Maryland Supreme Court: ‘Kingpin’ statute; freedom of information; farm odors

Criminal; “kingpin” statute

BOTTOM LINE: Where a man was convicted of promoting a criminal organization, because he stood by while another man spray painted a gang message on a wall, his conviction was vacated. There was no indication he ever occupied any leadership role in the gang or that he directed, planned or otherwise exercised discretion in connection with the offense.

CASE: Williams v. State, No. 44, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed July 30. 2025) (Justices Fader, Booth, BIRAN, Eaves, Killough) (Justices GOULD, Getty dissent).

FACTS: Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law, or CR, § 9-805(a) currently makes it a felony to “organize, supervise, promote, sponsor, finance, or manage a criminal organization.” A “criminal organization” is defined as an enterprise whose members, among other things, have as one of their primary objectives or activities the commission of certain crimes.

In May 2022, the state charged Jamal Antoine Williams under CR § 9- 805, alleging that he “promote[d] a criminal organization[.]” The criminal organization Mr. Williams was alleged to have promoted was the Rollin 30s Crips, which is a set of the transnational gang known as the Crips. Mr. Williams’s alleged act of promotion was standing watch while a leader of the gang spray-painted the message “Roll Three N 30s Crip” on a wall at Veteran’s Plaza in Silver Spring, Maryland.

After Mr. Williams waived a jury trial and the parties stipulated to the relevant facts, a circuit court  judge found Mr. Williams guilty of promoting a criminal organization, in violation of CR § 9-805. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed.

LAW: The court holds that, to obtain a conviction under CR § 9-805, the state must prove the defendant had knowledge that the organization the defendant organized, supervised, promoted, sponsored, financed, or managed was, in fact, a “criminal organization” within the meaning of the statute.

It further holds that the General Assembly intended CR § 9-805 to function effectively as a “kingpin” statute. That is, it is designed to reach acts committed by those who exercise a leadership role within a criminal organization or who – if they are not members of the organization – exercise discretion consistent with leadership with respect to the prohibited act.

Here, the state was required to prove, among other things, that: (1) Mr. Williams knew the Rollin 30s Crips was a “criminal organization” as that term is defined in CR § 9-801(c) and (2) Mr. Williams exercised a leadership role in the Rollin 30s Crips or – if he was not a member of the gang at the time of the offense – that he exercised discretionary authority with respect to the act of promotion.

This court need not examine whether the stipulated facts were sufficient to prove that Mr. Williams knew the Rollin 30s Crips was a “criminal organization.” Regardless of his knowledge, it is clear that the state did not introduce evidence that Mr. Williams exercised a leadership role within the Rollin 30s Crips or, if he was no longer a member of the gang at the time of the offense, that he exercised discretionary authority with respect to the defacement of the wall at Veteran’s Plaza.

The extent of the state’s evidence was that Mr. Williams stood watch while Mr. Dowdy – the “leader of their individual set” of the Crips – spray-painted the gang-related message on the wall, after which Mr. Williams posed for photographs. There is no indication that Mr. Williams ever occupied any leadership role in the Rollin 30s Crips. Nor is there any evidence that Mr. Williams directed, planned or otherwise exercised discretion in connection with the offense. Accordingly, the circuit court erred in finding Mr. Williams guilty of violating CR § 9-805.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland reversed.

DISSENT: The majority’s interpretation of CR § 9-805 departs from established interpretive principles in two critical respects. First, it imposes a knowledge requirement found nowhere in the statutory text, contradicting the General Assembly’s deliberate choice to include such requirements in neighboring provisions while omitting them here. Second, it eviscerates the plain meaning of the word “promote” through a limited construction that finds no basis in the statutory language, context or legislative purpose. For these reasons, I would affirm the conviction.

Criminal; reckless endangerment

BOTTOM LINE: Where a police officer was convicted of reckless endangerment because he failed to prevent a man from assaulting another man, his conviction was vacated. The state failed to identify any authority establishing a common law duty to act to protect a member of the public from a spontaneous, unforeseeable assault by a third person committed in the officer’s presence, and police department policies are similarly unavailing.

CASE: Nguyen v. State, No. 13, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed July 30, 2025) (Justices Fader, BOOTH, Biran, Gould, Eaves, Killough) (Justice WATTS dissents).

