Appellate Court of Maryland: Handgun statute; relation back; sufficiency

Administrative; handgun statute

BOTTOM LINE: Where a Maryland statute pertinently provides that “the Secretary shall issue a permit within a reasonable time to a person who the Secretary finds” “has not been convicted of a felony or of a misdemeanor for which a sentence of imprisonment for more than 1 year has been imposed,” there are no textual indications that an out-of-state offense must be converted to its equivalent Maryland offense and penalty.

CASE: In the Matter of Michael Chase, No. 69, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed July 8, 2026) (Judges Berger, KEHOE, Hotten).

FACTS: Michael Chase applied to the Maryland Department of State Police for a permit to carry a handgun. The Department denied Mr. Chase’s application due to his 2009 conviction in Virginia for conspiracy to commit grand larceny, a felony, in which he received a three-year sentence of incarceration with all but 30 days suspended and two years of supervised probation.

Mr. Chase appealed the denial of his handgun permit application to the Office of Administrative Hearings, or OAH, which affirmed the Department’s denial. Mr. Chase then filed for judicial review in the circuit court, which affirmed the ruling of the OAH and decision of the Department.

LAW: Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-306(a)(2)(i) pertinently provides “the Secretary shall issue a permit within a reasonable time to a person who the Secretary finds” . . . “has not been convicted of a felony or of a misdemeanor for which a sentence of imprisonment for more than 1 year has been imposed[.] Mr. Chase asserts that his Virginia felony conviction for conspiracy to commit grand larceny should be converted to Maryland’s misdemeanor theft under Criminal Law Article § 7-104(g)(2) for “theft of property or services with a value of at least $100 but less than $1,500[.]”

While the language used in § 5-306(a)(2)(i) on its face is unambiguous, its application to out-of-state convictions remains unclear. Must an out-of-state conviction be converted to its equivalent Maryland offense and penalty, as is required in § 5-101(g)? The court concludes that § 5-306(a)(2)(i) is unclear and ambiguous as it relates to the application of § 5-306(a)(2)(i) to out-of-state convictions. To resolve this ambiguity, the court may look to any relevant case law, the statute’s legislative history, the statute’s purpose and structure and how it relates to other similar laws to determine the meaning of the statute.

Taken together, the case law, statutory language, purpose and legislative history make clear that the interpretation of § 5-101(g)(3) cannot be imported to § 5-306(a)(2)(i).

The former focuses on the statutory maximum penalty for an equivalent Maryland offense, which expressly requires an equivalency analysis; whereas the latter relies on the actual sentence imposed in the applicant’s case.

Furthermore, there are no textual indications in § 5-306(a)(2)(i) that an out-of-state offense must be converted to its equivalent Maryland offense and penalty. The deliberate choice to modify the proposed language—changing from “could have been” imposed to “has been” imposed—persuades this court of a legislative purpose to treat these provisions of the Public Safety Article differently. As such, the court holds that § 5-306(a)(2)(i) does not require the Maryland equivalency analysis, as is required under § 5-101(g) for out-of-state convictions.

Because the equivalency analysis is not required under § 5‑306(a)(2)(i), Mr. Chase’s Virginia conviction—classified as a felony with an imposed sentence of three years—disqualifies him from obtaining a handgun permit. Even assuming arguendo that the offense was converted to a Maryland misdemeanor, the sentence imposed exceeds one year. Under any scenario, Mr. Chase is disqualified under § 5‑306(a)(2)(i), and the Department properly denied his Application.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Charles County affirmed.

Civil Procedure; relation back

BOTTOM LINE: Where an individual failed to timely bring or intervene in a wrongful death suit, he could not use the relation back to overcome this failure.

CASE: Vivar v. Dilts, Case No. 82, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed July 8, 2026) (Judges BERGER, Tang, Kenney).

