Supreme Court of Maryland: Plain error, expert testimony, foreclosure, more

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Appeals; collateral order doctrine

BOTTOM LINE: An order denying a claim of sovereign immunity that can be resolved as a pure matter of law meets the criteria of the collateral order doctrine.

CASE: Board of Education for Wicomico County v. Sturm, No. 54, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed June 23, 2026) (Justices FADER, Watts, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, Killough).

FACTS: The Child Victims Act of 2023, or CVA, removed all time limitations on bringing claims arising from child sexual abuse. Following passage of the CVA, Rhonda B. Sturm, brought tort claims against the Board of Education for Wicomico County for sexual abuse she alleges she suffered as a minor student between 1967 and June 1971.

The Board moved to dismiss, claiming that it retains sovereign immunity for tort claims arising from conduct that occurred before July 1, 1971, the date on which the General Assembly first authorized it to obtain insurance that covered such claims. The circuit court denied the Board’s motion, and the Board appealed. The Appellate Court of Maryland dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

LAW: Sovereign immunity is an immunity from suit, not merely liability, that only the General Assembly may waive. If an arm of the state is forced to litigate a lawsuit to final judgment before obtaining review of an order denying its claim to sovereign immunity, the state will have lost the protection from suit that sovereign immunity provides in a manner that an appellate court cannot effectively remedy.

Because a waiver of sovereign immunity is beyond the authority of the judiciary, an order denying a claim of complete sovereign immunity must be immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. This court therefore recognizes an exception to its holding in Dawkins v. Baltimore City Police Department, 376 Md. 53 (2003), for orders denying claims of complete sovereign immunity made by the state and its agencies and instrumentalities that meet all four prongs of the collateral order doctrine and can be resolved as a pure matter of law. In adopting this exception, this court joins many other courts in recognizing that orders denying claims of sovereign immunity meet the criteria of the collateral order doctrine.

Turning to the merits, a waiver of sovereign immunity requires both (1) specific authorization by the General Assembly to subject the state to suit and (2) an appropriation of funds or authorization of an independent funding mechanism to pay judgments. Here, assuming without deciding that the General Assembly, in enacting the CVA, specifically authorized suit against county boards of education based on conduct that occurred before July 1, 1971, it has neither appropriated funding to pay judgments for such claims nor authorized the county boards to raise funds for that purpose.

Judgement of the Appellate Court of Maryland reversed.

Consumer Protection; Mortgage Lender Law

BOTTOM LINE: Where the General Assembly enacted the Maryland Secondary Market Stability Act of 2025 to “clarify” that passive trusts to which mortgage loans are assigned are not required to obtain a license under the Maryland Mortgage Lender Law, the court now holds the Mortgage Lender Law did not require passive trusts to obtain licensure before the enactment of the Secondary Market Stability Act.

CASE: In re: Scarlett B. Bowman, Misc. No. 26, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed June 23, 2026) (Justices FADER, Watts, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, Killough).

FACTS: This case comes from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland. In that court, Scarlett Bowman filed for bankruptcy. Ms. Bowman listed as an asset a piece of residential real property that is subject to a note and deed of trust held by a creditor passive trust called Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-4, U.S. Bank National Association.

Towd filed a proof of claim asserting the right to collect interest and fees on the mortgage loan, in addition to principal. In response, Ms. Bowman asserted that Towd had forfeited the right to collect interest and fees because it was not properly licensed under the Mortgage Lender Law. Towd did not dispute that it was unlicensed, but argued that no license was required. Because Ms. Bowman’s claim and Towd’s objection raise questions of first impression under Maryland law, the Bankruptcy Court certified two questions of law to this court.

LAW: The General Assembly enacted the Maryland Secondary Market Stability Act of 2025 to “clarify” that passive trusts to which mortgage loans are assigned are not required to obtain a license under the Maryland Mortgage Lender Law. The central question in this case whether passive trusts—trusts that hold assets (in this case, mortgage loans) but that do not actively manage the assets or take on any administrative duties related to them—were required to obtain such a license before the effective date of the Secondary Market Stability Act.