FACTS: This appeal arises from the State’s prosecution of a police officer for the crime of reckless endangerment arising from an unprovoked and spontaneous assault on a member of the public by a third person that occurred in the police officer’s presence.

When Christopher Nguyen arrived on the scene, Wayne Brown was lying on the ground semi-conscious and covered in blood. Kenneth Somers was sitting in his truck talking on his cell phone. When questioned by Nguyen, Somers acknowledged that he assaulted Brown for allegedly stealing his car. In the minutes during which Nguyen was attempting to conduct his investigation, Somers walked up to Brown and kicked him in the head. The State charged Nguyen with the crime of reckless endangerment for failing to prevent Somers’s spontaneous kick.

The trial judge determined that Nguyen had a duty to protect Brown. The court found Nguyen guilty of reckless endangerment, concluding that a reasonable officer would not have allowed Somers to approach Brown, reasoning in part that “[a]ll the [police officer] witnesses” testified that “they would not have allowed it.” The Appellate Court affirmed in an unreported opinion.

LAW: The state asserts that Nguyen had a general common law duty, by virtue of his status as a police officer, to protect Brown as a member of the public. The state asserts that it is an “undisputed principle of the common law” that police officers have a common law duty to protect the public, the breach of which is “punishable by indictment.”

The state is correct that both the United States Supreme Court and this court have previously recognized that police officers owe certain duties to the public, as opposed to any particular individuals, the breach of which can be punished by criminal prosecution. But the common law does not impose a duty on a police officer to act in every circumstance.

The state here had to prove that Nguyen owed a duty to protect Brown from Somers’s spontaneous and unprovoked kick. The common law established legal duties of law enforcement officers to act only in certain circumstances, such as during an affray or a riot, and statutes and regulations establish additional duties to act in other circumstances, such as to intervene to prevent another officer’s use of excessive force.

To meet the duty element of the crime of reckless endangerment, the state must prove that the officer had a duty to act to protect Brown in the circumstances presented. The state did not establish such a duty here.

Although the common law did create a duty to act to protect the public in certain circumstances, including in cases of riot and affray, the state has not pointed this court to any authority establishing a common law duty to act to protect a member of the public from a spontaneous, unforeseeable assault by a third person committed in the officer’s presence. The Baltimore Police Department policies are similarly unavailing. These broadly phrased policy statements do not establish a legal duty that Nguyen owed to protect Brown, as a member of the public, in the circumstances presented.

The existence of a special relationship provides an exception to the general rule that a law enforcement officer owes duties only to the public and not to individual members of the public. A special relationship between an officer and an individual typically arises in two ways: (1) when an officer affirmatively acts to protect an individual, inducing specific reliance on police protection or (2) when an officer takes custody of a person, depriving them of their normal ability to protect themselves.

Here, the state argues that Brown was in Nguyen’s custody, but the record does not support that claim. Without custody, there was no special relationship, and without a special relationship, there was no duty owed directly to Brown.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland reversed.

DISSENT: Relying on the type of duty necessary to establish civil tort liability for a police officer, the majority essentially concludes that police officers may have a duty to protect the public in certain circumstances, but not individuals, unless the police officer has a special relationship with the individual such as the individual being in an officer’s custody. I disagree.

Freedom of Information; government instrumentality

BOTTOM LINE: Where an entity established by the General Assembly to manage an art collection given to the City of Baltimore essentially operates as a fiduciary carrying out a charitable purpose, it is not a “unit or instrumentality” of Baltimore City, and thus is not subject to the Maryland Public Information Act.

CASE: Trustees of the Walters Art Gallery Inc. v. Walters Workers United, No. 45, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed July 29, 2025) (Justices Fader, Watts, BIRAN, Gould, Eaves, Killough) (Justice BOOTH dissents).

FACTS: The General Assembly incorporated the Trustees of the Walters Art Gallery as an “educational corporation,” granting it “full and complete control” the Walters Art Gallery, adjacent property and all their contents. Since its formation, the Board has operated the Walters Art Gallery as an institution devoted to preserving and expanding its art collection for the benefit of the public.

This appeal presents a single question: whether the Board is subject to the Maryland Public Information Act, or MPIA, Md. Code Ann., Gen. Provis., or GP, § 4-101 et seq. as a “unit or instrumentality” of Baltimore City. The circuit court concluded that “the Walters is an instrumentality of the government for purposes of the [M]PIA,” and ordered the Walters defendants to respond to the MPIA requests. A divided panel of the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court.

