4th Circuit: Victim statements; qualified immunity

Criminal; victim statements

BOTTOM LINE: Where a teacher convicted of child exploitation, possessing child sexual abuse material and cyberstalking argued the trial court erred when it allowed certain testimony from the victims’ parents at sentencing, this argument was rejected. The trial court has broad discretion, and stated that it weighed only the portions of the parents’ testimony relevant to its 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) analysis.

CASE: United States v. Bendann, Case No. 25-4033 (filed June 25, 2026) (Judges DIAZ, Agee, Quattlebaum).

FACTS: This case arises from a teacher grooming, exploiting and stalking a minor student. After a six-day trial, a jury convicted Christopher Kenji Bendann of child exploitation, possessing child sexual abuse material and cyberstalking.

LAW: Bendann first argues the district court abused its discretion by declining to order a competency evaluation when Bendann experienced suicidal ideation leading up to trial. This court disagrees.

As the district court explained, there’s a fine line between “the effects of a mental disease or defect and . . . understandable distress, even resistance to the circumstances a person is in when they are the subject of a federal grand jury indictment on serious charges and are proceeding to trial.” And not all distress that warrants mental healthcare compels a competency inquiry.

Bendann was frustrated with the legal system and anxious about the severe penalties he faced. But he never expressed or displayed any difficulty understanding the proceeding or engaging with his lawyers. Nor did Bendann offer evidence that he lacked the capacity to consult with and assist his lawyers. If anything, Bendann’s critiques and occasional snark “demonstrat[ed] a mind that [was] razor sharp,” and showed that he was “quite aware of the circumstances and issues” in his case.

Accepting that Bendann experienced suicidal thoughts leading up to trial, every other record fact militates against incompetency. As the district court found, Bendann (1) had no record of mental instability, (2) behaved appropriately in court and (3) expressed nuanced grievances with the legal system. And although Bendann was often demanding and sometimes flippant, he was never irrational.

Bendann next says the court should have suppressed evidence obtained from his iPhone because the government discovered the phone’s passcode through an unlawful interrogation. This court again disagrees.

Bendann fairly emphasizes the intimidating nature of the early-morning search: as the district court found, a weapon-bearing SWAT team entered Bendann’s home around 5 a.m. and handcuffed him undressed in his living room. Detective Markel told Bendann about the search warrant but wouldn’t show it to him. And she told Bendann the warrant authorized her to use his “face and hands to unlock his electronic devices.”

But by the time Markel approached Bendann with the iPhone, Bendann was uncuffed, clothed and had been chatting politely with her. Markel didn’t hold the phone up for long, she didn’t say anything and Bendann entered his passcode within seconds.

On these facts, this court can’t find that Bendann’s will was so overborne that he would have felt compelled to enter his passcode. It thus agrees with the district court’s assessment that Bendann “voluntarily, perhaps even reflexively, enter[ed] the passcode.”

Bendann next insists that the government didn’t produce Jencks material for Wallace Halpert, one of several of the student’s classmates who testified. At trial, Halpert said that he gave a statement to law enforcement, but he wasn’t sure whether his interviewers took notes. The government, for its part, said it produced all the Jencks material it had.

For a court to compel the government to produce purported Jencks material, the defendant must “make a sufficiently specific request and provide some indication” that a Jencks statement exists. To lay a foundation that the statement exists, the defendant must show (usually through cross-examination) that the witness reviewed and formally approved the notes of his interview. Bendann didn’t lay such a foundation.

Bendann finally asserts the district court abused its discretion by allowing the parents’ testimony about Bendann’s choice to exercise his trial right and the student’s mother’s testimony that she couldn’t return to work after learning of the abuse. But there are few limits on the evidence a district court can receive at sentencing. That’s because district court judges are trusted to weigh evidence appropriately based on their experience and training. As the district court said it would, it weighed only the portions of the parents’ testimony relevant to its 3553(a) analysis. This court is satisfied that the court appropriately protected both the victims’ rights to be heard and Bendann’s right to a fair sentence.

Affirmed.

Employment; qualified immunity

BOTTOM LINE: Where two Black officers alleged a Maryland State Police drug task force supervisor allowed a racial hostile work environment, the supervisor was denied qualified immunity. The alleged facts established a constitutional violation, that was clearly established.

CASE: Gordon v. Heath, Case No. 23-2232 (June 24, 2026) (Judges GREGORY, King, Thacker).

FACTS: Don Gordon and Terrell Jones are two Black officers formerly assigned to a multi-agency Maryland State Police, or MSP, drug task force. Gordon and Jones brought this action against MSP and their supervisors, including Sergeant Heath, who co-led the unit, participated in the exclusionary practices and failed to address the racially charged text message.

The district court dismissed the race discrimination claims but allowing the Title VII hostile work environment claim to proceed against MSP and the § 1981 hostile work environment claims to proceed against Heath and a corporal (Oros) in their individual capacities, and denying qualified immunity. In this interlocutory appeal, Heath challenges that denial of qualified immunity.

LAW: Qualified immunity generally shields officials from liability unless their conduct violates clearly established law. Courts apply a familiar two-step inquiry that asks (1) whether the facts alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right and (2) whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.

The amended complaint plausibly alleges that Heath violated Gordon’s and Jones’s § 1981 rights (enforced through § 1983) by participating in and tacitly authorizing a racially hostile work environment. On plaintiffs’ account, the harassment was severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of their employment, affecting not only compensation and opportunities, but also their ability to perform safely and effectively in the field. As alleged, Heath’s own conduct contributed to that environment both through his participation in the exclusionary practices and his failure to intervene in the face of overtly racial harassment.

Plaintiffs identify as two Black officers, and they allege that from early on in their tenure on the task force, they were excluded from the informal meetings and group text chains where more desirable assignments and overtime opportunities were circulated to white officers. They also allege that in the immediate wake of George Floyd’s killing and the national controversy that followed, Oros circulated to the group a demeaning image of George Floyd—and that Heath, a co-leader with authority to act, did nothing and continued the same exclusionary practices toward plaintiffs.

On those assumed facts, the relevant question is whether a reasonable supervisor in law enforcement would have understood that participating in and perpetuating such a racially hostile work environment by tacit authorization violates clearly established law. This court finds that a reasonable supervisor would have. This court has recognized—notably in a policing context—that discriminatory mistreatment in a police unit can present through exclusion from the informal channels that structure day-to-day work.

Campbell puts public supervisors on notice that discrimination in law enforcement settings can manifest through exclusion from informal team channels through which information and support flow, and differential treatment tied to operational backup can be evidence of discriminatory mistreatment, not merely social friction. This is plainly analogous to plaintiffs’ allegations of exclusion from the informal meetings and group texts where desirable assignments and opportunities were distributed, and their allegation that the resulting mistrust affected their ability to work safely in the field.

This court’s hostile work environment cases also gave clear notice that supervisory authority may itself aggravate discriminatory harassment when those with authority ratify, reinforce or fail to correct the misconduct. A reasonable supervisor would likewise have been on notice that discriminatory harassment need not take the form of an explicit racial slur to be obviously unlawful when viewed in context.

Finally, a reasonable supervisor would have been on notice that discriminatory intent may be inferred from the cumulative context of workplace conduct, even when individual acts appear facially neutral in isolation. Taken together, these authorities leave “no legitimate question” that a reasonable MSP supervisor would have understood that continuing to exclude the only two Black officers from career-advancing communications and opportunities, while failing to respond to an overtly race-coded text message in the wake of a nationally consequential event, violates clearly established law.

Affirmed.