The answer is no. The Mortgage Lender Law did not require passive trusts to obtain licensure before the enactment of the Secondary Market Stability Act. The plain language of the Mortgage Lender Law is unambiguous. It does not require licensure of passive trusts. The provisions requiring licensure apply to “mortgage lenders,” defined to include any person who makes a mortgage loan or is a mortgage broker or servicer. A passive trust, as the term implies and as it is now defined in statute, does none of those things.

No other provision of the Mortgage Lender Law’s statutory scheme renders that language ambiguous. Based on its plain language, the Mortgage Lender Law therefore does not, and before adoption of the Secondary Market Stability Act did not, apply to assignees of mortgage loans that are passive trusts. The subsequent statutory history of the Mortgage Lender Law also supports this plain language interpretation.

Certified questions of law as set forth above.

Criminal; plain error

BOTTOM LINE: Where the Appellate Court reversed respondents’ convictions on a plain-error review, concluding that the testimony of an expert was prohibited by a Maryland Supreme Court decision that was issued after the respondents’ trial, it erred. The respondents did not satisfy the stringent requirements for plain error review.

CASE: State v. Thornton and Dunbar, No. 46, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed June 26, 2026) (Justices Watts, Gould, Eaves, KILLOUGH) (Justices FADER, Booth, Biran concur and dissent).

FACTS: William Thornton and James Dunbar were convicted in the murder of Donnell Brockington. The DNA of both respondents was found on a Desert Eagle 9mm pistol recovered from the front passenger floor of the getaway vehicle. The state’s firearms examiner testified at trial that two cartridge casings, one bullet, and two bullet fragments “were fired with” the Desert Eagle.

Approximately seven months after respondents’ trial, in Abruquah v. State, 483 Md. 637 (2023), this court held that the methodology of the Association of Firearm and Toolmark Examiners could support an opinion that ammunition evidence was “consistent with” having been fired from a particular firearm but could not support an unqualified opinion that the ammunitions fired from that specific firearm. The Appellate Court of Maryland subsequently reversed respondents’ convictions on plain-error review, concluding that the firearms examiner’s testimony “was exactly the kind of testimony that Abruquah prohibits.”

Thornton separately challenges the trial court’s decision to close the courtroom during jury deliberations and to permit only family members from each side to attend the return of the verdict. The Appellate Court rejected Thornton’s public trial claim, finding the closures de minimis.

LAW: Both respondents concede that the expert issue was not preserved below. The Appellate Court nevertheless reversed under plain-error review. But plain-error review requires that the error be “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute[.]”

Here, the admission of the firearms examiner’s testimony was not clear or obvious error at either the time of trial or the time of appeal.

Respondents’ trial took place in November and December 2022. By that point, the legal framework governing the admissibility of expert scientific testimony in Maryland had been the subject of significant change, and the admissibility of conclusive firearms identification testimony specifically was the subject of pending appellate review.

The unsettled state of the law placed the respondents on notice that the issue was open. With Rochkind providing the governing standard, Abruquah pending before this court and the issue being publicly debated, respondents’ counsel had every reason and opportunity to file a pretrial Daubert motion or, at the very least, to object at the time of the testimony. Four attorneys representing four defendants did neither. Plain-error review is not designed to rescue litigants from strategic choices made when the legal landscape is uncertain.

The Appellate Court’s analysis treated Abruquah as having resolved the question of unqualified firearms identification testimony with categorical clarity. It did not. Abruquah was a case-specific Daubert determination based on a particular evidentiary record. Several features of the opinion make this plain on its face. Even setting aside the express terms of Abruquah, the broader landscape of authority confirms that the admissibility of unqualified firearms identification testimony remains the subject of reasonable disagreement.

The Appellate Court imported the evidentiary record from Abruquah, which involved a four-day hearing with extensive expert testimony and multiple scientific studies, into a case in which no comparable record exists, and respondents now ask this court to endorse that approach. Federal courts addressing similar situations have warned against precisely this approach.