LAW: An entity will be found to be an instrumentality of the state or political subdivision if the “attributes” of the entity’s “relationship with the State [or political subdivision] that point to its being an instrumentality . . . predominate over those pointing to its private character, for purposes of the [entity’s] inclusion in the scope of the [MPIA].”

This court’s case law has identified factors typically relevant to the analysis: the method and purpose of the entity’s formation; operational control by the government; the power to appoint or remove members of the entity’s board; the level of funding received from the arm of the government in question; control of disposition of the entity’s assets upon dissolution; whether the entity performs traditionally governmental functions; tax exemption status; whether the entity has sovereign immunity and whether the entity is represented by government attorneys. These factors are not exhaustive.

Here, an analysis of the relationship between the Board and Baltimore City leads to the conclusion that the Board is not a “unit or instrumentality” of the City within the meaning of the MPIA. To be sure, there are aspects of that relationship that point in the other direction. The Board manages City-owned property for the public’s benefit in City-owned buildings, and receives varying forms of governmental support, including capital funding and contributions toward certain employee benefits.

However, the Board advances the objectives of a private bequest, and the record reflects that it has virtually complete operational independence, as well as substantial financial independence. The City does not appoint or remove the members of the Board, does not control their internal decision-making and does not direct their use of funds or policy priorities. Moreover, no statute names the Board as an entity that is entitled to sovereign immunity or any other form of tort immunity, and the City Solicitor has disclaimed the Board as a City agency.

The IRS’ statements concerning the source of the Board’s tax-exempt status, and similar statements by the Board, while relevant, are not dispositive. Viewed functionally and in context, the Board operates as a fiduciary carrying out a charitable purpose, not as an agent or instrumentality of government executing public policy. On balance, the weight of the evidence supports the conclusion that the Board falls on the private side of the public-private spectrum and therefore is not subject to the MPIA.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland reversed.

DISSENT: In my view, the Trustees of the Walters Art Gallery—which was incorporated by a special legislative act of the General Assembly “for the benefit of the public” as an “agency of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore”—is an “instrumentality” of the City of Baltimore under the MPIA and subject to the provisions of the Act. Applying the non-exhaustive list of factors described in our case law for purposes of determining whether an entity is an “instrumentality” under the Act, I would hold that the “attributes” of its relationship with Baltimore City that point to it being an instrumentality “predominate over those pointing to its private character” for purposes of its “inclusion in the scope” of the Act.

Landlord and tenant; disparate impact

BOTTOM LINE: Where a prospective tenant argued a landlord’s minimum-income requirement had an impermissible disparate impact on housing voucher holders, as compared with non-voucher holders, the circuit court erred when it granted the landlord’s motion for summary judgment.

CASE: Hare v. David S. Brown Enterprises Ltd., No. 32, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed July 28, 2025) (Justices FADER, Booth, Biran, Eaves, Killough) (Justices WATTS concurs) (Justice GOULD concurs).

FACTS: The Housing Opportunities Made Equal, or HOME, Act includes “source of income” to a list of prohibited considerations in the rental or sale of housing.

Ms. Hare is a voucher recipient. She sought to rent an apartment from DSB with a monthly rent of $1,590. Ms. Hare had a housing voucher that would have covered $1,464 of that amount, leaving her responsible for just $126 a month. However, when reviewing Ms. Hare’s rental application, DSB applied a minimum-income requirement by which it required renters to demonstrate monthly income that is at least 2.5 times the monthly rental payment. Ms. Hare’s only source of income outside of her voucher was supplemental security income of $841 per month.

Ms. Hare contends that DSB’s application of its minimum-income requirement discriminates against holders of housing vouchers by requiring them to demonstrate monthly income that is 2.5 times the total monthly rent, rather than 2.5 times the portion of rent for which they are responsible (i.e., the amount not covered by the voucher). She contends that DSB’s application of its minimum-income requirement constitutes disparate treatment discrimination against voucher holders, and that it also has an impermissible disparate impact on voucher holders as compared with non-voucher holders. The circuit court granted DSB’s motion for summary judgment.

LAW: This court agrees with the circuit court that DSB was entitled to summary judgment on Ms. Hare’s disparate treatment theory of liability. Ms. Hare argues that she is similarly situated to non-voucher holders, but that she is treated differently by being made to demonstrate income at a level that is far higher than 2.5 times her portion of rent. But that argument depends on redefining the measuring sticks applied by DSB: (1) from the total market rent for the unit to just the particular tenant’s portion and (2) from total income from all sources to income remaining after applying the voucher.