FACTS: Alex Vivar Perez, the son of Juan Carlos Vivar and Cristina Perez tragically passed away on Aug. 30, 2020. On Aug. 16, 2023, Ms. Perez filed a statement of claim, including a wrongful death claim, with the Maryland Healthcare Alternative Dispute Resolution Office, or HCADRO, against the attending physician and two corporate entities.

Thereafter, and pursuant to the relevant statute, Ms. Perez filed the present action in the circuit court on Sept. 22, 2023, in which she named Mr. Vivar as a use plaintiff. On June 7, 2024, Mr. Vivar filed the instant motion to intervene. During a hearing, Mr. Vivar conceded that his motion was untimely under the plain language of both the statutory and served notice deadlines in Maryland Rule 15-1001. Mr. Vivar asked the circuit court to “make new law” by applying the relation back doctrine to relate back the filing of the motion to intervene to the date Ms. Perez initiated the action. The circuit court denied Mr. Vivar’s motion to intervene.

LAW: The parties agree that, pursuant to the plain language of Rule 15-1001(d), to participate in the present action Mr. Vivar was required to file a motion to intervene with the clerk of the circuit court by the earlier of: (1) the statutory deadline or (2) the served notice deadline. Mr. Vivar concedes that the motion to intervene was untimely under either deadline.

Pursuant to Rule 15-1001(e)(2): “[a]n individual who fails to file a complaint or motion to intervene by the statutory deadline may not participate in the action or claim a recovery.” This language unambiguously sets out a process by which an individual’s failure to act before the statutory deadline constitutes waiver. As noted, it is undisputed that Mr. Vivar did not file either a complaint or a motion to intervene by the statutory deadline, Aug. 30, 2023. Accordingly, applying the plain language of Rule 15-1001(e)(2), Mr. Vivar waived his ability to participate in the present action as a party plaintiff.

This court is unpersuaded by Mr. Vivar’s argument that a plain language interpretation is improper because such a result fails to further the legislative intent underpinning Maryland’s wrongful death statute. First, contrary to Mr. Vivar’s assertion, the waiver that results from a plain language application of Rule 15-1001(e)(2) does not ignore the policy of preventing vexation of defendants by multiple suits.

Moreover, had Mr. Vivar acted by filing his own claim after Ms. Perez filed hers but before he was served, the multiple resulting suits could simply be joined into one. Rule 15-1001(e)(2) expressly contemplates this by stating that failing “to file a complaint or a motion to intervene” before the statutory deadline constitutes waiver.

Second, the result of a plain language interpretation here does not ignore the intent to compensate aggrieved families. Rather, Rule 15-1001 lays out the express procedures which eligible individuals must follow to be compensated in a wrongful death action. The fact that a family member may end up not being compensated for such a loss as a result of their failure to comply with the express provisions in Rule 15-1001 does not undermine that intent.

That Mr. Vivar was not served with the complaint and the Rule 15-1001(d) notice until after the statutory deadline passed does not change this court’s conclusion. Critically, Rule15-1001 expressly contemplates that the statutory deadline may, in some cases, be earlier than the served notice deadline. Indeed, the Rule 15-1001(d) notice provides that, to participate as a party plaintiff, a use plaintiff must file a motion to intervene by the earlier of either the statutory deadline or the served notice deadline. The plain language of Rule 15-1001, therefore, contemplates that, at least in some cases, a use plaintiff may not be allotted the full served notice window to decide whether to intervene in the suit.

Even if the statutory deadline is not a condition precedent rendering Mr. Vivar’s claim expired, the relation back doctrine does not apply. If Mr. Vivar was allowed to intervene as a party plaintiff, he would not merely share in the potential damages. Rather, Mr. Vivar may be eligible for additional damages that would pyramid appellee-defendants’ liability.

To be sure, under the wrongful death statute, damages may be awarded for, among other things mental anguish and emotional pain and suffering. A jury may well award additional sums for such damages if there are two, rather than one, party plaintiffs involved. In such circumstances, the relation back doctrine does not apply.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County affirmed.