Dunbar next contends that the state, as the proponent of the firearms identification evidence, bore the burden of initiating its own Daubert hearing to establish the reliability of the testimony, even in the absence of any challenge by the defense. In Dunbar’s view, the state’s failure to do so constituted preserved error. This court rejects that argument.

Thornton offers a separate argument that he is entitled to de novo review of the firearms identification issue. He bases the argument on the fact that the trial court entertained his Abruquah claim on the merits at the hearing on his motion for a new trial in October 2023. Thornton contends that the merits ruling rendered the issue preserved for purposes of appellate review. The argument fails for several independent reasons.

Turning to the closed courtroom issue, although the closures here were not de minimis, they were justified under the four-part test of Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984). The trial court advanced an overriding interest in juror safety and the integrity of deliberations, supported by three escalating incidents of spectator misconduct. The court’s response was no broader than necessary, considered reasonable alternatives and was supported by adequate findings on the record.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed in part and reversed in part.

DISSENT: I agree that the admission of the firearms examiner’s unqualified opinion was not clear or obvious error; that Kelly v. State, 195 Md. App. 403 (2010), is an apt framework to analyze whether a closure is trivial and that the complete closure of the courtroom when the court read the modified Allen instruction was not trivial. In my view, however, the trial court did not make sufficient findings to support the closure and, as a result, I am unable to conclude, on this record, that the complete closure of the courtroom when the modified Allen charge was given was appropriate.

Damages; number of occurrences

BOTTOM LINE: Where an inmate who suffered serious injuries when he was twice assaulted while incarcerated was awarded $800,000 for damages arising from two incidents within a short time, the award was vacated. Because the jury did not  expressly or necessarily find multiple negligent acts or omissions that were each the proximate cause of specific injuries or damages alleged by the inmate, the circuit court erred in not reducing the verdict to $400,000 to reflect a single incident or occurrence.

CASE: State v. Young, No. 27, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed June 23, 2026) (Justices FADER, Watts, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, Killough).

FACTS: Michael Young suffered serious injuries when other incarcerated individuals attacked him while he was incarcerated. He sued Sergeant Jeremy Wright, Warden Richard Dovey and the State of Maryland, among others, for damages.

A jury found Wright and Dovey negligent and awarded Mr. Young $1,000,000 in damages against each of them. The jury also found the state liable for engaging in or allowing a pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct by its employees, as set forth in Prince George’s County v. Longtin, 419 Md. 450 (2011), and awarded Mr. Young $2,000,000 on that claim.

The Appellate Court of Maryland held that the awards against the individual defendants should have been reduced to a combined $800,000 to comply with the Maryland Tort Claims Act, or MTCA. It also vacated the judgment against the state on the Longtin claim. The court held that Longtin pattern-or-practice claims may be brought against the state, but that Young had failed to present sufficient evidence for the jury to find in his favor on that claim.

LAW: The first issue is whether the circuit court erred in entering judgment against the individual defendants in the absence of a finding that they acted with malice or gross negligence. It did. Absent a finding of malice or gross negligence, or that the individual defendants’ actions were outside the scope of their duty, a judgment in an action covered by the MTCA may be entered against only the state.

The second issue presented concerns the number of “incidents or occurrences” in question, which in turn determines the limits applicable to Young’s damages. This court holds that the circuit court erred in not reducing the verdict to $400,000 to reflect a single incident or occurrence. Under the “cause” test, which this court have applied to claims under the Local Government Tort Claims Act and now adopts with respect to the MTCA, the number of incidents or occurrences depends on the number of non-concurrently acting tortious acts or omissions that proximately cause injuries or damages.