But DSB’s measuring sticks are facially neutral, and the disparate treatment framework does not allow us to redefine them to match Ms. Hare’s theory. Viewed under the lens of discriminatory treatment, the claim fails. Ms. Hare, like all other applicants, was required to demonstrate income of 2.5 times the total rent due for the unit she sought to lease, with all sources of income aggregated in the same way for purposes of that calculation.

With the disparate impact theory of liability in the case, however, DSB was not entitled to summary judgment solely on the ground that it treated all sources of income identically. When a voucher subsidy leaves a tenant obligated to pay only a portion of total rent, there is reason to doubt whether a minimum- income requirement applied to the full rent obligation bears any relationship to ability to pay. On this record, § 20-704(d)(1) does not support an award of summary judgment in favor of DSB as a matter of law.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County vacated

CONCUR: I would hold that Ms. Hare has demonstrated a prima facie case of source of income discrimination under both disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of discrimination as a voucher holder under DSB’s policy and that DSB is unable to demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the denial of her application or that the challenged policy is necessary to achieve a substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest. I would reverse the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment to DSB and remand the case to the circuit court for further proceedings, i.e., trial.

CONCUR: I join the Court’s opinion but write separately to address two matters. The first matter is the use of secondary sources in appellate opinions. The second matter is to emphasize what the court is not doing in its opinion and, from my perspective, why.

Nuisance; farm odors

BOTTOM LINE: Where residents near a farm complained about odors and midges originating from the farm, but the County Agricultural Board failed to make a determination as to whether the stockpiling and use of materials at the farm violated public health, safety and welfare, that precluded a determination that its decision was supported by substantial evidence.

CASE: In re: Foster Farm, No. 25, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed July 30, 2025) (Justices Fader, WATTS, Biran, Gould) (Justice MCDONALD concurs) (Justices EAVES, Killough dissent).

FACTS: Petitioners are residents of property near and adjacent to the Foster Farm, a farm in Talbot County. They filed a complaint with the Talbot County Agricultural Resolution Board regarding odors from the farm. While the matter was pending, petitioners and others filed additional complaints alleging the existence of swarms of midges originating from the Foster Farm.

The Board consolidated the complaints. It concluded that “the application and stockpiling” of Class A biosolids and soil conditioners “during certain times in 2021[] on the Foster Farm” are “generally accepted agricultural practice[s.]” The circuit court reversed the Board’s decision and remanded the matter to the Board with instructions to find that the agricultural operations on the Foster Farm “were not in existence for one year or more when the complaints were filed,” and that the operations do not benefit from protection under Talbot County’s Right to Farm, or RTF, law, Chapter 128 of Talbot County Code, or Maryland’s RTF law, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc., or CJ, § 5-403.

The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case to the circuit court with instruction to affirm the Board’s decision. It determined that there was substantial evidence “that the agricultural operation, under CJ[] § 5-403(c), had been under way for one year or more when the first complaints were received.” And it determined that “[t]here was substantial evidence to support the Board’s decision that the storage of the biosolids and soil conditioners on the Foster Farm amounted to a protected agricultural operation under TCC § 128” and that there was substantial evidence that the practices at the Foster Farm did not violate the public health, safety and welfare of its neighbors or state law.

LAW: In stating that the issues to be resolved concerned whether the practices at issue conformed to generally accepted agricultural practices and finding that stockpiling and applying the materials to the Foster Farm were generally accepted agricultural practices, the Board explicitly resolved the complaints against the Foster Farm based on the county’s RTF law, not the state’s RTF law.

Even though the circuit court addressed the applicability of CJ § 5-403 and found that the Board’s findings constituted an erroneous application of the statute, no question concerning the applicability of CJ § 5-403(c) had been decided by the Board, and no issue as to the application of CJ § 5-403 was before the circuit court or the Appellate Court. This court thus reverses the Appellate Court’s holding with respect to the interpretation and application of CJ § 5-403.

Further, it is not clear from the Board’s opinion that the Board considered whether stockpiling or storing of greater quantities of materials than that which could be applied at the Foster Farm is a generally accepted agricultural practice and that there is insufficient information in the record for the Board to have determined that this is a generally accepted agricultural practice.

