at the scene, police identified James Brown as a suspect in their investigation. Mr. Brown’s cell phone records led police to a second suspect: Lionel Lee Prince.

At Mr. Prince’s trial, the detective who reviewed Mr. Prince’s and Mr. Brown’s cell phone records testified, without being qualified as an expert, about the locations of the cell towers with which both men’s phones communicated at various times before and after the robbery. Mr. Prince’s trial counsel didn’t object to the entirety of the detective’s cell site data testimony but objected successfully when the detective attempted to interpret what that data indicated about the men’s proximity to one another before the robbery and their directions of travel after the robbery.

After a jury convicted Mr. Prince of several crimes in connection with the robbery, he filed a petition for postconviction relief on the ground that the entirety of the detective’s cell site data testimony was improper lay opinion testimony and that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by objecting only to parts of it. The postconviction court agreed and granted Mr. Prince a new trial.

LAW: To bring a successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), a criminal defendant must prove two things. First, they “must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.” Second, the defendant “must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense” such “that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.”

It is undisputed that Mr. Prince’s trial counsel didn’t object to the entirety of Detective Kim’s cell site data testimony but did object—successfully—when Detective Kim attempted to give his interpretation of the data. It is undisputed as well that at the postconviction hearing, Mr. Prince’s trial counsel agreed that “the connection of a cell tower and [Mr. Prince’s] phone at a particular time” was a subject that would “[p]erhaps” require expert testimony.

Counsel’s failure to object to opposing testimony can be unreasonable if it involves some obvious legal error. But because a failure to object to admissible testimony wouldn’t be erroneous at all, that failure to object wouldn’t be unreasonable and thus wouldn’t be ineffective assistance.

This court and the Supreme Court have held that cell site data testimony must be given by a qualified expert if the testimony involves some interpretation of the data that falls beyond the knowledge or experience of the average juror. By contrast, however, in Johnson v. State, 457 Md. 513 (2018), the Supreme Court held that testimony by an officer who “literally read[]” entries from a GPS report was admissible lay testimony that didn’t require a qualified expert.

Here, Detective Kim recited the locations of the cell towers that Mr. Prince’s and Mr. Brown’s cell phones operated from at various times before and after the robbery as they appeared in the call detail records. The T-Mobile call detail records  listed the address of each tower and the times at which Mr. Prince’s and Mr. Brown’s phones communicated with those towers “in plain language” that the jurors themselves could read and understand easily.

Detective Kim didn’t need to utilize any special training or knowledge to determine the cell tower locations. He didn’t need to use a computer program to plot the location data from Mr. Prince’s and Mr. Brown’s cell phone records on a map, or decipher a “‘string of data’” in order “to hone in on the pertinent entries.” And when he attempted to interpret what the call detail records told him about Mr. Prince’s and Mr. Brown’s proximity to one another before the robbery and their directions of travel after the robbery, trial counsel objected successfully and got those parts of the testimony stricken.

The postconviction court’s determination that the entirety of Detective Kim’s cell site data testimony was inadmissible was incorrect legally. Because the parts of that testimony to which trial counsel didn’t object were admissible, he didn’t commit any “obvious error” by deciding not to object to them, and his decision not to object was reasonable “considering prevailing professional norms.” So without needing to decide if the decision not to object was strategic, this court holds that Mr. Prince failed to meet his burden to prove that trial counsel’s performance was deficient, and thus failed to prove that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Howard County reversed.

Criminal; IAD

BOTTOM LINE: Where the state failed to bring the defendant to trial within 180 days from the date he demanded compliance with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, the charges were dismissed with prejudice. Although the state argued his counsel agreed to a date beyond the 180-day deadline, this alleged agreement did not occur in open court and there was no record of it.

CASE: Smith Jr. v. State, No. 1736, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed April 7, 2026) (Judges Reed, KEHOE, Eyler, J.).

FACTS: On Oct. 16, 2024, John William Smith Jr. filed a motion to dismiss his then pending criminal charges on the basis that the state had not complied with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, or IAD, when the state did not bring him to trial within 180 days of his request that they do so. The circuit court, without holding a hearing, signed an order summarily denying appellant’s motion to dismiss.

Appellant then entered a plea of not guilty on an agreed statement of facts to two counts of third-degree sexual offense. In doing so, he preserved the right to appeal the decision of the trial court to deny his motion to dismiss.

LAW: “Courts have routinely stressed that the IAD is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed in favor of the prisoner against whom the detainer is lodged.” It is further understood that because the state “controls the only ultimate guarantee of performance for the benefit of the prisoner,” “‘the burden of compliance with the procedural requirements of the IAD rests upon the party states and their agents.’”

The IAD contains “five distinct requirements for obtaining [] a continuance.” Those are (1) the court must have competent jurisdiction, (2) the grant of the continuance must be in open court, (3) the defendant and/or his attorney must be present, (4) the movant must demonstrate good cause in open court and (5) the length of the continuance must be reasonable or necessary. As noted, the state carries the burden for each of those five requirements.

Here, the state failed to shoulder its burden under the IAD when it chose to permit an in-chambers scheduling conference rather than conduct that proceeding on the record in open court. While an informal chambers conference may be acceptable for routine trial calendaring, in this case the specific statutory requirement provides that trial shall be scheduled within 180 days after the prisoner is delivered to the prosecutor’s jurisdiction unless “provided that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or the prisoner’s counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.”

In this case, the trial judge’s written order stated there was good cause, but there is no record of what that good cause was. There was no proceeding to set forth the basis for good cause in open court.

This court is completely unpersuaded by the state’s post-hoc and ad-hoc effort on appeal to re-create the record of the chambers scheduling conference by referencing what it terms “an uncontradicted account of what occurred [during] the schedule[ing] hearing” sourced from its opposition to appellant’s motion to dismiss. As a result, the court is likewise unpersuaded that appellant’s supposed waiver of his IAD rights obviated the need to find good cause during proceedings conducted in open court.

State v. Meadows, 261 Md. App. 464 (2024), makes clear that it is incumbent on the state to make sure that there is adherence to the statute. To that end, if there had been an in-chambers discussion as to why a trial date within the 180-day window was unworkable, it was the responsibility of the state to request to go on record to set forth that basis. This court has no record as to why the court found cause to go beyond the 180-day window. It was incumbent on the state to make sure that there was a record. Defense counsel had no obligation to save the other parties from themselves.

Because the state failed to comply with the IAD’s procedural requirements, its subsequent failure to bring appellant to trial on or by Oct. 15, 2024, violated the express terms of the IAD and dismissal of the charges against him with prejudice is mandated under CS § 8-407(c). Accordingly, this court must reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand the case to it with instructions to dismiss the charges against appellant in this case with prejudice.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Washington County reversed.