Specifically, where the plaintiff proves only a single negligent act or omission that proximately causes a plaintiff’s injuries or damages, there is only one incident or occurrence under the MTCA. Where a plaintiff proves multiple negligent acts or omissions that proximately caused a plaintiff’s injuries or damages, there still may be a single incident or occurrence under the MTCA if the acts or omissions constitute “continuous and repeated acts of negligence” or if all such negligent acts are causally related, give rise to the same risk or act concurrently to produce the same injury.

Third, where a plaintiff proves that multiple negligent acts or omissions proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries or damages, there will be multiple incidents or occurrences if the acts or omissions are not causally related, introduce different risks and act separately to produce injury or damages. It is the plaintiff’s burden to prove to the trier of fact all elements of their claim.

In this case, Young’s claim of two incidents or occurrences is premised on his contention that Wright engaged in two independent tortious acts, each of which was the proximate cause of a separate attack. However the jury made no such finding, and so the circuit court erred in not reducing the verdict in favor of Mr. Young to $400,000 to reflect a single incident or occurrence.

The third issue is whether plaintiffs may bring so-called “Longtin claims” against the state. The Appellate Court held that such a claim also may be brought against the state, but that Young had not presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find in his favor on that claim.

Before this court, the state sought review of that aspect of the Appellate Court’s decision. However, Young has not sought review of the Appellate Court’s determination that he did not present sufficient evidence to support such a claim. Because the Appellate Court’s sufficiency decision is now final as to Young’s Longtin claim, and he can seek no further review of it, the state’s appeal is moot as to that claim.

Rather than allow Young’s concession of the ultimate merits of his Longtin claim to effectively insulate from this court’s review the determination that such claims may be brought against the state, it vacates the Appellate Court’s opinion to the extent it addresses the viability of a Longtin claim against the state.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland reversed in part and vacated in part.

Evidence; lay expert testimony

BOTTOM LINE: Where a detective testified at the trial of a man charged with distributing a visual representation of a minor engaged in sexual conduct, and the lesser-included offense of possessing such material, about how an IP address is tied to a subscriber and a physical address, that did not cross the line into expert testimony.

CASE: Jun v. State, No. 29, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed June 23, 2026) (Justices Fader, Booth, Biran, GOULD, Eaves, Killough) (Justice WATTS dissents).

FACTS: The state charged Adam James Jun with 10 counts of distributing a visual representation of a minor engaged in sexual conduct and 10 counts of the lesser-included offense of possessing such material. Detective Jonathan Bruce of the Anne Arundel County police department was the state’s primary witness during a four-day bench trial. The state staked its case against Jun on certified records from an internet service provider (Verizon) and a social media platform (Kik), both of which were introduced through and explained by Bruce.

The issue in this appeal is whether Bruce’s testimony about the contents of records produced by an internet service provider and a social media platform required the investigator to be qualified as an expert under Maryland Rule 5-702, or whether his testimony could have been admitted as lay testimony under Rule 5-701. The trial court admitted the records as certified business records and permitted the explanatory testimony as lay testimony.

The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed in a reported opinion. It concluded that the Verizon and Kik records, read alongside the Kik legend, were within the range of perception and understanding of an average layperson, and that Bruce’s testimony amounted to a recitation of those records rather than an expert interpretation of them.

LAW: Detective Bruce’s testimony about the Verizon report, this court finds, required an ability to read, not to interpret. The record was short. It identified the 220 IP address, the subscriber’s name (Adam Jun), the service address in Linthicum Heights, and the email associated with the account. Bruce’s testimony on direct examination recited the information on the face of the document.

To be sure, Bruce also explained what an IP address is and how it ties a subscriber to a service provider and a physical address. In this court’s view, that, too, did not cross the threshold into expert testimony. This court initially agrees that few members of the public could explain the technical aspects of an IP address, such as how an IP address connects users and service providers, and that such technical details are not “common knowledge in modern society.”