In addition, the Board failed to make a determination, as required under TCC § 128-2, as to whether the stockpiling and use of materials at the farm violated public health, safety and welfare, which precludes a determination that the Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. For these reasons, the Board’s decision that the stockpiling and application of materials at the Foster Farm and other locations are generally accepted agricultural practices is not supported by substantial evidence.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland reversed.

CONCUR: I join the thorough majority opinion. I write simply to clarify the function of the Talbot County Agricultural Resolution Board under the County right-to-farm law.

DISSENT: The court overreaches by substituting its judgment for that of the Board. I would hold that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Board’s findings that the practice of both stockpiling and applying certain biosolids and soil conditioners on Foster Farm are generally accepted agricultural practices. The court’s view that the Board failed to make explicit findings as to these issues is incorrect. The Board considered the evidence in the record before reaching its decision, and its actions comported with TCC § 128-2.

Negligence; CQE

BOTTOM LINE: Where a patient was previously diagnosed as having developed a pressure ulcer at a skilled nursing facility, a registered nurse who meets the peer-to-peer requirement of CJP § 3-2A-02(c)(2)(ii)1A may attest in a certificate that a breach of the applicable standards of nursing care at the facility proximately caused the pressure ulcer, provided that the nurse’s opinion consists of a nursing diagnosis and does not address medical causation.

CASE: Canton Harbor Healthcare Center Inc. v. Robinson, No. 22, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed July 29, 2025) (Justices Fader, BIRAN, Gould) (Justice WATTS concurs) (Justices BOOTH, Eaves, Killough concur and dissent).

FACTS: Under Maryland’s Health Care Malpractice Claims Act, a person who has a claim against a health care provider for damage due to a medical injury must go through an arbitration process. As part of that process, unless the sole issue in the claim is lack of informed consent, the claimant must file a “certificate of a qualified expert . . . attesting to departure from standards of care, and that the departure from standards of care is the proximate cause of the alleged injury[.]”

The question in this case is whether a registered nurse may be qualified to attest to these matters in a claim against a skilled nursing facility for negligently allowing a patient to develop pressure ulcers. The circuit court answered no.

The Appellate Court of Maryland held that, in negligence cases alleging breach of nursing standards for preventing and treating pressure ulcers, a registered nurse is not disqualified per se to attest that failure to adhere to such standards proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries. It vacated the order of dismissal and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings.

LAW: Where a patient was previously diagnosed as having developed a pressure ulcer at a skilled nursing facility, a registered nurse who meets the peer-to-peer requirement of CJP § 3-2A-02(c)(2)(ii)1A may attest in a certificate that a breach of the applicable standards of nursing care at the facility proximately caused the pressure ulcer, provided that the nurse’s opinion consists of a nursing diagnosis and does not address medical causation.

Here, according to the Report, Mr. Robinson was diagnosed by Canton Harbor staff as suffering from pressure ulcers that he developed while a patient at Canton Harbor. Nurse Jones-Singh meets the peer-to-peer requirement to the extent she attests to alleged breaches of care by Canton Harbor’s nurses. She does not meet the peer-to-peer requirement to the extent she attests to the standards of care applicable to Canton Harbor’s physicians and to the physicians’ alleged departures from those standards of care.

A review of the certificate and attached report shows that Nurse Jones-Singh attested to alleged breaches of care by Canton Harbor’s nurses and to those breaches having proximately caused Mr. Robinson’s pressure ulcers. In so doing, Nurse Jones-Singh did not make a medical diagnosis. Because the certificate meets the requirements of the Act, Mrs. Robinson’s negligence claim may go forward.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed.

CONCUR: I agree with the majority that the circuit court erred in dismissing the complaint in the case. I also would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland. But, because I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court for different reasons than the majority, I write separately.

DISSENT: I agree with the plurality that a registered nurse cannot attest in a certificate of qualified expert to the standard of care applicable to a physician or that the physician departed from that standard of care. I also agree that the plaintiff’s registered nurse expert is a “health care provider” under CJ § 3-2A-01(f)(1) and is qualified to attest to the breach of the standard of care for nurses. However, I disagree that the record establishes that Nurse Jones-Singh was qualified in this case to attest “that the departure from [the] standards of care is the proximate cause of the alleged injury” as required by CJ § 3-2A-04(b)(1)(i).