Criminal; sufficiency

BOTTOM LINE: Where the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for first-degree murder, second-degree murder, first-degree assault, second-degree assault, recklessly discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, using a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence and conspiracy to commit each of those crimes, they were affirmed.

CASE: Carroll v. State, No. 1818, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed July 8, 2026) (Judges Shaw, EYLER, Zic).

FACTS: A jury in the circuit court convicted Berquan Carroll of first-degree murder and other crimes.

LAW: Carroll asserts that an inference drawn from his driving Cottingham and Nunn to Reed’s location that he knew that Cottingham and Nunn were armed or shared their intent to kill or seriously injure Reed is merely conjecture. This court disagrees. The stitch video showed not only that Carroll drove Cottingham and Nunn to Reed’s location but also that he positioned the Honda slightly in front of Reed’s car, the best location for the rear passengers to have Reed in their sightline if they leaned out the windows.

Once so positioned, Carroll stopped the Honda altogether for the entirety of the shooting. There would have been no reason for him to do so had he not known that the passengers were going to shoot Reed and needed the Honda to be still in order to aim their firearms in his direction and hit him.

Jurors rationally could infer from this evidence that Carroll knew of, and shared, his rear passengers’ lethal intent toward Reed and aided them in carrying it out. The same evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable inference that Carroll conspired with Nunn and Cottingham with the intent that the murder be accomplished.

In addition to the above, the stitch video established that, beginning about an hour before the shooting, Carroll and the other three men acted in concert, first meeting at the surface parking lot and all getting into Nunn’s Lincoln. The car Carroll brought to the meet-up had no front license plate and bore a rear license plate that was not registered to any of the men (or anyone at all), making it untraceable.

Carroll spent the next hour as a passenger in the Lincoln as the men drove around Hagerstown. Upon seeing Reed and following him to the road where he parked, the men quickly returned to the surface parking lot where they exited the Lincoln and climbed into the untraceable Honda, with Carroll behind the wheel. Carroll drove the three men directly back to Alexander Street where, as explained above, he positioned the Honda to facilitate the shooting.

Immediately after Reed collapsed from his injuries, Carroll began driving again, fleeing the scene of the shooting. As before, he drove directly back to the surface lot where the other two cars were parked, making only one brief stop to let Cottingham and his dog out of the vehicle. At the lot, Carroll immediately removed the license plate from the rear of the Honda and then left with Walker, abandoning the Honda.

The evidence recounted above showed that the group of four men acted together to find Reed, follow him, return to their meet-up site to retrieve an untraceable vehicle, and return to Reed’s location in that vehicle, with Carroll at the wheel, to shoot Reed with lethal force. From this evidence, rational jurors reasonably could infer that Carroll and at least Nunn and Cottingham agreed to commit the charged crimes and that Carroll acted as an accessory, with a shared intent for Reed to be killed. Given that the evidence, direct and circumstantial, permitted a rational inference of an agreement to kill Reed, and that Carroll shared Nunn’s and Cottingham’s lethal intent and knowingly aided them in carrying out Reed’s murder, the evidence was legally sufficient to support all of Carroll’s convictions.

Carroll takes the position that the nine month postponement from Aug. 25, 2022, to May 22, 2023, was inordinate, and that the analysis of that issue must be based only on what was known at the time the postponement was granted, on July 26, 2022, and nothing more. This court disagrees. In deciding whether the postponement resulted in an inordinate delay, we can take into account the “circumstances of the case,” including the intervening event of Carroll’s suggestion of incompetency. That intervening event made it impossible for Carroll’s trial to commence at any time before October 2023.

Finally, Carroll contends the circuit court violated his right to be present at a critical stage of his trial when it held the July 26, 2022, scheduling conference without his being present. Because defense counsel acquiesced in Carroll’s absence from the scheduling conference, his right to be present, if any, was waived.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Washington County affirmed.