Yet, it is not “beyond the ‘ken’ of the average layman” that accessing the internet requires service from an internet service provider, that the service provider knows which subscriber is using its service at any given time and that the subscriber’s account is tied to a physical address (the point where a user accesses the internet). Anyone who has set up home internet service, signed an apartment lease that included Wi-Fi, or paid a monthly Wi-Fi bill understands that their service provider knows who is using its network and where. The court therefore holds that Bruce’s testimony about the Verizon report, including his general explanation of what an IP address is and how it could be tied to a service provider’s subscriber, was properly admitted under Maryland Rule 5-701.

Jun nevertheless argues that Bruce’s testimony interpreting the Kik chat logs—using the Kik-supplied “legend” as a guide—required expert qualification because the logs used arcane field names—“User JID” and “Related User JID.” According to Jun, a jury could understand these terms only with the help of a witness with specialized experience and training, that is, an expert. Jun also points to the trial court’s observation that what the detective was doing was “somewhat akin” to “translating a foreign language.” This court disagrees.

That leaves Bruce’s testimony about the distinction between IPv4 and IPv6 addresses and the “static” character of the 220 IP address. On this narrower point, the court agrees with Jun that such testimony fell within the ambit of expert testimony under Rule 5-702 and therefore was inadmissible as lay testimony under Rule 5-701. The court nonetheless concludes that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

First, the IPv4/IPv6 testimony was narrow in scope and limited in function. Second, the evidence connecting Jun to the 220 IP address and to the Kik account that transmitted the material was overwhelming on grounds independent of the IPv4/IPv6 testimony.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed.

DISSENT: I do not agree with the majority’s holding that the officer’s “testimony about the IP address associated with the defendant’s home and about the content of the chat logs from the social media platform Kik fell within the range of perception and understanding of an average layperson, was largely a recitation of what the records said, and reflected a common-sense connecting of the dots.”

Parent and child; CINA

BOTTOM LINE: A permanency plan of reunification that is established after a disposition in which a child is declared a Child in Need of Assistance and removed from the child’s home is not a permanency plan determined under the relevant statute. As such, a child must be provided a hearing in which a permanency plan is determined pursuant to the statutory requirements within 11 months after a child enters an out-of-home placement.

CASE: In Re: K.B., No. 52, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed June 22, 2026) (Justices Fader, WATTS, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, Killough).

FACTS: The Baltimore County Department of Social Services initiated an action seeking to have an infant, K.B., declared a Child in Need of Assistance, or CINA. The juvenile court sustained the allegations in an amended petition, with mother’s agreement.

After the adjudication/disposition hearing, the Department began providing reunification services to mother. At the initial review hearing, the Department recommended that K.B.’s permanency plan be changed from the sole plan of reunification with a parent to a concurrent plan of reunification and adoption by a relative or non-relative, and a magistrate adopted the recommendation. Mother filed exceptions to the magistrate’s recommendation.

The juvenile court overruled the exceptions and signed an order purporting to change the permanency plan from reunification to a concurrent plan of reunification and adoption by a non-relative. The Appellate Court of Maryland held that the juvenile court established a permanency plan before it should have and reversed the judgment of the juvenile court and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings.

LAW: The issue in this case is whether, after a child is declared a CINA, the juvenile court may change, at an initial review hearing, the permanency plan of reunification, which exists after a disposition in which a child is declared a CINA and removed from the home, to a permanency plan that includes both reunification with the child’s parent and adoption.

After a disposition hearing in which a child is declared a CINA and committed to an out-of-home placement, reunification is the presumptive permanency plan. Because Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-823 and Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 5-525(f)(1) require that mandatory factors be considered by the juvenile court in determining a permanency plan, this court cannot conclude that a presumptive permanency plan of reunification established at disposition is the equivalent of a permanency plan determined under CJ § 3-823. Such a finding would render the requirements for determining a permanency plan under CJ § 3-823 and FL § 5-525(f)(1) pointless.

The court holds that the permanency plan of reunification that is established after a disposition in which a child is declared a CINA and removed from the child’s home is not a permanency plan determined under CJ § 3-823 and that a child must be provided a hearing in which a permanency plan is determined pursuant to the requirements of CJ § 3-823 and FL § 5-525, within 11 months after a child committed under CJ § 3-819 enters an out-of-home placement.

Additionally, all parties are entitled to reasonable notice, prior to a hearing at which a permanency plan will be determined or reviewed, of the date and time of the hearing and that, at the hearing, the permanency plan may be determined or changed, not simply notice after disposition that the permanency plan of reunification may be changed to a different plan at some future point in time. None of the above happened in this case.

Although the court concludes that, in this case, the juvenile court did not consider the FL§ 5-525(f)(1) factors or sufficiently scrutinize the concurrent permanency plan, it recognizes that it is important for the best interests of the children involved that the CINA permanency plan determination process retain flexibility. As such, this court does not set forth a bright-line rule that a juvenile court may never determine a permanency plan at an initial review hearing. With proper notice to the parties concerning the reason for the hearing and appropriate consideration of CJ § 3-823 and FL § 5-525(f)(1) and any other applicable authority at the hearing, the juvenile court may determine a permanency plan at any time within 11 months after a child enters an out-of-home placement.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland.

Real Property; foreclosure

BOTTOM LINE: A borrower may not raise as a post-sale exception a defense to foreclosure that it included or should have included in a pre-sale motion. This includes a claim that the lien is invalid for any reason, including satisfaction of the debt, forgery or other fraud.

CASE: Hallam v. New Life Evangelical Baptist Church, Inc., No. 15, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed June 22, 2026) (Justices Fader, Booth, BIRAN, Gould) (Justices WATTS, Eaves, Killough dissent).

FACTS: William Hallam filed a foreclosure action against New Life Evangelical Baptist Church, Inc. and Turning Point, Inc. concerning parcels of real property in Baltimore City. Prior to the scheduled sale date, respondents raised several defenses to foreclosure.

Their chief contention was that the lender, Kevin Pfeffer, long ago had forgiven the debt upon which the foreclosure action was based. According to respondents, Mr. Pfeffer persuaded New Life’s senior pastor, Reverend Milton Williams, to maintain the satisfied mortgage in Baltimore City land records as a purported lien on the property, supposedly to protect New Life from claims of potential creditors. The circuit court scheduled a hearing at which the parties would litigate the merits of respondents’ defenses and stayed the foreclosure sale to allow the hearing to go forward.

But respondents failed to satisfy a property insurance condition that the circuit court had imposed on its grant of the stay. The court denied respondents’ motion to extend the time to obtain insurance, and the stay dissolved. The sale occurred without the court having ruled on the merits of respondents’ defenses.

In post-sale exceptions, respondents again raised the alleged invalidity of Mr. Pfeffer’s lien. They also added a new allegation of fraud, based on the contention that Mr. Pfeffer had never made a loan to New Life. The circuit court determined that respondents could not raise these claims as post-sale exceptions and ratified the sale. The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing at which respondents would be permitted to prove post-sale that Mr. Pfeffer’s asserted right to foreclose was the product of fraud.

LAW: A borrower must raise a fraud defense pre-sale if the borrower was on notice of facts suggesting such fraud pre-sale. A borrower may not raise as a post-sale exception a defense to foreclosure that it included or should have included in a pre-sale motion.

This includes a claim that the lien is invalid for any reason, including satisfaction of the debt, forgery or other fraud. A borrower may not raise as a post-sale exception a defense to foreclosure that it included or should have included in a pre-sale motion. This rule applies regardless of who purchases the property at the foreclosure sale.

When an order to docket foreclosure is filed, a borrower does not know who the purchaser at the sale will be. Sound policy dictates that a borrower should assume the purchaser will be a third party who has no knowledge of an alleged problem with the lien. Therefore, if a borrower knows or should know of such a problem with the lien pre-sale, the borrower must raise the issue pre-sale.

Respondents argue that a borrower who raises a fraud claim pre-sale, but who does not obtain a ruling on the merits of that claim following the revocation or dissolution of the stay, should be permitted to raise the claim again as a post-sale exception. According to respondents, this court need not be concerned about a third-party purchaser who bids on a property with notice that the borrower filed a pre-sale fraud claim that has not been resolved on the merits. As respondents see it, such a purchaser proceeds at their peril.

Respondents’ approach would chill potential bidders in the same way that allowing a borrower to raise a known fraud claim for the first time post-sale would chill bidders. There are ways for a borrower to seek a pre-sale merits hearing after revocation or dissolution of the stay of a foreclosure sale. If the borrower does not pursue any of those options and the sale goes forward without a hearing and ruling on the borrower’s pre-sale defenses, the borrower may not re-raise a pre-sale fraud claim as a post-sale exception.

Here, respondents could not raise their pre-sale defenses again as exceptions. Nor were respondents permitted to raise their new fraud claim as a post-sale exception. Respondents knew or should have known the facts underlying that claim for more than 20 years. They had to raise that defense pre-sale as well.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland reversed.

DISSENT: I would hold that, although respondents failed to satisfy the conditions of their temporary stay, the circuit court did not make a finding of non-compliance and revoke the stay under Maryland Rule 14-211(c)(1) and that based on this circumstance and the text of Maryland Rule 14-211, respondents remain entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the merits of their fraud allegations. 

Real Property; foreclosure

BOTTOM LINE: Where a landlord argued it was exempt from a Montgonery County licensing requirement because the building was on land that was the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress, such that the County licensure regulations would not apply, but it failed to establish that the property is subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction, its argument was rejected.

CASE: Fort Detrick/Walter Reed Army Medical Center Housing LLC v. Wynn, No. 28, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed June 23, 2026) (Justices Fader, Watts, Booth, BIRAN, Gould, Eaves, Killough).

FACTS: Montgomery County requires that the owner of a residential property located within the County obtain a license before operating the property as rental housing. A landlord that does not possess a required rental license may not file a summary ejectment action. This case involves Fort Detrick/Walter Reed Army Medical Center Housing LLC, an unlicensed landlord, in Montgomery County that filed such an action.

Robert Wynn, the tenant, moved to dismiss the case, based on the landlord’s failure to obtain a rental license. In response, the landlord claimed that it is exempt from licensure because Glen Haven is located on land covered by Article I, Section 8, clause 17 of the United States Constitution. That relatively obscure provision of the Constitution, which is known as the Enclave Clause, provides that certain land is the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress, such that the County licensure regulations would not apply.

The District Court ruled that Glen Haven is exempt from licensure and entered an order of summary ejectment against Mr. Wynn. The Circuit Court reversed the judgment of the District Court. It concluded that the landlord is not exempt from Montgomery County’s licensure requirements as applied to units leased to civilian tenants.

This court granted certiorari to decide whether the Enclave Clause preempts Montgomery County licensure regulations that would otherwise be applicable to Glen Haven and, in particular, to units rented to civilians.

LAW: In the lower courts and in their initial briefs filed in this court, the parties agreed that the property is covered by the Enclave Clause. However that premise now turns out to be debtatable.

The landlord argues that the United States acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the property when it acquired the property by condemnation in 1941 and caused the judgment of condemnation to be recorded in the land records of Montgomery County in or about January 1942. This court disagrees.

The landlord did not establish at trial or in this court that the United States accepted exclusive federal jurisdiction over the property, as required by 40 U.S.C. § 255. Thus, this court cannot conclude that the property is a federal “enclave” subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.

Because the landlord did not establish that the property is subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction, it follows that the landlord also failed to demonstrate that Glen Haven is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States under the Enclave Clause. This, in turn, means that: (1) the landlord did not establish that the Enclave Clause preempts Montgomery County’s licensure requirements as applied to Glen Haven’s rental units; and (2) the landlord did not meet its burden at trial to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it is exempt from licensure.

That being the case, the District Court should have entered judgment in favor of Mr. Wynn. Although this court’s reasoning differs from that of the circuit court, its judgment is affirmed.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County affirmed.